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ABSTRACT 
Patterns of Violence: Narratives of Occupied East Timor from Invasion to Independence, 
1975-1999 
M. Scott Selders, M.A. 
Concordia University, 2008 
In October 2005, the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in 
East Timor (CAVR) released Chega!, its massive report detailing the human rights 
violations committed on all sides during the 1975 to 1999 Indonesian occupation of East 
Timor. Chega! offers the most comprehensive description of this history of East Timor 
during this period. 
This thesis examines the CAVR's treatment of three major events of the 
occupation period. These events are the Indonesian invasion and conquest of East Timor 
(1975-1979), the Santa Cruz massacre (November 12,1991), and the Popular 
Consultation (1999). For each of these events, the thesis analyzes four major narrative 
strands: the East Timorese narrative, the Indonesian narrative, the journalists' narrative, 
and the truth commission's narrative. The focus is on evaluating the current CAVR 
treatments of these events in light of previous work, as expressed in the other narratives. 
The East Timorese truth commission sought to find patterns to the violence of the 
occupation. In the case of the invasion, it offered an extensive discussion of human 
rights violations committed by the East Timorese resistance, showing how the population 
suffered from both Indonesian war crimes and suicidal resistance policies. The 
Commission's treatment of the Santa Cruz massacre focused on what the killings showed 
about the makeup of the second generation of the resistance, which was devoted to a 
iii 
diplomatic, rather than military, resolution to the East Timorese conflict. Finally, when 
discussing the Popular Consultation, the CAVR sought to reveal the planning behind the 
mass destruction of 1999 and to show that the militia violence was not anarchic, but 
rather conformed to quantifiable aims and strategies. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia)—Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Army, Navy, Air Force, Police). 
Apodeti {Associaqao Popular Democrdtica Timorense)—Timorese Popular Democratic 
Association. 
ASDT {Associaqao Social Democrdtica Timorense)—Timorese Social Democratic 
Association. 
CAVR (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliaqdo de Timor Teste)— 
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor. 
CNRM {Concelho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere)—National Council of Maubere 
Resistance. 
CNRT {Concelho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense)—National Council of Resistance 
of the People of East Timor. 
Falintil {Forqas Armadas de Tibertaqdo Nacional de Timor Teste)—National Liberation 
Armed Forces of East Timor. 
FEER—Far Eastern Economic Review. 
Fretilin {Frente Revoluciondria do Timor Teste Independente)—Revolutionary Front for 
an Independent East Timor. 
Gadapaksi {Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi)—Youth Guard for Upholding Integration. 
Gestapu {Gerakan September Tigapuluh)—Movement of September Thirtieth. 
INTERFET—International Force in East Timor. 
Kopassus {Komando Pasukan Khusus)—Special Forces Command. 
KPN {Komisi Penyelidik Nasional)—National Commission of Inquiry. 
KPP HAM {Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur)— 
Investigative Commission on Abuses of Human Rights in East Timor. 
PKI {Partai Komunis Indonesia)—Indonesian Communist Party. 
Rp.—Rupiah. 
vi 
TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia)—National Army of Indonesia (Army, Navy, Air 
Force). 
UDT (Uniao Democrdtica Timorense)—Timorese Democratic Union. 
UNAMET—United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor. 
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INTRODUCTION: INDONESIA, EAST TIMOR, AND THE 
MEANING OF NARRATIVE 
On October 31, 2005, Aniceto Guterres Lopes, Chair of the Comissdo de 
Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliagdo de Timor Leste (Commission for Reception, 
Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor, CAVR), presented his Commission's report, 
Chega!, to East Timor's President, Jose Alexandre (Xanana) Gusmao.1 The ceremony 
completed a process begun in August 2000, when East Timor's National Congress 
authorized a truth and reconciliation commission to address East Timor's legacy of 
suffering and violence arising from civil war and brutal Indonesian rule. By giving 
expression to East Timor's "individual and collective nightmares," Chega! became the 
newest addition to and version of the territory's historical narrative, versions of which 
had been vehemently fought over throughout the occupation.2 
Indonesia: The New Order (1965-1998) 
Knowledge of modern Indonesia, and of the New Order government that ruled it 
for thirty-two years, is a prerequisite for any understanding of East Timor, as their 
histories are inextricably bound together during much of the twentieth century. 
1
 Lopes defined "Chega" as a "Portuguese word.. .which roughly translates to 'no more, stop, 
enough!' "; Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor (hereafter CAVR), 
"Preface," <http://www.ictj.org/static/Timor.CAVR.English/00--Preface.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2006), 
p. iii. Under Indonesian rule, East Timor was known as "Timor Timur." Independent East Timor refers to 
itself as "Timor-Leste" (in Portuguese) or "Timor Lorosa'e" (in Tetum). Because neither of these phrases 




In late 1965, the Republic of Indonesia witnessed "one of the bloodiest 
inaugurations of a new regime anywhere in the world." In less than two years, the 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, 
ABRI), especially the Army, supported and directed the mass killing of members of the 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI).4 The immediate cause of 
the bloodletting was a mysterious coup attempt on September 30, 1965, when a group of 
disaffected officers, calling themselves the "September Thirtieth Movement," abducted 
and murdered six of the country's senior generals. However, the "Movement" was 
exceedingly ill-run, allowing Army units, under Major-General Suharto, to prepare a 
counter-stroke against what Suharto called the Gestapu {Gerakan September Tigapuluh, 
Movement of September Thirtieth), a grammatically awkward term meant to stir Nazi 
connotations. 
By the evening of October 1, Suharto's forces had taken control of the capital, 
Jakarta. Army-controlled newspapers immediately accused the PKI of engineering the 
coup.6 The actual extent of Communist involvement in the coup remains uncertain, but 
3
 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order, 
3rd edition (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 34. 
4
 From 1957 to 1965, Indonesia was ruled by a presidential dictatorship under the charismatic 
nationalist, Sukarno. His Guided Democracy rested on a balance of power between the PKI, which by 
1965 had become the world's largest non-ruling Communist party, and ABRI. Guided Democracy pushed 
Indonesia into economic collapse, international isolation, chronic domestic instability, and the Konfrontasi 
war with the British in Malaysia. See M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the 
present (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 245, 254-268; Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New 
Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42, 3 
(May 1983): pp. 484-486; Ken Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces (Jakarta: Equinox 
Publishing, 2003), pp. 92-105, 109, 131, 154-161; Adrian Vickers, A History of Modem Indonesia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 144-156. 
5
 The events of the coup are surveyed most fully in Ricklefs, pp. 268-271; Conboy, pp. 131-140; 
Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, pp. 16-24; Roland Challis, Shadow of a Revolution: 
Indonesia and the Generals (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2001), pp. 79-104; Vickers, pp. 156-157. 
6
 Specifically, the Army accused members of the PKI Women's Movement of sadistically 
torturing the officers to death, after which they engaged in a bloodstained orgy; Jacques Leclerc, "Girls, 
girls, girls, and crocodiles," in Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia, ed. Henk 
Schulte Nordholt (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), pp. 291-305, especially 297-299. These allegations were 
2 
is, to a great degree, academic.7 Its actual culpability was much less important than the 
fact that many Indonesians believed in such culpability. From 1965 to 1966, an estimated 
500,000 Indonesians, condemned by association with the PKI, were put to death in a 
o 
combination of communal frenzy and Army massacre. This was a society-wide project 
of mass murder, a response not only to the abortive coup, but to years of social 
polarization and resulting paranoia, "the expression of a... society placed under such 
intolerable pressure that it erupted in a kind of temporary mass psychopathy."9 Of 
course, the Army cannot be absolved of responsibility for the massacres of 1965 and 
1966, as it was the ABRI-created Gestapu myth that justified the mass slaughter and 
Army units that played a critical part in mobilizing and arming the population for mass 
killing.10 
effectively refuted by Benedict R. O'G Anderson; Benedict R. O'G Anderson, "How did the generals die?" 
Indonesian (April 1987): pp. 109-134. 
7
 Anderson and Ruth T. McVey were the first scholars to question the Army's version of the coup 
in their so-called "Cornell Paper" of 1966. They argued that the coup was primarily an internal Army affair 
that inadvertently allowed Suharto and other anti-Communist officers to scapegoat the PKI for their own 
political ends. Anderson and McVey's thesis continues to be influential; see Ernst Utrecht, "The Military 
Elite," in Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia, ed. Malcolm Caldwell (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 
1975), pp. 41-43; Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (St. Leonards: Allen & 
Unwin, 1994), p. 20; Challis, pp. 91-92; Vickers, pp. 156-160. Other Indonesianists, however, argue that 
the PKI had compelling reasons to either sponsor or direct a coup; see Ricklefs, pp. 267-271; Conboy, pp. 
109, 131, 134. An excellent survey of the various interpretations of the coup is Harold A. Crouch, 
"Another Look at the Indonesian 'Coup'," Indonesia 15 (April 1973): pp. 1-20. Such debates indicate that 
most events in Indonesian history spawn a host of conflicting explanations and scenarios: "[n]o major 
political event passes in Indonesia without spawning at least two or three, and often many more, 
interpretations of what happened and who was behind it"; David Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State 
Authority in Indonesia," in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman (Clayton: Monash 
University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 192. 
8
 Five hundred thousand is the most widely-cited estimate of the death toll. The number is 
explained in Robert Cribb, "How Many Deaths?: Problems in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia (1965-
1966) and East Timor (1975-1980)," in Violence in Indonesia, eds. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer 
(Hamburg: Abera, 2001), pp. 82, 86-88, 90-92. 
9
 Robert Cribb, "Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966," Asian Survey 42, 
4 (July 2002): p. 554. 
10
 Robert Cribb, "Introduction: Problems in the historiography of the killings in Indonesia," in The 
Indonesian Killings of 1965-1969: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb (Clayton: Monash 
University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 16, 26; Conboy, pp. 147-148; Hamish McDonald, 
Suharto's Indonesia (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981), pp. 52-53. 
3 
By April 1966, Suharto had effectively taken control of Indonesia's government, 
banned the PKI, and begun to purge ABRI and the bureaucracy of all vestiges of 
Communist influence.11 By the end of 1966, the Army ended Konfrontasi, thereby 
restoring some of the Indonesia's international respectability.12 In 1968, Suharto became 
Indonesia's second President, inaugurating the New Order government, which would rule 
Indonesia for over thirty years. 
Repression and Development 
Analyses of the New Order generally fall into two camps, one of which sees 
Suharto's regime as a military dictatorship maintained through violence, while the other 
portrays the New Order as an authoritarian regime that brought real economic progress to 
Indonesia. The greatest expression of the New Order's homicidal tendencies was the 
massacres that marked its beginning. Repression and violence remained inseparable from 
the New Order's method of rule, although the regime never subjected the country as a 
whole to another bloodletting on the scale of the mid-1960s. A 1994 Amnesty 
11
 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup," Pacific Affairs 43, 1 
(Spring 1970): p. 44; McDonald, pp. 53-57. At least 100,000 suspected Communists remained imprisoned 
in Indonesia in 1975; Carmel Budiardjo, "Repression and Political Imprisonment," in Ten Years' Military 
Terror in Indonesia, ed. Malcolm Caldwell (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), p. 100. The mass 
killings had, meanwhile, run their course by the end of 1966, although verifiable reports of Communist-
related unrest and harsh military countermeasures continued until 1969; Kroef, pp. 34-60; Ernst Utrecht, 
"The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) since 1966," in Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia, ed. 
Malcolm Caldwell (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), pp. 275-295; McDonald, pp. 60-62. 
12
 McDonald, pp. 57-60. Army leaders had covertly curtailed Konfrontasi even before the 
abortive coup. Two of the officers most involved in these efforts, Ali Murtopo and Leonardus Benyamin 
("Benny") Murdani, had close ties to Suharto and became his "fixers and troubleshooters"; Vatikiotis, 
Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 30. Also see Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military: Structure, Procedures, 
and Effects on Indonesian Society," in Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, eds. Karl D. 
Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 64-65. 
13
 It is important to note that these two analyses are not mutually exclusive. According to 
Vatikiotis, Western foreign aid, so crucial to Indonesia's economic growth, was prompted by donors' 
"gratefulness] for the stability a strong government guaranteed. The New Order's obsession with order 
has been one of its best selling points in the corridors of western finance"; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics 
under Suharto, p. 48. 
4 
International report detailed "human rights violations on a staggering scale" throughout 
Indonesia, including extra-judicial executions, torture, and political imprisonment.14 The 
report also placed the blame for this violence squarely on ABRI, which it stated to be the 
dominant power in the Indonesian government.15 Studies of the Indonesian military 
reveal that its heavy presence in the ruling apparatus was based on its self-conception. 
ABRI embraced dwi-fungsi ("dual function"), which meant, according to A. Hasnan 
Habib, an Indonesian Lieutenant-General, that it was responsible for both external 
defense and a "socio-political function."16 The military perceived itself as the founder of 
the Republic, those who had led the "people's war of independence" against the Dutch in 
the 1940s when the civilian nationalist leadership proved unable to do so.17 ABRI, and 
especially the Army, saw itself, in Michael R. J. Vatikiotis's words, as "the co-founder" 
1 ft 
of the modern Indonesian state with an inherent right to participate in domestic politics. 
The New Order can be seen as the ultimate fulfillment of the dwi-fungsi ideal, as 
for most of the period ABRI was the "single strongest institution in the country."19 In 
Amnesty International, Power and Impunity: Human rights under the New Order (New York: 
Amnesty International, 1994), p. 1. 
15
 Ibid., pp. 36-37,41. 
16
 A. Hasnan Habib, "The Role of the Armed Forces in Indonesia's Future Political 
Development," in Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s, eds. Harold Crouch and 
Hal Hill (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1992), p. 85. 
17
 Ibid., p. 88. In late December 1948, Sukarno and other nationalist leaders allowed themselves 
to be captured by the Dutch, hoping their imprisonment would spark an international outcry. In this they 
proved correct, but ABRI never forgave the civilian leaders for surrendering to Dutch forces while the army 
fought on; Ricklefs, p. 218; Challis, p. 39. 
18
 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 70. For more on dwi-fungsi, see Peter Britton, 
"The Indonesian Army: 'Stabiliser and Dynamiser,' " in Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's 
'AcceleratedModernisation,'' ed. Rex Mortimer (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1973), pp. 83-
84; Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, "The Military and Democracy in Indonesia," in The Military and Democracy 
in Asia and the Pacific, eds. R. J. May and Viberto Selochan (Bathurst & London: Crawford House 
Publishing & C. Hurst & Co. [Publishers] Ltd., 1998), p. 31. 
19
 Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Chandra, A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military 
Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, 
Cornell University, 1999), p. 7. For details of ABRI's dominance of the government, see Sundhaussen, pp. 
51 -52; David Reeve, "The Corporatist State: The Case of Golkar," in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, 
5 
addition to its political representation, ABRI under the New Order was a dominant 
economic force. Suharto made sure that lucrative business opportunities were farmed 
out to each of the service branches, thus giving officers and soldiers a major stake in the 
maintenance of the regime.21 Certain units were favored recipients of largesse, prime 
examples being the elite reserve and Special Forces battalions. Once again, this made 
good political sense: Suharto had close personal ties with both divisions and ensured that 
they remained under his direct command.22 Implicit in this system, in both its repressive 
and financial aspects, was the idea that the Indonesian people could not be trusted, and 
therefore needed ABRI to keep them in line. It was also foreseeable that any non-
compliance with this vision of a "passive" population, of people acting, in effect, "against 
their own best interests," as defined by the state, would be met with violence.23 Even 
when the military's political role was circumscribed, beginning in the mid-1990s, it still 
ed. Arief Budiman (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 165; 
Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, pp. 70-71. 
20
 Even under Guided Democracy, the Indonesian military had significant economic concerns, 
including special units devoted to running its smuggling operations, a tactic necessitated not only by greed, 
but also by the fact that central government budget allocations were never adequate to meet ABRI's 
operational needs. Even in the 1980s, it was estimated that ABRI derived at least one-third of its budget 
from smuggling; Ricklefs, pp. 249, 255-256; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 72; Challis, 
p. 190. 
21
 Sundhaussen, p. 55; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 72. Crouch described the 
process thus: "[Suharto] Allies were rewarded, potential dissidents were brought over while recalcitrants 
were cut off from business opportunities"; Harold A. Crouch, "Military-Civilian Relations in Indonesia in 
the Late Soeharto Era," in The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Viberto 
Selochan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 57. Suharto had already developed this practice while in 
command of Central Java's Diponegoro Division in the 1950s. He proved so successful at linking the local 
economy to the Division's finances that a nervous high command transferred him; Vatikiotis, Indonesian 
Politics under Suharto, pp. 15-16. 
22
 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 77. Military control of Indonesia's economy 
was among the greatest criticisms directed at the New Order. See Britton, pp. 91-98; Challis, p. 177. 
23
 Robert E. Elson, "In fear of the people: Suharto and the justification of state-sponsored violence 
under the New Order," in Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary violence in historical perspective, 
eds. Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 
177-178, 193. 
6 
remained incredibly influential politically, ready to defend the state against anything it 
perceived to be a threat. 4 
The second analytical trend of the New Order describes how the state achieved 
impressive economic development. According to political scientist R. William Liddle, it 
was Suharto's economic policies that "undoubtedly accounted] for much of the positive 
support for the regime." Suharto struck a bargain with the Indonesian population: 
accept his government's "repression and control," and it would deliver "accelerated 
economic development and modernization."26 Proponents of the New Order could thus 
justify its repressive polices as a means of keeping the Indonesian population out of 
politics and focused on development tasks.27 
Almost immediately after coming to power, Suharto, advised by a group of 
Indonesian economists, instituted measures to curb hyperinflation and to boost exports. 
These measures were so successful that Indonesia became "something of a model of 
Third World development."29 From a purely statistical perspective, it is easy to see why. 
Under Suharto, Indonesia's infrastructure developed at a remarkable pace. Basic 
24
 For ABRI's declining political power, see Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, pp. 
211-212. 
25
 R. William Liddle, "Coercion, Co-optation, and the Management of Ethnic Relations in 
Indonesia," in Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, eds. Michael E. Brown 
and Sumit Ganguly (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 311-312. 
26
 Robert Cribb, "From Petrus to Ninja: Death Squads in Indonesia," in Death Squads in Global 
Perspective: Murder with Deniability, eds. Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2000), p. 188. Rupert Emerson saw the New Order as part of a new wave of Asian 
nationalism, one that defined national greatness not in struggle against a foreign power, but in quiet 
economic advancement; Rupert Emerson, "Post-Independence Nationalism in South and Southeast Asia: A 
Reconsideration," Pacific Affairs 44, 2 (Summer 1971): p. 190. 
27
 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. xi. According to Ali Murtopo, bans on popular political 
activity were necessary so that people did not "spend their valuable time and energy being involved in the 
political struggles of parties and groups, but [instead] will be occupied wholly with development efforts"; 
Sundhaussen, p. 50. 
28
 McDonald, pp. 75-79. 
29
 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 35. 
30
 The economic data in this paragraph is found in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 57-60; 
Shalendra D. Sharma, "The Indonesian Financial Crisis: From Banking Crisis to Financial Sector Reforms, 
7 
education was, theoretically, available to all; the percentage of the population living in 
poverty fell dramatically; infant mortality decreased; and Indonesia achieved self-
sufficiency in rice production. By the 1990s, Indonesians were healthier than they had 
ever been; many had access to medical care; average daily caloric intake had increased 
from 2,035 in 1968 to 2,781 in 1990; and life expectancy had risen to 63 years (1995) 
from 46 years (1970). Throughout the New Order, Indonesia's economic growth 
averaged almost seven percent per year, a growth rate among the most impressive in the 
region. Its shipping lanes were clogged with traffic as forty percent of the world's 
international commerce passed through Indonesian waters annually. Business 
opportunities for Western companies exploded. By 1994, according to Foreign Minister 
Ali Alatas, the United States alone was "export[ing] more to Indonesia than to Eastern 
Europe," and had "invested over $30 billion.. .in the ASEAN [Association of South-East 
Asian Nations] region," of which Indonesia was the prime member.31 
Many Indonesianists point out that these advances needed to be qualified. The 
most oft-cited criticism of the New Order's economy was the fact that it institutionalized 
corruption throughout the Indonesian government and society, effectively mutilating the 
country's economic advances. Journalist Adam Schwarz stated that the New Order's 
biggest economic problem was cronyism. He suggested that many Indonesians did not 
object to the fact that Suharto used the "spoils of office" to buy off potential rivals and 
1997-2001," Indonesian (April 2001): pp. 81-83; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, pp. 34-
47, 57-58; Challis, pp. 4-5; Vickers, pp. 184-196. 
31
 Ali Alatas, "Sharing Responsibilities with a Superpower (Excerpts from a keynote address at a 
Conference launching a public education project, 'The Uncovering of Indonesia'; New York, 13 April 
1994)," in A Voice for a Just Peace: A Collection of Speeches by Ali Alatas (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka 
Utama, 2001), p. 528. 
8 
keep allies happy, such were the prerequisites of power. However, by the 1990s, many 
Indonesians felt that cronyism had gone too far, as Suharto's children gained access to 
incredibly lucrative monopolies in petrochemicals, construction, shipping, and 
agriculture. 
In hindsight, the Indonesian economy was also highly susceptible to external 
economic shocks. Economic growth was heavily dependent on high oil prices. When 
prices were high, as during the early 1990s, Indonesia's gross domestic product grew 
quickly. This growth, however, disguised the fact that a significant portion of state-
owned businesses (at least two-thirds, by one estimate) were financially unsound. 4 The 
financial system was also weak; banks had been deregulated and ignored existing 
regulations assuming that the government would bail them out if things went bad.35 For 
most of the 1990s, such confidence seemed justified and Suharto's power secure. Yet, 
consequent events would show that when the New Order's economic achievements were 
called into question, the stability of Suharto's rule was not far behind. 
The New Order Falls: The Economic Crisis and the May Revolution 
When the Thai baht depreciated on July 2, 1997, many economic analysts 
believed that the Indonesian economy was strong enough to avoid the turmoil.36 Such 
expectations were quickly proven wrong. Within a month of the baht's depreciation, 
32
 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 135-137. At a very basic level, Suharto ensured that every 
first-echelon bureaucrat received a small monthly allowance directly from him; new Ministers also received 
Rp.l billion when they joined the Cabinet; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 112. 
33
 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 135-139, 141-144, 151-153; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics 
under Suharto, pp. 151-153; Vickers, pp. 201-203. 
34
 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 60-66. 
35
 Sharma, pp. 86-90. 
36
 Hal Hill, "The Indonesian economy: the strange and sudden death of a tiger," in The last days of 
President Suharto, eds. Edward Aspinall, Gerry van Klinken, and Herb Feith (Clayton: Monash Asia 
Institute, 1999), p. 15. 
9 
bank runs erupted in Indonesia, and by October, with the Indonesian rupiah in free fall, 
the government was forced to negotiate a bailout agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). It was clear that the New Order was institutionally incapable of 
responding to the economic crisis. With the country unable to pay its bills (when the 
rupiah was devalued in the summer of 1997, Jakarta's short-term foreign debt, alone, 
amounted to more money than was currently in circulation) and thousands of Indonesians 
slipping back into poverty, the government stalled on reform. Businesses and banks 
linked to Suharto's family and cronies, no matter how debt-ridden, were usually protected 
from closure. Then, in March 1998, Suharto, despite ill health, began his seventh term in 
office. As Vice-President, he selected B. J. Habibie, a long-standing associate who had 
previously headed Indonesia's technological development programs. Habibie lacked the 
support of ABRI and was not popular among international economists. By this point, 
Suharto's rule was clearly detrimental economically and he seemed increasingly out-of-
touch.37 
The government's ineffective response to the economic crisis led to increasingly 
T O 
strident public protests, especially by students. On May 12, 1998, a clash between 
Most of the information in this paragraph is taken from Sharma, pp. 90-103. The effects of 
Suharto's health on the exchange rate are described in Hill, "The Indonesian Economy," p. 17; Patrick 
Walters, "Suharto's endgame," in The last days of President Suharto, eds. Edward Aspinall, Gerry van 
Klinken, and Herb Feith (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), p. 21. Information on Indonesia's 
crippling foreign debt is from Gerry van Klinken, "From go-go to yo-yo," in The last days of President 
Suharto, eds. Edward Aspinall, Gerry van Klinken, and Herb Feith (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), 
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students and police outside Jakarta's Trisakti University left four students dead. Over 
the next two days, Jakarta was convulsed by riots and looting. On May 19, students 
occupied Parliament's grounds, vowing to stay until Suharto quit. ABRI remained 
publicly loyal to Suharto and warned demonstrators that they were courting "their own 
Tiananmen" by protesting.40 Nevertheless, the students remained at the Parliament, a 
visible, and increasingly popular, symbol of mass rejection of Suharto's rule.41 
The Indonesian President desperately maneuvered to keep power, but his 
promises of new elections failed to satisfy the 30,000 student protestors encamped around 
Parliament.42 Even national legislators began to turn against him.43 With public support 
gone and ABRI increasingly unwilling or unable to guarantee his hold on power, Suharto 
submitted his resignation of May 21, 1998, making Habibie Indonesia's third President.44 
The New Order was over. 
Analysts were divided about how to view the prospects of post-Suharto Indonesia. 
Some heralded the beginning of a "democratic moment" when "almost anything seems 
possible," including democracy and redress for past crimes.45 Others focused on the 
39
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significant difficulties faced by the Habibie Administration.46 This combination of 
opportunity and uncertainty also prevailed in East Timor in 1998, just one example of 
how the territory's history paralleled developments in Indonesia. 
East Timor: Colonialism, War, and Independence 
Just over ten years after the massacre of the PKI, East Timor became a central 
component of the New Order's history.47 This paper will analyze three major events in 
East Timor's modern history: the Indonesian invasion of 1975, the Santa Cruz massacre 
in 1991, and the Popular Consultation of 1999, which resulted in East Timor's 
independence from Indonesia but left the territory devastated by Indonesian-sponsored 
militias. Before describing these events in detail, it is necessary to elaborate on East 
Timor's history as part of the Portuguese Empire. 
East Timor comprises half of an island in the south of the Indonesian 
archipelago and was a Portuguese colony in the midst of the Dutch East Indies. The 
methods and effects of Portuguese colonialism are debated by scholars; however, all 
agree that Portugal cared little about East Timor.49 Portuguese neglect persisted well into 
the twentieth century: 93 percent of the population was illiterate in 1973, infrastructure 
released political prisoners, lifted restrictions on freedom of the press and assembly, and began limited 
denunciation of past military abuses; Challis, pp. 206-207. 
46
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was minimal at best, and East Timor was "the most economically backward colony in 
Southeast Asia."50 Yet, James Dunn, Australian Consul in East Timor from 1962 to 
1964, ultimately offered a positive view of Portuguese colonialism, doubting that East 
Timor would have done any better under Dutch rule.51 Indonesian West Timor was 
hardly a comparative model, being a backwater in the Indonesian Republic; indeed, 
economic activity was brisker and medical care was better in East Timor that in West 
Timor. By the mid-1970s, Dunn also pointed out, life in East Timor was dramatically 
improving. The number of schools and students had soared (although educated Timorese 
remained an incredibly small portion of the population) and East Timorese increasingly 
participated in public life as journalists, clergy, or soldiers; clearly, East Timor's 
"backwardness" was "exaggerated." 
On April 25, 1974, Portugal's dictatorship was overthrown in the Carnation 
Revolution. The new government made decolonization a priority and legalized 
indigenous political parties. Within weeks, several parties had been set up in East Timor, 
each representing a different option for the colony's future. The first to form was the 
Uniao Democrdtica Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union, UDT) on May 11, whose 
platform called for East Timor to form a federation with Portugal.5 A second party was 
founded on May 20: the Associacdo Social Democrdtica Timor ense (Timorese Social 
Democratic Association, ASDT), which called for independence.55 In September 1974, 
the ADST changed its name to the Frente Revoluciondria do Timor Leste Independente 
50
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(Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, Fretilin), reflecting a radicalization 
of its politics, especially a more strident anti-colonialism. By this point, it was the largest 
party in East Timor.56 The third significant party, the Associaqao Popular Democrdtica 
Timorense (Timorese Popular Democratic Association, Apodeti), was founded in late 
May 1974. It advocated merging with Indonesia, albeit with a special status, freedom of 
speech, and the right to strike. Apodeti remained by far the smallest of the three parties, 
and would not have survived without Indonesian support.57 
Throughout the following months, the new parties struggled to solidify their 
bases, the Portuguese sought decolonization, and Indonesia became involved in the 
situation.58 The literature widely holds Indonesian machinations responsible for the 
destabilization of East Timor.59 Beginning in 1974, Indonesia began broadcasting pro-
Apodeti propaganda across the border, accusing the UDT and Fretilin of being "fascist" 
and "Communist," respectively. This propaganda campaign was clumsy and 
counterproductive since these terms were alien to many Timorese and the common threat 
of Indonesia led to a UDT-Fretilin coalition in January 1975.60 However, Indonesian 
56
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propaganda laid the groundwork for its version of events in East Timor and found a ready 
audience abroad. 
The UDT-Fretilin alliance only lasted a few months, and its disintegration has 
generally been blamed on Indonesian interference. In fact, the UDT had compelling 
reasons to break the coalition. The alliance had never been strong, as both parties 
maintained their own foreign policy apparatuses, which had radically different 
approaches to foreign affairs, especially regarding Indonesia, where the UDT's contacts 
in ABRI increasingly warned about Fretilin's Communist leanings.62 UDT leaders were 
also anxious about Fretilin's populism. The Front had begun literacy campaigns, formed 
unions, and instituted agricultural cooperatives throughout the countryside, measures that 
enjoyed widespread popular support and whose socialist tinge worried the other political 
parties.63 
Despite any indigenous divisions, however, the final break between Fretilin and 
the UDT was initiated by Indonesia. ABRI effectively forced the UDT's hand in early 
August 1975, when Indonesian intelligence chief Ali Murtopo informed its 
representatives, incorrectly, that Fretilin was preparing a coup for August 15; he added 
that if the coup went ahead, Indonesia would not stand idly by. UDT leaders launched 
their own coup on August 11, not, as Indonesia would later claim, to advance integration 
61
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with the Republic, but to forestall Indonesian military action. East Timor plunged into 
civil war.64 
The Civil War lasted from August 11 to September 24, 1975, ending with a 
decisive Fretilin victory as the Front's forces expelled their political opponents from East 
Timor, forcing them to take refuge in Indonesian West Timor. The Indonesians quickly 
forced these anti-Fretilin Timorese to sign a petition calling for integration with 
Indonesia.65 Fretilin was now in control of East Timor, the Portuguese having fled during 
the conflict. They faced enormous challenges: most civil servants had left with the 
Portuguese and Indonesian Special Forces were conducting cross-border raids. These 
attacks were meant to destabilize the Fretilin government and create the impression that 
the Civil War was still raging. Although this was "sheer fabricated nonsense," the 
64
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perception of continuing civil war in East Timor dominated international coverage and 
diplomatic versions of events.66 
Faced with a full-scale border war and neglected by the international community, 
Fretilin unilaterally declared independence on November 28,1975, hoping that this act 
would focus international attention on the territory, as well as give their soldiers 
something to fight for.67 The next day, its political opponents in West Timor issued a 
Declaration of Integration with Indonesia under the watchful eyes of Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Adam Malik and senior ABRI officers. On December 7, Indonesia invaded East 
Timor. 
Invasion and Aftermath (1975-1979) 
The Indonesians estimated that the conquest of East Timor would take three 
weeks.68 ABRI began committing atrocities against the East Timorese population the 
moment its units landed in the capital of Dili, with Indonesian soldiers gunning people 
down in the streets and conducting executions at the wharf. Yet, Fretilin's resistance 
was much stronger than the Indonesians had anticipated, so much so that when 
Indonesia's Parliament declared East Timor the Republic's twenty-seventh province in 
July 1976, ABRI controlled neither the majority of East Timor's territory nor its 
population.70 ABRI attempted to rectify this situation with a major offensive beginning 
66
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in September 1977, which specifically targeted East Timorese civilians, destroying their 
crops and herding them into "resettlement centers." ABRI overran Fretilin's last major 
stronghold around Mount Matebian at the end of 1978. Civilians who had sheltered 
behind Fretilin lines surrendered en masse and joined their fellow Timorese in the 
resettlement centers. By 1979, the population of these camps reached an estimated 
300,000 persons, and famine raged.71 Indonesia turned this horrific situation to its 
advantage, using the famine as a bargaining chip in its struggle for international 
recognition of its sovereignty over East Timor.72 In this, Jakarta was generally 
successful, as the international community, valuing good relations and economic ties with 
Indonesia, effectively granted de facto recognition to Indonesia's claim.73 
The Santa Cruz Massacre (November 12, 1991) 
By 1979, the East Timorese resistance was apparently defeated. Indonesia sealed 
off the territory, limiting both travel to and news originating from East Timor, a ban that 
applied to both the outside world and to Indonesians themselves.74 The occupation of 
East Timor should have ceased to exist as an international issue and although this never 
quite happened, the plight of the East Timorese was something the major powers could 
ignore. 
Yet, for all the military's repression, East Timorese resistance to the occupation 
persisted. While small guerilla units continued to operate in the bush, major resistance 
71
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activity shifted to the cities and to East Timor's youth. This shocked the Indonesian 
authorities, who thought that the geragao faun, or "younger generation" of East 
Timorese, would have been supporters of integration. According to Indonesian logic, 
most Timorese born before the invasion would resent the loss of independence for the 
rest of their lives. However, their children, who had matured knowing nothing but 
Indonesian sovereignty, would be much more acquiescent. Raised speaking bahasa 
Indonesia and having been educated in the New Order's schools, the geragao faun would 
surely accept Jakarta's rule.75 In this thinking, the Indonesians were deeply mistaken. 
In November 1991, a Portuguese parliamentary delegation was scheduled to visit 
East Timor. The visit was cancelled at the last minute, as the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry objected to the inclusion of Jill Jolliffe in the delegation's journalist 
contingent.77 Many Timorese had been anticipating the visit and were bitterly 
Jusuf Wanandi, a high Indonesian government official, reflected this mindset thus: "Forget 
about this [1975] generation....They will never love us. We need to wait until the next generation comes of 
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disappointed. On October 28, 1991, two East Timorese, including an eighteen-year-old 
named Sebastiao Gomes, were killed in a clash with ABRI. The resistance organized a 
funeral march in his memory on November 12. When the procession, now numbering 
several hundred persons, reached Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery, they were fired upon by 
Indonesian troops.79 ABRI initially stated that 19 persons had been killed and ABRI's 
Commander, General Try Sutrisno, called any declarations to the contrary pure 
"bullshit."80 Outside observers never accepted this estimate, with Amnesty International 
later calculating that 270 had been killed on November 12 and in following days.81 
The massacre might have remained relatively unknown if not for the presence of 
foreign journalists, on hand to cover the cancelled Portuguese visit. Video of the Santa 
Cruz massacre "proved to have more immediate political impact than the mountains of 
written evidence accumulated by human rights organizations on the sixteen previous 
years of brutal Indonesian rule." The international outcry forced Jakarta to convene the 
Komisi Penyelidik Nasional (National Commission of Inquiry, KPN), which concluded 
that, while ABRI had overreacted, troops had been "provoked" by the marchers. The 
report was widely denounced as a whitewash, with Amnesty International calling it 
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"fatally flawed" and "unacceptable," and stating that the KPN had effectively endorsed 
military force as a justifiable reaction to dissent. 
In the long term, the massacre forced Indonesia to moderate certain occupation 
policies. Suharto personally relieved two of the top generals in East Timor and expressed 
his condolences to the families of the dead. Increased international attention to East 
Timor also prevented the execution of resistance leader Xanana Gusmao in 1992, and the 
regime was forced to allow a group of East Timorese who "invaded" the U.S. Embassy in 
o r 
1994 to go into exile in Portugal. In East Timor itself, the massacre "radicalized a new 
generation of East Timorese. It destroyed the myth that the very real economic 
development in East Timor had as its corollary the greater acceptance of integration" and 
ensured that East Timorese opposition to the occupation could not be so easily ignored as 
in the past.86 
Popular Consultation and Independence (1999) 
The fall of Suharto created a sense of potential in East Timor. Less than a month 
after the dictator's resignation, former Australian diplomat James Dunn wrote an article 
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in which he characterized the Habibie government's handling of East Timor as a 
"barometer" of its "sincerity and commitment to democratic reforms."87 In January 1999, 
Habibie issued a surprise proposal offering autonomy for East Timor, which meant 
control over a wide range of government affairs excepting foreign and fiscal policies and 
national defense. Habibie was greatly motivated by the "increasing sense [in some 
quarters of the government] that the East Timor issue was causing more trouble than it 
QO 
was worth." The occupation was expensive, took a great deal of manpower to maintain, 
and sapped international goodwill towards the new Indonesian government, and thus 
affected the flow of economic aid. To many Indonesian officials, resolving the East 
Timor issue relieved a headache that had persisted for decades.89 
For years, Indonesia and Portugal had been pursuing negotiations under United 
Nations (UN) auspices. Habibie's autonomy proposal quickly resulted in an agreement 
on May 5, 1999. The East Timorese would vote on whether to accept or reject autonomy; 
if they rejected, independence would follow. The most controversial component of the 
May 5 Agreement was Indonesia's insistence that it handle security during the vote; 
United Nations personnel, who would conduct voter registrations and count the ballots, 
would be in East Timor under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The United Nations' 
acceptance of these terms has been heavily criticized, with many wondering how the 
organization could trust the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (National Army of Indonesia, 
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TNI), given its record of human rights violations. Yet others, especially UN personnel, 
maintained that Indonesia would not have signed any agreement had the international 
organization not acquiesced to its continuing military presence during the ballot. Further, 
no one knew if this chance would ever come again, and so the United Nations decided to 
take a calculated risk in order to carry out the vote.91 On June 11, 1999, the Security 
Council created the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to 
fulfill the conditions of the May 5 Agreement. 
It was immediately clear to observers that the TNI was anything but impartial in 
its enforcement of security. The Indonesian Army, especially Kopassus, created and 
funded militias that carried out violent acts, including massacres, preceding the vote in 
August 1999.92 Their goal was to secure a favorable result, either support for autonomy, 
or such a narrow vote for independence that Indonesia might argue that it could not 
abandon the pro-integrationists to the mercy of their anti-autonomy fellows. Despite 
These criticisms are found in Geoffrey Robinson's "With Unamet in East Timor: A Historian's 
Personal View," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32, 1-2 (January-June 2000): p. 26; and " 'If You 
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referring to the armed forces. 
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the TNI's official denials, many officers and civilian leaders made no secret of their 
support for the militias, openly attending pro-integrationist rallies and issuing arms to 
militias. Militia leaders themselves also bragged about the support offered by the Army. 
The TNI's plausible deniability was, therefore, ludicrous, and its international reputation 
further stained by its actions. Given these negative repercussions, why did the military 
go to such obvious lengths to secure a favorable vote? 
The answers to this question lay in both the TNI's institutional culture and in the 
interests of specific units, in this case Kopassus. The majority of the TNI's members had 
served in East Timor. Letting the East Timorese go would therefore have invalidated 
the sacrifices made by Indonesian soldiers. Military leaders also feared that East Timor's 
separation from Indonesia would begin a chain reaction leading to the disintegration of 
the Republic. In this scenario, East Timor's secession gave impetus to other separatist 
movements, specifically in restive Aceh and Irian Jaya, whose importance to the 
conjunction with silencing the minority pro-independence lobby. Moore concluded that the Army was 
seduced by its own propaganda, and was therefore incredibly astounded when the voting went against 
integration; Moore, pp. 9-44. This was, of course, not the only time that the military had allowed its false 
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Indonesia had poured a massive amount of resources into East Timor. The results of the Popular 
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fruits of this development policy as an independent nation? Thus, East Timor burned. 
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Republic, both politically and economically, was significantly greater than East 
Timor's.95 
The control of East Timor's economy at a unit-based level also contributed to the 
military's reluctance. East Timor's provincial economy, as in all other parts of Indonesia, 
was farmed out to certain military units, in this case to Kopassus.96 East Timor in effect 
became the Special Forces' fiefdom and developed what Roland Challis, a BBC 
Southeast Asia correspondent, disparagingly called a "plantation" economy.97 Lucrative 
indigenous industries, especially coffee cultivation, were seized by the Special Forces, 
which purchased the crop at artificially low prices, then sold it on the international 
market for a substantial profit.98 By the early 1980s, it was estimated that the Special 
Forces derived at least US$30 million per year from its coffee monopoly.99 While these 
profit margins had decreased by the late 1990s, Kopassus's economic attachment to East 
Timor undoubtedly contributed to its willingness to defy Habibie's and the world's hopes 
for a smooth vote. 
Ultimately, all attempts to terrorize the Timorese population into voting for 
continued membership in the Republic failed. An astonishing 98.6 percent of registered 
voters turned out on August 30. The results were conclusively in favor of independence, 
with 78.5 percent of the voters rejecting Habibie's autonomy proposal. Immediately 
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Challenges," Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, 1 (April 2000), Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, 
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following the announcement of the results, the militias embarked on an orgy of violence, 
as the TNI either stood by or joined in. Dili was burned; Timor's infrastructure 
destroyed; and most of the population displaced, with at least 200,000 East Timorese 
crossing the border into West Timor.100 Under intense diplomatic pressure, including 
from Indonesia's long-term allies such as the U.S., Indonesia eventually agreed to allow 
peacekeepers into East Timor. The UN-backed International Force in East Timor 
(INTERFET) landed in Dili on September 20, 1999. It found a devastated territory. A 
World Bank document, compiled in late 1999, reported that 70 percent of East Timor's 
"administrative buildings have been partially or completely destroyed," while 75 to 80 
percent of the schools were damaged or destroyed. The health system was also wrecked: 
the vast majority of doctors had fled the territory, and all medical equipment had been 
removed. East Timor might have gained its independence, but it had nearly been 
destroyed in the process.101 
This evacuation is among the most puzzling aspects of the post-ballot events. William 
Shawcross called it "ethnic cleansing Indonesian style," an attempt by the TNI to partition East Timor, 
annexing its Western-most districts to Indonesia; William Shawcross, "From Kosovo to East Timor," in 
Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict (New York: Simon & 
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The Narratives: Meaning and Structure 
The analyses of these three events—the Indonesian invasion, the Santa Cruz 
massacre, and the Popular Consultation—occupy the remainder of this thesis. I will 
examine a series of narrative strands which purported to explain these case studies. For 
each, I will analyze four different narratives: the East Timorese, the Indonesian, the 
journalistic, and the truth commission's. I do not aim to construct a master narrative of 
the occupation, as attempts to do so already exist and space does not permit, but rather to 
show how the four narratives nourished and influenced each other, both through their 
similarities and their differences. 
I have had to be selective in my sources. So much has been written about East 
Timor that I can only present snapshots of writing about the occupation. This is not 
necessarily a drawback, as "[b]road generalizations and the use of ideal types are crucial 
to causal explanation; otherwise source material would become mired in descriptive 
detail."103 Nor will equal space be devoted to each narrative. While all their perspectives 
were undeniably crucial to East Timor's story, they were not all important at the same 
time. The starting point for my use of narrative is offered by Donald Brenneis, who 
discussed narratives in conflict situations, pointing out that conflicts automatically spawn 
several different stories, none of which can be taken as objective. Despite these 
difficulties, however, conflict narratives offer an invaluable guide to how "participants 
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define, clarify, and comprehend troubled relationships and troubling events." And 
according to Hayden White, it is only through studying conflicting narratives, which he 
terms "complex set[s] of codes," that one arrives at "a story infinitely rich in suggestion 
and variety of affect."105 Narratives are necessary to create a "story" that can be studied 
by historians.106 Despite their subjectivity, narratives provide an invaluable tool for 
understanding the construction of a conflict, a construction that is often capable of 
influencing events themselves. This was certainly the case in the narratives about East 
Timor. 
The East Timorese Narrative 
The main thrust of the East Timorese narrative concerns resistance activities. 
Indeed, much of the literature about the occupation chronicled the East Timorese struggle 
against the Indonesian invaders. Most authors are unabashedly pro-Timorese, and while 
not ignoring the Civil War, minimize its story in favor of descriptions of Indonesian 
repression. I have suggested that, while the Indonesians cannot avoid responsibility for 
events in 1975, neither were the East Timorese passive instruments. Suicidal policies 
were common behind Fretilin lines throughout the late 1970s. In September 1977, 
Fretilin's President, Xavier do Amaral, was arrested for "high treason" and replaced by 
Nicolau Lobato, who declared Fretilin a Marxist organization. The Front purged itself of 
"counter-revolutionaries," which almost always meant supporters of do Amaral, and was 
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thus distracted from the war against Indonesia. If Fretilin was not Communist before 
the invasion, as Indonesia liked to claim, it certainly became so after. Not every 
Timorese saw this as a positive development. 
In Chapter 1, covering the invasion period, I discuss three sources. The first two, 
by resistance leader Xanana Gusmao and by UDT member Arsenio Ramos-Horta, speak 
directly about the troubles arising from Timorese political divisions. Gusmao was an 
early member of Fretilin, yet was greatly disturbed by the Front's political repression. 
Arsenio Ramos-Horta, the brother of Jose Ramos-Horta, one of the ASDT's founders, 
had been captured by Fretilin during the Civil War and spent three years as its prisoner. 
His autobiography, while containing several demonstrably false pro-Indonesian claims, 
nevertheless offers an insightful look at Fretilin's disastrous radicalization. The third 
source is a book by Arsenio's brother, Jose Ramos-Horta, the resistance's roving 
diplomat, who worked tirelessly to bring international attention to the plight of East 
Timor. His is a chronicle of the world's indifference to the situation in East Timor and as 
such fits well with other accounts that portrayed the resistance as extinct in the late 
1970s. 
Chapter 2, discussing the Santa Cruz massacre, opens with the memoir of 
Constancio Pinto, a leader of East Timor's clandestine urban resistance and one of the 
prime organizers of the march that ended with the massacre. Pinto's book reveals the 
evolving tactics of the East Timorese resistance, specifically how the Timorese who 
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matured in the 1980s perceived themselves and their place within Indonesia. This section 
also includes analysis of an anonymous email that circulated on Indonesian university 
campuses in the wake of the massacre. This email was written specifically for 
Indonesians, using their language and anti-colonial rhetoric to expose the hypocrisy of 
the country's own brutal colonial practices in East Timor. As such, the source 
demonstrates how East Timorese nationalists used Indonesian occupation policies as a 
tool to protest the Indonesian occupation. 
The third chapter focuses on the Popular Consultation. As of yet, there is no 
single source representative of Timorese experiences during the 1999 events. This 
section therefore employs interviews and news reports about the Popular Consultation to 
show how Timorese perceived their circumstances. It then discusses post-ballot efforts at 
reconciliation in East Timor, attempts by the newly independent Timor to come to grips 
with its violent past in order to forge a new nation. 
The Indonesian Narrative 
In Chapter 1,1 will describe Indonesia's efforts to ensure that its version of 
Fretilin as a Communist movement became the accepted worldwide image of events in 
East Timor. I illustrate this point using recently declassified records of conversations 
between U.S. President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Indonesian 
President Suharto, in which the leaders discussed the looming Communist threat in Asia 
following the fall of Saigon and in which Suharto effectively linked developments in East 
Timor to Cold War anxieties. I then trace how Indonesia successfully sold Fretilin's 
Communist credentials to the wider world, specifically through an analysis of the 
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conservative Australian journal Quadrant, which openly advocated East Timor's 
integration by referencing the anxieties of the Cold War. 
A major consequence of the Santa Cruz massacre was the shredding of Indonesian 
conceptions that they had bought Timorese loyalty through development projects. In 
Chapter 2,1 examine Indonesian portrayals of its development efforts in East Timor using 
two booklets issued for international consumption by the Indonesian government in the 
early 1980s. While these sources predate the massacre, they are useful for providing 
glimpses of how the Indonesians cast the benefits of integration. I will also discuss how 
this government line was questioned within Indonesia itself, specifically in two 
Indonesian academic studies. The section then turns to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's 
damage control efforts following the massacre. Realizing that the shooting had greatly 
mauled their country's international reputation, Indonesian officials vigorously asserted 
that the country should not be held to the same human rights standards as its developed 
counterparts and that doing so represented Western prejudice. 
Chapter 3 discusses Indonesia's attempts to come to grips with its actions during 
the referendum in 1999. It uses two accounts of the violence during the Popular 
Consultation. The first, a report by the Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hah Asasi 
Manusia di Timor Timur (Investigative Commission on Abuses of Human Rights in East 
Timor, KPP-HAM), an Indonesian government body charged with investigating 
Indonesian involvement in the 1999 violence, shattered not only the TNI's denial of 
sponsoring the 1999 violence, but also the very conception of the occupation held by 
Indonesia's highest officials. The second source is the recent memoir by former Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas, in which he describes Indonesia's diplomatic attempts to resolve the 
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East Timor issue. In the book, Alatas confirmed the deep divisions within the Indonesian 
government concerning the Popular Consultation and presented a deeply nationalistic 
version of the August ballot in which violence took place because of military 
indifference, international stubbornness, and diplomatic mistakes. 
The Journalist Narrative 
The Indonesian government always recognized the necessity of limiting and 
controlling information about East Timor. Their efforts in this regard included the 
careful management of foreign journalists or the denial of journalist access to East Timor 
altogether. And, on an infamous occasion in October 1975, it even included murder, as 
Special Forces troops murdered five Western journalists in the East Timorese town of 
1 OR 
Balibo in order to prevent them from reporting on ABRI's presence in East Timor. 
East Timor then disappeared from newsprint for a long period, reemerging when 
Indonesia released news of the famine in the resettlement camps to the outside world in 
the late 1970s. 
In Chapter 1,1 examine three separate journalistic treatments of East Timor in the 
1970s. The majority of my sources are from the Far Eastern Economic Review (JFEER), 
an "authoritative" publication that provided extensive coverage of the situation in East 
Timor throughout the period.109 FEER's treatment of the Civil War period demonstrated 
a marked tendency to question Indonesian propaganda. However, these same articles 
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also depended on Indonesian sources and thus reflected, if only abstractly, Indonesian 
preoccupations over East Timor. The second journalistic treatment of the war in East 
Timor is Hendro Subroto's Eyewitness to Integration of East Timor. Subroto, an 
Indonesian journalist, accompanied joint Timorese and ABRI units in raids on East 
Timor, and wrote a breathtaking account of the Indonesian landings in Dili on December 
7. Finally, I analyze journalistic treatments of the famine using FEER articles which 
alternatively present stories describing East Timor as an excellent example of Indonesian 
development policies or as a hellish place gripped by starvation and despair. I also cite 
an article in The New York Times, whose portrayal of the harsh conditions behind Fretilin 
lines was so wrenching that the Times adopted an anti-occupation editorial stance that 
persisted for over twenty years. 
In the second chapter, on media coverage of the Santa Cruz massacre, I initially 
focus on eyewitness testimony. The first testimonial of the massacre was offered by New 
Zealander Helen Todd, whose son, Kamal Bamadhaj, was shot and killed by ABRI while 
he observed the massacre with other foreign journalists. The second testimony is by 
Allan Nairn, an American reporter whose famous New Yorker account of the slaughter 
led to strong editorial condemnations of the occupation from both The Washington Post 
and The New York Times. Both newspapers questioned why Indonesian rule was 
sanctioned by the United States, especially since the Cold War was over and the 
international community had shown so little regard for the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait 
that year, a situation that the dailies maintained was analogous to the Indonesian 
occupation of East Timor. This section also discusses the work of John Pilger, an 
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Australian journalist and incessant campaigner for East Timor's independence and his 
use of public knowledge of the massacre to castigate Western support of the occupation. 
In the last chapter, I describe how news coverage of the Popular Consultation 
demonstrated a preoccupation with the questions of whether East Timor could be a viable 
independent country and whether the intra-Timorese violence was representative of a 
new civil war. Journalistic concern with such questions mirrored coverage of the East 
Timor situation in 1975, and demonstrates that, while few international journalists 
supported the occupation, the tropes that Indonesia had introduced into media coverage 
of East Timor remained compelling. The section concludes with a discussion of an 
editorial debate that took place in The New York Times in September 1999, in which three 
analysts tackled the issue of whether the United States should intervene militarily in East 
Timor, as it had recently done in Kosovo. 
The Truth Commission's Narrative 
East Timor's truth commission offered the most current and complete version of 
the occupation.110 The CAVR was established both to create a historical record and to 
promote national reconciliation. This thesis does not evaluate the "truth" of Chega!, 
rather it shows how the Commission attempted to discover patterns among the violence 
of East Timor's past. I seek to understand how the CAVR advances the story of East 
Timor, as told by the East Timorese themselves, who finally had the chance to speak 
following decades of silence. 
The standard work on truth commissions is Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing 
the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York & London: Routledge, 2002). 
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Chapter 1 discusses the CAVR's treatment of the 1975 Civil War, life behind 
Fretilin lines prior to 1978, and the famine of the late 1970s. In contrast to most 
treatments of this period, the CAVR devoted a great deal of space to describing human 
rights violations on the part of the resistance. Indeed, the report concluded, the 
horrendous death toll of the early years of the occupation was created largely by the 
combined brutality of the Indonesians and the resistance. 
In its discussion of the Santa Cruz massacre, Chega! devoted relatively little 
space to describing the killing itself. It focused instead on the ways the massacre was 
representative of the clandestine resistance's strategy, which was itself derived from the 
decision to concentrate on diplomatic, rather than armed, means of pursuing East Timor's 
independence. For the truth commission, the process, not the event, mattered more in this 
case. 
The final chapter discusses how East Timor's truth commission chronicled the 
Popular Consultation period. Again, the CAVR attempted to impose a framework upon 
events, describing how the militias of the late 1990s were the culmination of the long-
term Indonesian strategy of stoking intra-Timorese tensions. Chega! also sought to 
delineate patterns in the post-ballot violence, whose massive scale and totality gave the 
impression of chaos. In fact, the CAVR concluded, militia violence reflected quantifiable 
aims and strategies. The destruction of East Timor was planned and deliberate, the final 
act of a brutal occupation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INVASION AND AFTERMATH, 1975-1979 
Photos of the Indonesian invasion of December 7, 1975 are rare and mostly depict 
Indonesian paratroopers in the sky over Dili or that city burning as seen from Atauro 
Island, off the coast. The lack of images is indicative of a wider pattern. For almost 
fifteen years, East Timor was effectively sealed off. The Indonesian government tried to 
guarantee that the territory disappeared from international consciousness, except on terms 
that it could control. And by 1979, these efforts were seemingly successful. Full-scale 
Fretilin resistance had been broken by ABRI, East Timor had become Indonesia's 
twenty-seventh province, and the issue had been buried at the United Nations. It was a 
time of absolutes: one could agree with Indonesia's portrayal of Fretilin members as 
dangerous Marxist terrorists, or one could see the invasion as an act of aggression. And 
even those who took a skeptical position towards Indonesian claims were influenced by 
them. These years witnessed the struggle to define an East Timorese identity by the 
Indonesians, among the Timorese themselves, and in the outside world. 
The East Timorese Narrative 
In the Introduction, I demonstrated that most analyses portray the Fretilin 
interregnum—from the end of the Civil War in September 1975 to the invasion that 
December—in an extremely positive light. This underemphasizes the heavy 
politicization of much of East Timor's society. Family members often belonged to 
different political parties and held radically different opinions about the direction 
decolonization should take. Even the idea of political parties was a novelty. It seems 
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unlikely that East Timorese politicians would have matured in such a short time. 
Ideology, rather than practicality, determined the directions political parties took. This is 
confirmed by two authors considered below: Xanana Gusmao and Arsenio Ramos-Horta. 
Both agreed that Fretilin members were, at the least, undisciplined and, at worst, 
reactionary. However, beyond this, their opinions diverged. Xanana Gusmao became the 
leader of the resistance, while Arsenio Ramos-Horta embraced Indonesian control of East 
Timor. While these domestic struggles occurred, Arsenio's older brother, Jose Ramos-
Horta, confronted international indifference towards East Timor and a willingness on the 
part of the world community to accept Indonesia's version of events. 
Xanana Gusmao: How the Revolution Overcame Practicality 
Gusmao wrote his "Autobiography" while imprisoned in Jakarta during the 
1990s. The leader of the resistance portrayed himself as a semi-reluctant political actor, 
initially ambivalent towards the Timorese political parties established after the Carnation 
Revolution in 1974. Indeed, Gusmao hesitated to join any party. According to Gusmao, 
his reluctance to declare for any party irked many of his friends, some of whom even 
refused to speak to him until he had "identified" himself "politically."1 Politics appeared 
to take over peoples' lives, representing not only how one felt about East Timor's future, 
but even determining who one's friends were and, in some cases, one's family relations. 
The real-world consequences of such divisions were starkly revealed by the UDT 
coup on August 11, 1975. Politics, which had always tended to be divisive and 
alienating, became lethal. Yet, it seemed to Gusmao that few had an idea what the major 
1
 Xanana Gusmao, "Autobiography," in To Resist Is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana 




differences between the parties were. He recalled a young Timorese soldier telling him 
that the UDT was fighting Communism; however he had no idea what a Communist 
was. Political immaturity, Gusmao suggests, made Timorese victimize themselves 
before the Indonesians ever got a chance. Nor, according to Gusmao, was Fretilin 
immune to confusion and uncertainty. The "Autobiography" described the Fretilin 
leadership as astonishingly immature politically, split between radicals who wanted to 
declare immediate independence and moderates desiring to resume the decolonization 
process.4 This "fragile" political operation was also under constant external pressure 
from Indonesian military incursions. 
For Gusmao, the epitome of his party's political immaturity was its decision to 
unilaterally declare independence on November 28, 1975, a step that, Gusmao decided 
two decades later, was symptomatic of Fretilin's wider dysfunctionality. What, he asked, 
did East Timor's new freedom mean? "Free" from whom? The Portuguese had fled, 
effectively surrendering their colonial prerogative. "From capitalism or imperialism?" 
Few people knew what those meant. Gusmao and the other members of Fretilin's 
Central Committee should have possessed answers to some of these questions, but, 
according to Gusmao, they did not.7 The Declaration's attempt to cement an East 
Timorese identity was, therefore, deeply flawed, for the people attempting to articulate an 
identity did not themselves possess one. 
Following the December 7 invasion, Gusmao became one of Fretilin's regional 
Vice-Secretaries and observed the internal divisions and increasing radicalization within 
3
 Ibid., pp. 22-31. 
4
 Ibid., p. 31. 
5
 Ibid., pp. 33, 36-37. 
6
 The paragraph up to this citation is based on Ibid., p. 33. 
7
 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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the Front. This portion of Gusmao's "Autobiography" rarely mentions Indonesians at 
all, focusing instead on the combination of political grandstanding and lethality that tore 
Fretilin apart during the war. As the conflict continued, Gusmao became increasingly 
weary, even contemptuous, of many Fretilin leaders, who seemed more concerned with 
the definition of "isms" and "dissertations" than with fighting ABRI. Political purity 
determined strategy no matter what the cost. For example, President Xavier do Amaral 
was supposedly removed due to his willingness to negotiate with the Indonesians, but 
Gusmao maintained that do Amaral's real sin was his desire to request aid from the 
Soviet Union. Fretilin radicals, who derived much of their inspiration from Mao, were 
naturally appalled that their President would associate with the "social imperialist" 
USSR.10 Do Amaral's argument that Fretilin should take aid from any source meant little 
to the Front's ideological purists.11 Such dogmatism was not new to East Timorese 
politics, but, by 1976, doctrinal rigidity dominated party discussions. And, 
catastrophically, the aim of political purity increasingly led to violence. 
Violence by Fretilin cadres was not solely attributable to the stresses of the 
invasion. Atrocities had been committed by both sides during the Civil War and 
continued in Fretilin prisons after its victory over the UDT. Gusmao was initially able to 
understand, if not condone, these acts because the UDT had attempted a coup and killed 
many Fretilin members; the horrors in Dili's prisons were revenge, an urge that, Gusmao 
insisted, soon exhausted itself. Yet, under the stresses of the Indonesian invasion, 
politically motivated violence arose within Fretilin's own ranks. Do Amaral's removal as 
8
 For Gusmao's account of the invasion, see Ibid., pp. 38-40. 
9
 Ibid., first quotation on p. 44; second quotation on p. 47. 
10
 Ibid., p. 41. 
"Ibid. 
12
 Ibid., p. 32. 
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President coincided with a growing conviction among many Fretilin cadres that the party 
needed to be purged. They called for "revolutionary violence" aimed at cleansing the 
resistance of "reactionary" elements, who were often supporters of the deposed do 
Amaral.13 The resistance did an excellent job of crippling itself even before ABRI began 
its last major assault in 1978.14 
When the Indonesians did make an appearance in Gusmao's "Autobiography," it 
was with a vengeance, mercilessly bombing Fretilin's redoubts around Mount 
Matebian.15 The Central Committee decided to abandon the base, and instructed the 
population to surrender to the Indonesians and Fretilin cadres to melt through Indonesian 
lines and reconstruct the resistance. Xanana Gusmao was one of the few who managed to 
do so. By early 1979, he was one of only three Fretilin Central Committee members still 
at large.16 Gusmao spent the following months wandering a ghostly countryside, hiding 
from ABRI while stricken with malaria. This part of the "Autobiography" reads like an 
account of rebirth, as Gusmao described consulting with East Timorese villagers and 
arriving at a greater appreciation of what independence meant to them. For him, this 
pilgrimage was an essential prerequisite to renewed resistance.17 
13
 Ibid., pp. 49-51, 55. 
14
 It is interesting to read these sections of Gusmao's "Autobiography" in light of the theories of 
Frantz Fanon. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon wrote that violence was a cleansing force, to be used 
by the colonized not only to throw off the bonds of colonialism but also to purify and unify the new 
independent people. Revolutionary violence was, indeed, central to Fanon's conception of the anti-colonial 
struggle and to the redemption of the colonized. See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. 
Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963), especially "Concerning Violence" and 
"Spontaneity: Its Strengths and Weaknesses," pp. 35-147. 
15
 Gusmao, p. 56. 
16
 Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975-99," p. 219. 
17
 GusmSo, pp. 58-65. 
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The Brothers Ramos-Horta, Part I: Arsenio Ramos-Horta 
Like his brother, Jose, Arsenio Ramos-Horta joined one of East Timor's new 
political parties, but opted for the UDT, rather than Jose's ASDT, which later became 
Fretilin. Arsenio was captured by Fretilin troops during the Civil War and was interned 
1 Q 
in squalid conditions in Dili. He was still in prison on December 7, and remembered 
feeling elation upon seeing Indonesian paratroopers parachuting into the capital.19 
Arsenio Ramos-Horta was not, however, to be freed by Indonesian troops in Dili. 
As Fretilin forces pulled out of the capital, he was among the prisoners evacuated with 
them. For the following three years, Arsenio was forced to work as a radio operator for 
the resistance. The material circumstances behind Fretilin lines were, he wrote, 
exceedingly poor. He and other prisoners became incredibly weak, their health broken 
by hard labor and miniscule rations. These horrific physical conditions were made 
worse by the attitudes of Fretilin's cadres, who considered their prisoners, according to 
Arsenio, "something [sic] under the level of animal," to whom no mercy could be shown, 
In Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, Jose Ramos-Horta insisted that Arsenio had been 
"stranded" in Dili at the beginning of the Civil War and stumbled onto a UDT camp, where he was 
captured; Jose Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1987), p. 
56. However, according to Arsenio, he was captured with several UDT troops as they attempted to cross 
the border into Indonesian West Timor; Arsenio Ramos-Horta, The Eyewitness: Bitter Moments in East 
Timor Jungles (Singapore: Usaha Quality Printers), pp. 5-6. 
19
 Arsenio Ramos-Horta, p. 6. It is important to note that Arsenio routinely referred to Indonesian 
troops as "volunteers," thus subscribing to a key component of Indonesia's propaganda. The Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry initially denied that the country had troops in East Timor. Any Indonesians in East Timor 
on December 7 were, according to Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, merely "volunteers who are 
helping the Apodeti forces"; Dan Coggin, "The 'Volunteer' Invaders," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
December 19, 1975, p. 13. Few people at the time believed this line, and by the 1990s, Indonesia seemed 
to have given up on it as well. Julius Pour's hagiographic biography of General Benny Murdani, published 
in 1993, made no attempt to disguise the fact that the invasion was a military operation; Julius Pour, Benny 
Moerdani: Profile of a Soldier Statesman, trans Tim Scott (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar 
Sudirman, 1993), pp. 316-344. 
20
 Arsenio Ramos-Horta, pp. 12, 24-25. By 1977, Arsenio estimated that at least 20,000 people 
had starved to death behind Fretilin lines, an estimate that cannot be immediately dismissed given that 
Indonesia routinely eradicated Timorese crops in outlying areas; Ibid., pp. 30-31. Arsenio did not, 
naturally, mention this aspect of ABRI's strategy. For him, the lack of food was solely the result of 
Fretilin's rapacious policies and the greed of its cadres; Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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regardless of any previous blood or friendship ties. Arsenio's situation was especially 
onerous, he wrote, because he served under Alarico Fernandes, Fretilin's Information 
99 
Minister, who Arsenio portrayed as violent, cowardly, and mentally unstable. 
Fernandes was, according to Arsenio, completely devoted to radical Maoist ideology and 
envisioned the creation "of a communist state based on Mao's doctrine and it [Fretilin] 
would not stop.. .to achieve its target even if Fretilin had to eliminate two-thirds of East 
Timor population." The Front described by Arsenio had thus become so radical that by 
the late 1970s it could allegedly contemplate mass murder in pursuit of its revolutionary 
aims. Indonesian victory was therefore necessary not only for Arsenio's salvation, but 
that of the Timorese as well. 
Interestingly, the story of Alarico Fernandes's allegedly genocidal plans was 
not Fretilin's worst threat, according to Arsenio Ramos-Horta. What he actually 
considered the most malign effect of Fretilin's sway was how its Maoist ideology 
corrupted peoples' morality. Arsenio was especially incensed by the Front's destruction 
of Timorese sexual purity. He described how Fretilin commanders swapped wives 
during political meetings, acerbically commenting that this must have been the reason 
Fretilin liked to discuss politics so much.25 More scandalous was the fact that their 
promiscuity spread throughout Timorese society, as proven by the fact that Arsenio was 
2
' Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
22
 Ibid., p. 42. Gusmao offered a similar description of Fernandes; Gusmao, p. 32. 
23
 Arsenio Ramos-Horta, p. 36. 
24
 Arsenio's focus on Fretilin's supposedly rampant sexuality initially seems gratuitous and 
hypocritical, for Arsenio himself had neither trouble nor compunction about obtaining sexual favors during 
his captivity. Sex was clearly one of his personal obsessions. 
25
 He ruefully added that "[sjexually speaking I was not very successful at the meetings"; Arsenio 
Ramos-Horta, p. 37. 
42 
propositioned by an eight-year-old girl. It becomes clear that Arsenio has turned his 
own obsession with sex to political ends. 
Arsenio was eventually freed by Indonesian soldiers at the end of 1978, 
supposedly the first time he had ever met an Indonesian soldier. Following his 
recovery, the Indonesians found him a job teaching English in Dili, where he made 
9R 
enough money to purchase a motor-bike and ride it on newly-paved streets. The 
remainder of his book extolled the material benefits of the occupation and called on his 
brother, Jose Ramos-Horta, to stop his diplomatic efforts and to help build a new East 
9Q 
Timor under Indonesian rule. Despite this pro-Indonesian conclusion, however, it is 
noteworthy that Arsenio Ramos-Horta wrote from an East Timorese perspective, seeking 
fulfillment as an Indonesian citizen, but nevertheless subscribing to the existence of a 
separate Timorese identity. His brother was not willing to make even this compromise. 
The Brothers Ramos-Horta, Part II: Jose Ramos-Horta: 
One of Jose Ramos-Horta's first stops after fleeing Dili was the United Nations in 
New York, where he pled East Timor's case before the General Assembly and Security 
Council. His Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor recorded, over a decade later, an 
ever increasing disillusionment with this process. Unlike his brother, Arsenio, Jose 
Ramos-Horta refused to accept that Indonesia's annexation benefited the Timorese. Yet, 
reading his Funu, one cannot escape the impression that he would have agreed with 
Arsenio's contention that integration was an established fact and that attempts to alter the 
26
 However, this proposition only happened after Arsenio told the girl, supposedly at her 
insistence, about a woman he had slept with the night before; Ibid., p. 35. 
27
 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
28
 Ibid., p. 74. 
29
 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
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status quo were doomed to failure, at least in the short term. Indeed, throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, there seemed little reason to believe otherwise. 
Funu was overtly written to evoke sympathy, portraying Jose Ramos-Horta's 
efforts, and, by extension, those of his homeland, to persevere against a rapacious 
Indonesia abetted by international cynicism and appeasement. To accomplish this, Jose 
acquainted the reader with East Timor and with what he claimed was a distinct Timorese 
identity. These arguments were made through an interesting use of history, as seen in his 
claim that Portugal's "civilizing mission" had made "little if any impact" on traditional 
Timorese culture. Indonesia, he continued, was now imprinting its own definition of 
Timorese identity. Despite all these attempts to subsume the Timorese into an identity 
defined by the colonizer, the country retained, Jose argued, its unique indigenous 
character. And that meant that it deserved a place among the community of nations. 
Having rhetorically established a separate identity for his country, Jose Ramos-
Horta showed how this identity had been violated with the assistance of the international 
community. Funu portrayed the uphill battle East Timor's supporters faced to keep the 
issue before the United Nations. According to Jose, the Fretilin delegation was severely 
hampered in these efforts. They had few allies, were chronically in debt, and had 
absolutely "nothing to offer" other countries in exchange for their support of UN 
3os6 Ramos-Horta, Funu, p. 14. Note, however, that many East Timorese names, including 
Ramos-Horta's, had Portuguese origins, and that many Timorese possessed at least a basic understanding 
of the Portuguese language. 
31
 Jos6 Ramos-Horta vehemently denied, for instance, that Fretilin was a Communist movement; 
Ibid., pp. 52-53. He also hinted that this perception might have been partially created by foreign supporters 
of East Timorese independence. He described the journalist Jill Jolliffe, for instance, as "a militant 
Trotskyist working as a stringer for a number of Australian newspapers"; Ibid., p. 99. While in no way 
condemnatory of Jolliffe, the fact that Ramos-Horta singled her out for such a description suggests that he 
might have been attempting to distance the resistance from a radical leftist profile. 
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resolutions condemning the occupation.32 East Timor's independence movement had the 
benefit of moral authority, as few Western powers could completely ignore Indonesia's 
blatant aggression. Yet, these same powers also desperately wanted to maintain alliances 
with Suharto's Indonesia. They thus condemned Indonesia's actions in East Timor while 
forestalling any meaningful action to rectify the situation.33 As described by Jose Ramos-
Horta, international reaction to the invasion was characterized by a tepid condemnation, 
tempered with supposed realism. United Nations resolutions annually lamented the 
occupation and called for an Indonesian withdrawal, but studiously avoided imposing any 
sort of sanctions to compel Indonesian compliance; these resolutions were an 
embarrassment for Indonesia, but hardly a credible deterrent. This was, for Jose Ramos-
Horta, nothing less than a cowardly stall for time, which, in this case, worked against 
Fretilin. The longer the occupation continued, the more it seemed to be a fait accompli 
and the more likely it became that the East Timor question would "simply fade" from the 
international agenda.34 And, by the late 1970s, it certainly seemed as if the East Timor 
i f 
issue would do just that. 
32
 Ibid., p. 128. Indonesia, by contrast, made "East Timor a top priority issue," devoting its 
considerable diplomatic resources (Jakarta's delegation, for instance, did not have to share office space 
with the small delegation from Guinea-Bissau) to removing the issue from the UN agenda altogether; Ibid., 
p. 126. 
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 Ibid., p. 107. 
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 According to Ramos-Horta, the disappearance of East Timor from the UN's annual schedule 
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any clout in the situation—it was both a member of NATO and officially remained the governmental 
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 As will be seen in Chapter 3, diplomacy eventually played a crucial role in facilitating East 
Timor's independence. And Jose Ramos-Horta insisted that he never doubted that this would be the 
outcome; Ibid., p. 206. However, at the time Funu was written, few would have predicted that result. 
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The Indonesian Narrative 
The attack on December 7,1975 was predicated on an Indonesian government 
narrative that cast East Timor as a battleground in the Cold War. This is not the place to 
debate whether Indonesian leaders genuinely believed that an independent East Timor 
would be a Communist menace or whether they cynically employed such rhetoric in 
order to gain Western approval. The Suharto regime made every effort to guarantee that 
this version of events predominated. The Indonesian government also insisted that 
Fretilin was a minority Communist movement, preventing the East Timorese from 
joining the Republic of Indonesia, which the vast majority wanted to do. And, early in 
the occupation, the Indonesians were generally successful in ensuring that they controlled 
outside perceptions of the situation in East Timor. 
Selling the Communist Conspiracy to a Government... 
In April 1975, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese Army. The Communist 
victory caused Malcolm Caldwell, a Scottish Marxist academic, to write that a resurgent 
PKI, inspired by the "heroic example of Indochina," would ultimately "liberate" 
Indonesia from Suharto and his "fascist" generals. With American policy in tatters and 
friendly regimes in Asia appearing increasingly scarce, Suharto met with U.S. President 
Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at Camp David on July 5, 1975. 
Most of their discussion centered on developments in Vietnam, but also, tellingly, 
touched on the situation in Portuguese Timor. 
Malcolm Caldwell, "The International Context," in Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia, ed. 
Malcolm Caldwell (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), p. 36. 
46 
Suharto might not have read Malcolm Caldwell's confident prediction of a 
Communist resurgence in Indonesia, but he expressed a similar conviction that the fall of 
Saigon presaged further Communist gains. In the short-term, Suharto told his hosts, the 
Northern Vietnamese victory would encourage leftist agitation in neighboring countries. ' 
But in the long-term, these initial Communist agitations would find ready support from 
unified Vietnam. Once the Vietnamese Communists consolidated their victory, which 
Suharto estimated would take five years, they would offer financial and military aid to 
other leftist movements, thus destabilizing Southeast Asia. Having made this dire 
prediction, Suharto reminded Ford of Indonesia's past struggle against Communism and 
of the fact that the New Order had spent years "unifying and nationalizing the people [of 
Indonesia] to prepare to fight the threats which eventually will be made against our 
independence," threats specifically associated with Communist aggression.39 Suharto 
then suggested that the U.S. "review" its economic assistance policies in regards to 
Southeast Asia and dropped a hint that Indonesia was an archipelago nation with an 
antiquated Navy.40 Ford was sympathetic, expressing his "understand[ing] if you 
[Indonesia] don't make economic progress there will be the growth of a Communist 
ideology in Indonesia," and bluntly asked Suharto "[h]ow big a Navy" he needed.41 The 
Indonesian President had clearly found a receptive audience for his warnings that 
Communism was ascendant in Southeast Asia, that future regional instability was all but 
"Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford, Suharto, and Kissinger, 5 July 1975, 
12:40 p.m. — 2:00 p.m.," in East Timor Revisited: Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, eds. 
William Burr and Michael L. Evans, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 62, December 6, 
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 Ibid., p. 4 for the quotation on economics, p. 5 for the quotation on the Navy. 
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certain, and that Indonesia, staunchly anti-Communist, should receive increased America 
support. 
By lunchtime on July 5, Suharto had achieved continued and expanded American 
commitment to Indonesia's economic development and further U.S. arms shipments. If 
the conversation had stopped there, this meeting would merely represent an excellent 
example of how to successfully negotiate increased assistance from the U.S. during the 
Cold War. However, the transcript also reveals that Suharto took the opportunity to 
broach the subject of the Communist threat in Portuguese Timor to the highest levels of 
the U.S. government. The July 5 meeting would become a major part of the construction 
of the Indonesian narrative about East Timor, where Suharto explicitly linked events in 
the Portuguese colony to his dire predictions of a coming Communist advance in 
Southeast Asia. 
Suharto assured Ford that the majority of East Timor's people desired "unity with 
Indonesia," and that those Timorese who agitated for independence were "Communist-
influenced."42 The Indonesian President thus placed Fretilin in the forefront of 
Communist groups who he claimed would be inspired by the North Vietnamese victory. 
The East Timorese political party was now held to be a menace to the region. And if 
Indonesia was the best guarantee of continuing stability, an assessment that the U.S. 
President had just endorsed, it followed that the presence of a Communist state on its 
borders was a major reason for concern to which the United States should be 
sympathetic. In addition, to fight Fretilin would actually be an act of liberation on 
Indonesia's part, as, according to Suharto, the population of East Timor yearned to be 
part of Indonesia. Such tropes must have appealed Gerald Ford, a President confronting 
42
 Ibid., p. 6. 
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the debacle in Indochina and needing to take steps to prop up any potential ally in a 
suddenly unfriendly region.43 
The ideas Suharto planted with the Ford Administration in July were reinforced at 
another meeting five months later. On December 6, 1975, as Suharto, Ford, and 
Kissinger met in Jakarta, events in East Timor had reached a boiling point for the 
Indonesian President. With Fretilin's Declaration of Independence, said Suharto, 
Indonesia was confronted with a "fate [sic] accompli." "Communists" now controlled 
Portuguese Timor, guaranteeing an "increase [to] the instability in the area."44 Suharto 
continued that his government's priority was "to establish peace and order for the present 
and the future in the interest of the security of the area [a]nd Indonesia," and that 
Indonesia would likely have to "take rapid or drastic action" to achieve these aims.45 The 
Indonesian President was baldly telling Ford that Indonesia would take military action 
against East Timor. Gerald Ford was understanding, and responded that the U.S. "will 
not press you [Indonesia] on the issue," while Kissinger promised to provide diplomatic 
cover, although he stressed that Indonesia had to quickly establish control over the 
Suharto's case was bolstered by the fact that the U.S. State Department had little interest in or 
knowledge about East Timor. At a high-level State Department meeting on August 12, 1975, Fretilin was 
described as "a Communist-dominated group"; "The Secretary's Principal's and Regional Staff Meeting, 
Tuesday August 12, 1975," in East Timor Revisited: Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, eds. 
William Burr and Michael L. Evans, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 62, December 6, 
2001 <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc2.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2007), p. 3. 
Yet, just over three months later, a brief to President Ford from the State Department called Fretilin merely 
"a vaguely leftist party"; "Department of State Briefing Paper: Indonesia and Portuguese Timor, November 
21, 1975," in East Timor Revisited; Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, eds. William Burr and 
Michael L. Evans, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 62, December 6, 2001 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc3a.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2007), p. 1. 
Relations with Indonesia were the State Department's priority, and the U.S. government proved more than 
willing to trust Suharto's assessment of the situation. 
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Evans, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 62, December 6, 2001 
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territory in order to minimize international fallout. The three men then proceeded to 
discuss trade relations, effectively leaving East Timor to whatever fate Indonesia decided. 
Suharto's portrayal of East Timor as a source of Communist conspiracy had found a 
ready audience in the American government and was now officially part of the American 
foreign policy mindset. 
• ..andto the World 
Indonesia was quite successful at controlling how East Timor was perceived in 
the West, not only within their governments, but also among influential portions of their 
populations. In Australia, support for the invasion and occupation was especially 
vehement in the pages of Quadrant, a journal closely associated with the highest levels of 
Australian conservatism.47 This section specifically examines Quadrant articles by 
economist Heinz W. Arndt, who justified support for the occupation in the context of the 
Cold War and for the sake of Australia's diplomatic relationship with Asia in general, 
and Indonesia in particular.48 
Of course, Suharto and his generals expected the war to be over quickly, and Suharto assured 
Kissinger that, while there would "probably be a small guerilla war" following the invasion, so many East 
Timorese supported integration that the situation would quickly resolve itself favorably; Ibid. 
47
 For a full discussion of Quadrant and its support for the occupation, see Ben Kiernan, "Cover-
Up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor, and the Aborigines," Critical Asian Studies 
34, 2 (June 2002): pp. 163-183. 
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Arndt fully subscribed to Indonesia's characterization of Fretilin as Communist. 
For him, Jakarta's fears of "a 'Cuba' on Indonesia's doorstep" made perfect sense given 
"the advance of revolutionary socialism throughout the Third World" (read Indochina).49 
Those who dismissed the Communist threat were oblivious to this international reality. 
Indeed, Arndt maintained, it made little sense for Indonesia to incorporate East Timor 
without having an overriding national security interest. Indonesia, he reminded readers, 
was a poor country whose government "had no wish to saddle itself.. .with another 
poverty-stricken, backward province."50 By this logic, Portuguese mismanagement of 
decolonization, coupled with Communist Fretilin's seizure of the territory in a "coup," 
had effectively forced Indonesia to intervene.51 Faced with threats to "its national 
security interests.. .and.. .the consequent risk of a communist satellite being established" 
in East Timor, Indonesia had acted, Arndt maintained, no differently "than any other 
power.. .would have done in similar circumstances."52 
This last point—that Indonesia's actions would have been taken by any 
responsible Western government in similar circumstances—was closely associated with 
H. W. Arndt's second major criticism of those opposing the occupation: a racist 
worldview. Arndt stated that Australia's fundamental sin was its "culture-bound 
prejudices against Asians in general and Indonesians in particular," the idea that, because 
Indonesians are "Asians," the worst things said about them had to be true. Those who 
accused Indonesia of committing genocide in East Timor were therefore addressing the 
49
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basest instincts of the Australian body politic, and especially its fear that the country was 
vulnerable to attack from Asian hordes.54 Arndt insinuated that anyone who gave 
credence to stories about Indonesian atrocities in East Timor was not only naive, but also 
hopelessly backward, representative of the worst stereotypes about Australians' 
inveterate racism, a racism of which neighboring Asian countries were fully aware, and 
which they resented. Criticizing Indonesia and its policies in East Timor was therefore 
weakening Australia and, in a Cold War world, the country could not afford weakness. 
The Journalist Narrative 
Indonesian and international journalists covering East Timor before the invasion 
were based in the Indonesian town of Atambua, West Timor, roughly forty kilometers 
from the border with East Timor.55 From Atambua, they had access to the camps in West 
Timor where East Timorese refugees congregated after fleeing the Civil War. Based on 
material gathered in these camps, the reporters of the Far Eastern Economic Review 
(FEER) wrote several articles before December 7. A survey of the results shows an 
interesting and complex relationship between the Indonesian version of events and what 
reporters saw on the ground. The details that made it into articles were often tellingly 
different from Indonesia's official line, yet, the general picture was grounded in the 
Indonesian narrative. Even Indonesian reporters fully appraised of ABRI infiltration into 
East Timor, among them Hendro Subroto, a reporter for Televisi Republik Indonesia 
Details of the deployment of journalists are found in Hendro Subroto, Eyewitness to Integration 
of East Timor (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997), p. 40. Subroto, who spent months on the border, had 
a very low opinion of foreign journalists, who, being based in Jakarta, often spent no more than a few days 
in Indonesian Timor at a given time. 
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(TVRI), found their material controlled and censored by the state. International 
reporters would not gain access to East Timor until the late 1970s, when they filed stories 
about their visits to the resettlement camps and about the famine raging there. Testimony 
by those who had lived behind Fretilin lines also began to appear in Western 
publications. In 1979, The New York Times published an interview with a priest who had 
lived with the resistance, and consequently, the paper issued an editorial condemning the 
occupation, an opposition that its editors maintained for decades. 
Before the Invasion 
Initially, the Far Eastern Economic Review's reporting on the growing tensions in 
East Timor was colored by the perspective that "regional stability" trumped the wishes of 
East Timor's people.58 That Indonesia would invade if it felt threatened by leftists in East 
Timor was also reported as a given, despite the Suharto government's consistent 
denials.5 Indonesia, FEER reporting assumed, was clearly following events in East 
Timor very closely, and its wishes would likely be the determining factor in Timor's 
political future.60 Even when articles concerned events in East Timor itself, the Timorese 
were seen through the prism of their giant neighbor. The Timorese did not matter, what 
mattered was how Indonesia chose to react to their actions. Until late 1975, however, 
It is uncertain how many of Subroto's reports were ever seen by the Indonesian public: "As a 
journalist, I am proud to have been able to cover the integration struggle of East Timor, although only a 
small part of it was broadcasted and the rest was turned into [sic] the national archives"; Ibid., p. 275. 
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Indonesia's aims regarding East Timor remained opaque, and the lengths to which it was 
willing to go to guarantee its "interests" were likewise unknown. 
Following the Civil War, FEER correspondents had ready access to the anti-
Fretilin political leadership residing in refugee camps. Contrary to Indonesian 
propaganda, these Timorese seemed "defeated and dispirited," broken by their defeat.61 
The same article also pointed out that Fretilin's victory proved that the party must have 
"won considerable support outside the Europeanised elite of Dili" and was truly a mass 
movement. The FEER view of the situation along the Indonesian-Timorese border in 
October 1975 therefore conflicted strongly with what Suharto had said at Camp David in 
July, namely, that the vast majority of East Timorese enthusiastically supported 
integration. Indeed, on reading the Far Eastern Economic Review, the impression of 
Fretilin is one of a dynamic party with widespread popular support that had effectively 
expelled its rivals from East Timor, leaving them to fade into insignificance along the 
border, supported at most by Indonesian guerillas.63 
It is noteworthy that Fretilin's victory in the Civil War and Indonesia's apparent 
lack of forceful response infuriated the Hong Kong-based editors of the Far Eastern 
Economic Review.M As with Heinz W. Arndt in Quadrant, FEER editors saw 
Dan Coggin, "Timor: The Waiting Game," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 17, 1975, p. 
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international relations solely in terms of the Cold War. For them, Fretilin was clearly a 
Communist front, whose supporters were "terroris[ing] into submission the largely 
apolitical population" of East Timor.65 The Far Eastern Economic Review's editors also 
insisted that East Timor should become part of Indonesia for the good of the Timorese 
themselves. Echoing Indonesian proclamations, as well as the Australian Prime Minister, 
they declared that East Timor could never "be an independent entity, politically or 
economically" and that the only solution to this "problem" was integration.66 Ultimately, 
the editors maintained, Suharto had been much too lenient, "smother[ing] his own deep-
seated anti-communist instincts... in favour of maintaining Indonesia's image of 
sobriety." This restraint was commendable, but, FEER's editors concluded, the Timor 
situation demanded "swift surgery," not diplomacy. For the good of the region and of 
the Timorese themselves it was imperative that Indonesia absorb East Timor. 
The War from an Indonesian Perspective 
As foreign journalists were barred from East Timor following the invasion, 
among the best journalistic accounts of the war, from both a practical and analytical 
perspective, is Hendro Subroto's Eyewitness to Integration of East Timor. In many ways, 
Subroto's professional narrative parallels the official Indonesian one, but it also differs in 
interesting ways. For instance, he portrayed the Civil War as an attempt by the UDT to 
eradicate the Communist scourge of Fretilin.69 However, for Subroto, the major count 
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against Fretilin was not its Communist ideology, which received only passing mention, 
but its aggressive and violent tactics. Indeed, Subroto proudly admitted that ABRI had 
crossed the border into East Timor in 1975, but, he insisted, only in response to Fretilin 
sorties into Indonesian West Timor. Thus, Indonesia's border incursions were not the 
culmination of a long-term policy of destabilization, but were actually demanded by the 
people of West Timor.70 
Subroto's account of the border war also contained several differences with the 
official Indonesian version. He was quite clear that, while the UDT had great enthusiasm 
for war with Fretilin, its efforts would have failed without Indonesian aid.71 Subroto also 
insisted that, when he accompanied troops into East Timor, it was to cover both Timorese 
"Partisan" and Indonesian units. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that Subroto seemed to 
engage in self-censorship: he only photographed East Timorese units, never ABRI 
77 
personnel. Thus, while verbally contradicting his government's insistence that there 
were no ABRI units participating in the border war, Subroto visually conformed to 
Jakarta's pronouncements. 
The climax of Hendro Subroto's book is the invasion of Dili, an incredibly 
detailed passage that includes diagrams of Indonesia's naval and air deployments. The 
operation, as breathlessly described by Subroto, was a massive achievement, with ABRI 
Ibid., pp. 57-59. Subroto did admit, however, that Indonesia had long been trying to influence a 
pro-integration outcome in East Timor; Ibid., pp. 11-14. 
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troops facing fierce Fretilin resistance while having to make do with equipment cobbled 
together from several different countries.74 The reader is encouraged to admire ABRI for 
its soldiers' courage and professionalism. The Army's executions of Timorese at Dili's 
docks are not mentioned. The conquest of Dili, in Subroto's view, was above all a war 
story, with soldiers battling valiantly and achieving their objectives while immortalized 
by combat j ournalists. 
After describing the conquest of Dili, Eyewitness to Integration of East Timor 
elaborated at length about atrocities allegedly committed by Fretilin.75 Subroto cited 
eyewitness testimony (much of it, incidentally, by Arsenio Ramos-Horta) to prove that 
Indonesia's invasion had saved lives by ending Fretilin's reign of terror.76 These post-
invasion atrocity stories became another component of Indonesia's justification for the 
invasion. Many were recycled variants of earlier Indonesian pronouncements labeling 
Fretilin members as murderous terrorists. Atrocity was always part of the story told 
about East Timor, even when told by the Indonesians. But such stories were the hardest 
to shape to Indonesia's desired aims. 
Famine and Atrocity 
By 1978, ABRI had forced hundreds of thousands of Timorese out of the 
mountains and confined them to resettlement camps under horrific conditions. Mass 
starvation ensued and Indonesia eventually requested international humanitarian 
74
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assistance. Foreign journalists were able to finally gain access to East Timor and they 
described a hellish situation that had, by 1979, become "as bad as anything that is being 
reported from Kampuchea," whose desperate refugees dominated international 
headlines.77 After years of silence, East Timor returned to the news cycle as a disaster 
story. 
In late 1978, two reporters for the Far Eastern Economic Review traveled to East 
Timor. The radically different stories they filed show the malleability of journalistic 
accounts of East Timor. Much depended on the constraints under which the reporters 
were forced to operate, but much also depended on what the reporters themselves were 
willing to see and acknowledge. The first article was written by an anonymous 
7R 
correspondent and covered President Suharto's first visit to the province in July 1978. 
The author focused on Suharto's speech in Maliana, where the President was given a 
"tumultuous greeting" by over 10,000 Timorese "in colourful traditional dress, beating 
their drums and spears as a sign of welcome to their leader," all the while waving 
Indonesian flags.79 Suharto, "[ojbviously overwhelmed by the massive reception," then 
abandoned his prepared remarks and "spoke to the people spontaneously," promising 
them Rp.l million for an irrigation project.80 The audience, "A Correspondent" reported, 
responded with thunderous applause, drawing even more effusiveness from Suharto, who 
regaled them "with the traditional loud cry of Indonesian revolutionary fighters, 
77
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'Merdeka' (freedom)," which the crowd echoed four times. Anyone perusing this 
article was left with the impression that Indonesia was undertaking strenuous efforts to 
develop East Timor and that the Indonesian leader felt a special connection with the 
Timorese, which they reciprocated. The article contained absolutely nothing about 
famine and war damage; for the author, these negatives did not exist. 
Another FEER correspondent, David Jenkins, visited the Remexio refugee camp 
less than two months after Suharto's August tour of Maliana. Jenkins's visit had eerie 
parallels with Suharto's. He too was greeted by Timorese, but this audience was living 
skeletons, "bewildered residents drawn up in two rows, jiggling Indonesian flags and 
mouthing the words merdeka (freedom) to the prompting of local cheerleaders"; it was 
"something less," Jenkins concluded, than "an effusive welcome." The "singularly 
depressing" Remexio camp contained only four thousand people; there were at least 
fourteen similar camps throughout East Timor, several of them more crowded, and in 
many people were even worse off.83 According to Jenkins, there were at least 125,000 
displaced people in East Timor, 100,000 still hiding out in the mountains, and 60,000 
were already dead.84 Jenkins's East Timor was a society "in a state of deep collective 
trauma" whose people were "shocked both by the severity of the killing and by the recent 
O f 
political changes." Those he interviewed were singularly not disposed to give Suharto a 
tumultuous reception. Yet Jenkins's article, for all its demolishing of Indonesian 
propaganda, still subscribed to a fundamental component of the Indonesian narrative: 
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Jakarta's humanitarianism. In his conclusion, Jenkins wrote that Indonesia had been 
"saddled with this enormous humanitarian and development problem as a result of its 
takeover," implying that the Indonesian government had stumbled upon this humanitarian 
disaster, not played a major part in creating it. Even Jenkins, a journalist obviously at 
odds with the image Indonesia wanted to project, was unable to escape completely the 
narrative frame that his hosts had constructed. 
There were also journalistic attempts to place responsibility for the disaster 
squarely on Indonesia. In the case of The New York Times, these attempts led to an anti-
occupation editorial stance persisting for decades. It began with a December 1979 article 
written by Kathleen Teltsch.87 She had interviewed Father Leoneto Viera do Rego, a 
Catholic priest identified as the first Western eyewitness to the war, who claimed to have 
spent three years in the highlands with Fretilin. The priest described massive Indonesian 
bombardments and a systematic military strategy of starvation. Teltsch further noted that 
the U.S. State Department did not dispute allegations of a horrendous humanitarian 
situation in East Timor, although it attributed the problem to neglectful Portuguese 
colonial practices, not Indonesian actions. Teltsch herself did not place blame for the 
crisis, but her article left no doubt that something horrible was happening in East Timor, 
something about which most people were unaware, and which the American government 
wanted to downplay. 
Ten days after Kathleen Teltsch's article, The New York Times editorial page 
carried a blistering attack on Indonesia for its aggressive action and on the U.S. 
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government for acquiescing to the invasion. The piece accused the Indonesian 
government of aggression and of using the harmless "leftist" tendencies of Fretilin as a 
"pretext" to justify its covetous aims. Using information clearly gleaned from Father do 
Rego, the Times then charged the Indonesian government with committing war crimes 
such as bombing populated areas and "forcing Timorese into the mountains and 
devastating their rice economy." During these atrocities, the Carter Administration, the 
paper noted, had "muted its concern" for the sake of the "familiar pragmatic reasons": oil, 
fear of offending Muslim sensibilities, and diplomatic fondness for Indonesia's "rightist 
and repressive" government. In the case of The New York Times, a first-hand account of 
the slaughter in East Timor led to an editorial policy of opposition to the occupation. 
Allegations of atrocity would always be the weakest link in the Indonesian narrative. 
Jakarta had used stories of pre-invasion atrocities by Fretilin in order to justify 
intervention. However, horrific accounts of Timorese life under Indonesian rule proved 
to be the most difficult narrative to control, and once they were proven, it was difficult to 
justify a continued Indonesian presence in East Timor. 
The Truth Commission's Narrative 
The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation concluded that the 
majority of deaths throughout the occupation resulted from Indonesian, especially ABRI, 
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policies. However, the CAVR's report also devoted a great deal of space to 
descriptions of intra-Timorese violence. Chega! foregrounds these atrocities, arguing 
that significant portions of the violence that gripped the territory in the late 1970s—the 
deadliest period of the occupation—resulted from resistance group policies. Indeed, 
many infamous Indonesian practices, including mass killings and forced displacement of 
the population, were practiced among the East Timorese before the invasion. The 
massive death toll of the early occupation resulted from indigenous (Timorese) and 
foreign (Indonesian) measures that combined in a cycle of escalating and mutually 
reinforcing lethality. 
Before the Invasion: Early Atrocities 
According to Chega!, the major theme of East Timor's existence following the 
Carnation Revolution was that of division, both political and, increasingly, social. The 
Civil War was one of the most brutal expressions of self-inflicted injuries which 
complemented Indonesia's aggression. The Commission heard evidence of localized 
killings, carried out by both Fretilin and the UDT, occurring from mid-1975.91 Instead of 
reining in the escalating violence and paramilitarism, many of East Timor's elite 
positively encouraged such measures.92 Violence became self-igniting: increased 
lawlessness was manipulated by Indonesian agents, and when their machinations 
The Commission estimated that 70 percent of killings were committed by Indonesian forces and 
their East Timorese auxiliaries; CAVR, "Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances," 
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increased tensions within East Timor, it provided Timorese militants with greater 
justification for paramilitarism. 
The CAVR provided fascinating evidence that people often defined their political 
opponents through personal, rather than ideological prisms. Portuguese Timor had little 
tradition of mass politics, which meant that political identity following the Carnation 
Revolution was forged without much civic participation. People often chose a political 
party "based on local allegiance and conformity rather than party principles or 
policies."94 Personal differences and localized conflicts became political fodder, 
resulting in what the truth commission termed a "[ljack of political tolerance."95 The 
ultimate expression of this growing inability to compromise was, of course, the Civil 
War, whose short duration in no way mitigated the "deep wounds" it inflicted on East 
Timorese society.96 The Civil War was noteworthy for precipitating the first large-scale 
perpetration of atrocities that would reoccur throughout the occupation. 
Both the UDT and Fretilin committed mass killings during the Civil War, with 
those perpetrated by the former concentrated at the beginning of hostilities and those by 
Q7 
the latter framed as retributive killings. Fretilin's victory in September effectively gave 
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it control of East Timor and provided its members with the opportunity to settle scores 
with UDT and Apodeti prisoners. Chega! suggests that the poor treatment meted out to 
these captives marked an important benchmark in East Timor's political violence. The 
opportunity to torture and maltreat prisoners created a "culture of abuse" within Fretilin, 
the impression that opponents deserved to be assaulted, and that such treatment would be 
tolerated by the Front's leadership.98 
The Civil War also witnessed massive forced population movements similar to 
those that would occur throughout the late 1970s and in 1999. The CAVR estimated that 
up to 50 percent of Portuguese Timor's population fled or was forced from its homes in 
August and September 1975." The most concerted expulsions forced residents to move 
across the border into Indonesian West Timor, where up to 40,000 were confined to 
Indonesian-controlled camps in increasingly desperate circumstances.100 The vast 
majority of refugees within East Timor had returned to their homes before the invasion, 
but they would soon be forced to flee again, in greater numbers to face a much more 
uncertain future.1 x 
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Invasion and Full-Scale Warfare: ABRI, Fretilin, and the Suffering Population 
According to the CAVR, a major reason Indonesia was able to act with relative 
impunity towards East Timor was the Republic's enviable international profile. Good 
relations with Indonesia were prized by a multitude of countries and blocs. By 
contrast, East Timor had little to offer in an international partnership. The Indonesian 
military faced few constraints on its actions in East Timor, which the CAVR conclusively 
documented were characterized by "widespread atrocities."104 Indeed, killing by ABRI 
and its auxiliaries became such common practice that the perpetrators developed 
distinctive slang for their acts. Such mass killings, the CAVR concluded, "were 
implemented as part of a larger, centrally coordinated strategy aimed at eliminating the 
Resistance once and for all," destroying resistance leaders or anyone suspected of 
actively opposing Indonesian rule.106 The military aimed to "pacify" the Timorese 
population, and the fact that it consistently chose to employ violence to achieve this end 
created a culture of impunity, made subsequent violence more likely, and indicated that 
such measures had approval at the highest levels. 
Pacifying East Timor's population required ABRI to achieve physical control 
over the population, a condition which the resistance was determined to prevent. The 
Commission's description of the war between the invasion and the fall of Mount 
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Matebian portrayed the people as the ultimate commodity, "caught between a fear of life 
under harsh Indonesian military rule and a resistance determined to keep them out of 
10R 
Indonesian control." Just as the people were the ultimate prize over which the two 
sides fought, so were they the ultimate victims of the conflict, not only at the hands of the 
invader, but of their own side as well. 
According to testimony before the truth commission, life in the "Liberated Zones" 
(areas outside Indonesian control) required a fine balance between politics and 
pragmatism. Fretilin's declared strategy was for a "people's war" of liberation, with the 
population living in proximity to and providing logistical support for the soldiers of the 
Forgas Armadas de Libertagao Nacional de Timor Leste (National Liberation Armed 
Forces of East Timor, Falintil). Fretilin expected the people to develop a proper 
revolutionary consciousness under its tutelage. In their minds, Fretilin leaders created an 
indissoluble link between the war against Indonesia and the war against the colonial 
mindset, by which they meant acceptance of deference to the Indonesians, inequality, and 
poverty. An independent East Timor required not only victory over ABRI but a 
successful social revolution.109 "Strategically, people were considered a source of power, 
while ideologically the war was seen as a revolutionary war."1' Fretilin's strategy thus 
depended on its physical control of the population: to surrender the people meant 
surrendering any chance of making a successful revolution, which Fretilin considered an 
essential component of the war effort. 
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This "people's war" strategy was controversial. In Chega!, the contest of ideas 
was usually portrayed as a struggle between the military professionals in Falintil and 
increasingly radical politicians in Fretilin. The former argued that since the war was 
going to be protracted and brutal, it was unrealistic to require Falintil to provide security 
for a huge number of civilians. The population should be allowed to surrender so that 
Falintil could focus on military action against ABRI. Opposing this group was an 
increasingly radical faction of Fretilin that refused to countenance the idea of mass 
civilian surrender. For these militants, victory was linked to ideological purity, and 
surrendering the population was nothing less than "a betrayal of the national liberation 
struggle."113 These tensions form the background of the overthrow of do Amaral, which 
brought the ascendancy of the radical political leaders who began purging the resistance 
of "traitors" once they came to power. 
It is important to note that while the intra-Fretilin purges reached their height 
during the hunt for so-called "agents of Xavier" (do Amaral), similar purges had occurred 
on a smaller scale for years.114 Low-scale purges of "spies" and "traitors" had started in 
early 1976, and were "already common" by 1977, especially coinciding with periods of 
severe stress such as those triggered by Indonesian offensives.115 But the purges 
beginning in late 1977 were not only the most severe of the entire Fretilin administration, 
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they also coincided with ABRI's massive "encirclement and annihilation" campaign. It 
was the combination of these two events that made the late 1970s the deadliest period in 
the occupation, as ABRI and the resistance fought for control of the population while the 
people suffered massively. 
Famine: Indonesia's Crimes Culminate 
The truth commission placed blame squarely on the Indonesian military for the 
famine of the late 1970s. While Fretilin's policies undoubtedly caused massive 
deprivation, the "greatest humanitarian tragedy in Timor-Leste's history" took place only 
after the majority of the population surrendered to ABRI, a surrender necessitated, it 
should be recalled, by ABRI's atrocious attack on that population's food supplies.116 
Any hope that the starving population would be saved by surrendering proved false in the 
face of lethal Indonesian military policy. 
Chega! attributed famine deaths to an ABRI mind-set which prioritized security 
over humanitarianism. The surrendered and already starving Timorese were quickly 
placed in a series of internment camps meant not to facilitate the distribution of aid, but 
1 1 7 
to effect Indonesian control over the population. The camps were situated near major 
transportation networks, rather than food production centers, and Timorese movement 
outside the camps was tightly controlled by the military.118 Minimal preparation had 
been made to accommodate a massive population increase in the camps, and so the new 
arrivals, already weakened and malnourished, were confronted with a complete dearth of 
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necessities.119 The skyrocketing death toll was compounded by Indonesia's initial refusal 
to allow humanitarian relief to reach the camps.120 Since the invasion, the military had 
tightly controlled access to East Timor, and it maintained this prerogative even in the 
midst of humanitarian catastrophe. 
What reason could there be to subject an already traumatized population to such 
measures? The CAVR found the answer in the fact that ABRI was determined to 
approach any problem it faced in East Timor from a military campaign perspective. It 
will be recalled that Indonesia had been fighting to seize physical control over the 
population. Once that population was in its hands, the military moved to cut any 
remaining links between civilians and the remnants of the resistance. The internment 
centers, located in areas easily accessible to ABRI, "were the central element of [that] 
strategy."122 Famine deaths resulted from a combination of the poor location of the 
camps, the soul-crushing presence of the military in those camps, and ABRI's refusal to 
allow food aid to reach the starving until it was sure the resistance had been crushed. The 
Indonesians had probably not intended that so many civilians would die, but they had 
certainly created conditions ripe for famine by targeting civilian food supplies and then 
exacerbating those conditions through negligent and cavalier treatment. The Indonesian 
military was prepared to sacrifice untold numbers of Timorese for the sake of shattering 
any remaining Timorese nationalism and of fulfilling its strategic vision of a pacified 
CAVR, "Forced Displacement and Famine," pp. 52-53, 56, 77. 
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Timor. The civilian deaths that occurred were the "direct" and deliberate result of such 
policies. 
Conclusion 
During most of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, the East Timorese were 
invisible to the outside world. The rubrics through which their experiences were 
interpreted were based on explanations originating in Indonesia. The most common 
portrayed Fretilin as an oppressive Communist front and insisted that the invasion was a 
continuance of the Civil War, which had, in fact, ended months before. These bogus 
images found a ready audience among Indonesia's allies, who already feared the 
imminent advance of Communism throughout Southeast Asia following the Communist 
victories in Indochina. And even those who did not accept Indonesia's version of events 
in East Timor nevertheless worked within the confines of the narratives Indonesia had 
established. Many journalists, especially those writing for the prestigious and usually 
well informed Far Eastern Economic Review, consistently filed stories based on 
information provided by the Indonesians. While some publications expressed skepticism 
about Indonesian justifications, even they circulated Jakarta's rationales. 
Interestingly, the narratives of the East Timorese themselves also emphasized 
civil war among the Timorese rather than Indonesian colonialism. The Civil War, 
according to East Timorese testimony, sowed the seeds for mistrust and instability that 
would plague and hinder efforts to form a united front against Indonesian aggression. 
Indonesian accusations highlighting Fretilin's Communist character were also given 
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credence by circumstances. Yet, in a crucial departure from the Indonesian narrative, 
when the East Timorese wrote about their self-inflicted wounds, it was an attempt to 
exorcise and make sense of the events that had crippled the Timorese political process, 
rather than a response to Indonesian allegations. 
A final point must be made concerning the influence of the Indonesian narrative 
on popular and elite perceptions of East Timor, namely that it came with a hidden 
expiration date. As subsequent chapters will show, the history of the occupation 
concluded with the breakdown of Indonesia's ability to determine how the outside world 
viewed its East Timor policy. This process had already begun in the 1970s, and would 
come to predominate in the 1990s. Crucial to this new development would be the Santa 
Cruz massacre of 1991, the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE, 1991 
In late April 1991, an extraordinary gathering took place at American University 
in Washington, D.C. when an academic colloquium convened to discuss East Timor. The 
roster of participants included U.S. State Department officials, ABRI representatives, 
eminent Western and Indonesian academics, a representative of the Portuguese foreign 
service, journalists, activists, and East Timorese refugees.1 In hindsight, some of the 
presentations at the conference were heartbreakingly prescient. The Reverend Paul 
Moore, the Episcopal Bishop of New York, who had visited East Timor the previous 
year, spoke of young East Timorese engaging in an "intifada kind of resistance" against 
the Indonesians, and worried that ABRI would respond with a "Tiananmen Square" type 
massacre. Six months later, young East Timorese demonstrators lay dead under a hail of 
Indonesian bullets at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the killings witnessed by journalists 
Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman, who had themselves participated in the April 
colloquium. It is this event, and the way the various points of view represented at 
American University both reflected and deviated from the reality of a supposedly pacified 
East Timor, with which this chapter is concerned. 
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The East Timorese Narrative 
As has been described in Chapter 1, 1980s East Timor seemed a thoroughly 
cowed territory. Indonesia controlled most of the population and had destroyed the 
resistance as a major fighting force. Yet the resistance to Indonesian occupation 
persevered, albeit in an altered form, its focus shifting to East Timor's urban areas and to 
the youth who were the direct targets of much Indonesian aid and courting. The 
formation and proliferation of clandestine resistance cells dedicated to bringing East 
Timor to the attention of the outside world demonstrated a new type of resistance, one 
much less focused on ideology. The documents analyzed in this section, written by East 
Timorese student activists, also reveal how savvy and sophisticated the resistance had 
become. Far from being a gang of undisciplined malcontents, the resistance was in fact a 
highly organized body with defined goals and strategies, primary among them being to 
capture international attention at every media opportunity. It was for this reason that the 
march to Santa Cruz cemetery was organized. 
Constancio Pinto and the New Resistance 
In July 1990, Constancio Pinto became the Secretary of the Executive Committee 
of the CNRM in the Clandestine Front. The veteran clandestine activist—Pinto had 
joined a resistance cell in 1983—became one of the major leaders of the East Timorese 
struggle for self-determination, the culmination of a life lived under the oppressive 
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security state Indonesia had established in East Timor.4 Born in 1963, he fled with his 
family behind Fretilin lines following the invasion. Forced from the hills by starvation in 
1978 and confined in a resettlement center, the family was lucky enough to make it back 
to Dili in November of that year. Pinto, who had already served in a variety of support 
capacities for Fretilin during the war, easily transitioned into clandestine resistance, 
which he described in East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance, 
written with veteran activist Matthew Jardine.5 
The resistance described by Pinto was both founded upon and a response to the 
structure of the occupation. It would have been impossible for the resistance to continue 
without Indonesian connivance. In fact, the resistance survived off the corruption of the 
occupation. All of Falintil's weapons and ammunition came from Indonesian soldiers, 
and most were not even captured in battle. A major role of the clandestine urban 
resistance was to purchase war material from ABRI soldiers, who would sell a bullet or a 
hand grenade for the relatively low price of Rp. 1,500 and Rp.25,000, respectively.6 
Many actions of Pinto's clandestine resistance were also determined by the constant 
surveillance to which all East Timorese were subject by Indonesian intelligence services. 
Pinto could not even tell the rest of his family about his resistance activities for fear of 
being betrayed.7 Yet, according to Pinto, the very pervasiveness of Indonesia's spy 
4
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networks was adapted by the resistance when he was recruited to spy on the very 
resistance of which he was, unknown to the Indonesians, such a prominent member. 
Pinto was able to use this position against his controllers, feeding them false or 
misleading information while gleaning whatever he could about Indonesian policy and 
o 
upcoming offensives and security sweeps. Pinto's resistance activities, in other words, 
benefited from the very institutions with which the Indonesians maintained their 
authority. Collaboration, of a sort, the ability to struggle against and yet make use of the 
instruments of occupation, became crucial to the success of the resistance as a whole. 
Of course, the East Timorese resistance only worked with the occupation as a 
necessity for working against it. Pinto and his colleagues were responsible for providing 
Falintil with food, ammunition, weapons, money, and intelligence. Their main goal, 
however, was to organize demonstrations in times of a massive media presence in order 
to draw international attention to East Timor's plight.9 In furtherance of this aim, Pinto 
and his colleagues planned a massive turnout of East Timorese during the scheduled visit 
of Portugal's parliamentary delegation in November 1991. When Portugal's 
representatives canceled their trip, the resistance substituted a memorial march, which led 
to the Santa Cruz massacre. 
In retrospect, Pinto had excessive expectations for the visit of the Portuguese 
parliamentary delegation. He believed, for example, that Lisbon's representatives 
"would stay until arriving at some sort of agreement with the Indonesians that would end 
8
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the occupation." This unrealistic hope translated into grandiose, and probably 
unrealizable, plans for the delegation's visit, as Pinto planned a series of massive 
demonstrations in Dili as well as a meeting between the Portuguese and Xanana Gusmao, 
then the most wanted man in East Timor.11 ABRI also had been put on high alert at the 
time, with Pinto recalling that soldiers visited schools and bluntly threatened to kill any 
demonstrators and bury them in mass graves. Despite the warning signs that ABRI had 
even less tolerance than usual for demonstrations, Pinto and his colleagues continued to 
plan, this time taking advantage of the presence in November of the United Nations' 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Pieter Koojimans. Pinto recalled having little sense that 
the demonstration would be more dangerous than usual, since he felt that the Indonesians 
would not risk "very extreme actions" in the presence of a major UN official and a 
coterie of international journalists. Such assurances, ultimately, proved tragically 
mistaken. 
Constancio Pinto did not actually participate in the Santa Cruz demonstration. He 
had been forced to disappear on November 2, upon learning that ABRI was about to 
arrest him. Pinto's book, consequently, does not describe the demonstration itself, but 
rather the aftermath that he witnessed the night of November 12. According to him, 
everyone in post-massacre Dili was in mourning, with candles in every window and some 
East Timorese talking about organizing an uprising and attacking ABRI bases with 
10
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nothing but stones and arrows. In Pinto's recollection, the Santa Cruz shooting came 
very close to setting off a second massacre. Pinto escaped to the West in 1992. At that 
point international diplomacy had failed to pressure Indonesia into abandoning East 
Timor (a fact which infuriated many Timorese), but massive news coverage of the Santa 
Cruz massacre had made it impossible for the East Timor issue to be hushed up.15 
Therefore, the Dili shooting of November 1991 tragically and ironically fulfilled the 
major aim of the clandestine resistance—it brought increased international and public 
attention to East Timor and the plight of its people. 
Addressing Indonesians 
The East Timorese resistance did not confine its activities merely to winning 
international support. Young East Timorese activists also operated on university 
campuses throughout the Republic. By integrating East Timorese into Indonesia's 
educational system, the regime had hoped to assimilate them into Indonesian culture. 
Yet, according to Constancio Pinto, such academic endeavors backfired. Instead of 
Indonesianizing young Timorese, it introduced them to Indonesian nationalism, whose 
terms and spirit they appropriated for their own nationalist struggle.16 The opportunity to 
study in other parts of Indonesia also gave East Timorese activists greater opportunity to 
mobilize, as it allowed them to escape the stifling security presence in their homeland. 
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One example of how an East Timorese used the benefits of an Indonesian 
education in service of the resistance is found in an anonymous email circulated 
throughout Indonesian campuses in 1992. Entitled, "If only I were Free," the email was 
overtly modeled on a classic of anti-Dutch Indonesian nationalism from the early 
1900s. Throughout the email, the unknown author expressed admiration for Indonesian 
nationalists and their struggle to overthrow the cruel and dehumanizing Dutch colonial 
regime. And yet, the author wondered, how was it possible to celebrate Indonesia's 
Independence Day when Indonesia was itself engaging in brutal colonial domination? 
How was it just to make the East Timorese celebrate an Independence Day that to them 
meant nothing except a reaffirmation of their colonial status? Indeed, the author 
continued, Independence Day in East Timor was nothing less than a reminder of how 
East Timor's own nationalist aspirations had been crushed by the Indonesian military, 
and, as was shown by the Santa Cruz massacre, crushed with as much butchery as the 
Dutch ever visited upon the Indonesians during their independence struggle. Indonesia in 
1992, the author of "If only I were Free" argued, was a colonial power in its own right, 
and Independence Day, Indonesia's commemoration of its Declaration of Independence 
from Dutch colonial rule, was now tarnished by the Republic's imperialism in East 
Timor.21 
"If only I were Free" is an important document because it shows how East 
Timorese nationalists used the memorial commemoration of the occupation as a tool 
18
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against the occupation. Just as Pinto and the clandestine resistance took advantage of 
their rulers' corruption and espionage system, so this unknown author imbibed the 
lessons of Indonesian schools and then appropriated those lessons for anti-regime ends. 
The East Timorese author made an appeal to Indonesians in their own language, echoing 
their own anti-colonialist rhetoric, mastered while studying in Indonesian schools. The 
anonymous author had absorbed the lessons of Indonesian nationalism and then applied 
those lessons to East Timor's situation, a fascinating, if no doubt unintended result of 
Indonesia's education policies in East Timor, policies that ended up feeding, rather than 
starving, the resistance. 
The Indonesian Narrative 
As was shown in the previous chapter, Indonesia justified its intervention in East 
Timor by asserting that the territory was completely unsustainable as an independent 
entity. The necessity to develop East Timor, and the fact that Indonesia was devoting so 
many resources to that end, became the regime's main rationale for the occupation. And 
as was shown in the Introduction, the regime also hoped that successful development 
programs would lead to Timorese acceptance of Indonesian rule. The growth of the 
clandestine resistance, with its fatal consequences at the Santa Cruz cemetery, thus came 
as a rude shock, exposing the fact that, for all the economic progress it had undoubtedly 
brought to the territory, Indonesian rule remained profoundly unpopular among East 
22
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Timorese. In one afternoon, Indonesia's justification for the occupation was shattered 
before the world. Suharto's regime responded by going on the diplomatic offensive, 
joining with the authoritarian governments of other developing countries by claiming that 
human rights was a luxury that the developing world could not yet afford. It is these two 
phenomena—the rhetoric of development with which Indonesia underpinned the 
occupation and the harsh diplomatic reaction that ensued when that rhetoric was proven 
to be largely a sham—that form the subject of this section. 
Development and its Discontents 
Justifying the occupation of East Timor was the duty of every part of the 
Indonesian government. Agencies dealing with the Republic's external relations issued 
pamphlets and other media items in order to garner foreign support. This section begins 
by examining two publications issued by the Indonesian Foreign and Information 
Ministries in the 1980s. The documents, East Timor After Integration and The Province 
of East Timor: Development in Progress, both began with the premise that Indonesia had 
taken on the odious and awesome challenge of developing and modernizing the province, 
which was more than the Portuguese had ever bothered to do. 4 Both publications offer 
Republic of Indonesia, The Province of East Timor: Development in Progress (Jakarta: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Information, n.d), p. 8. 
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extensive descriptions of Jakarta's development efforts in all areas of East Timor. The 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry claimed that from 1976 to 1984 the central government had 
sunk Rp.207,736,691,506 into East Timor, far more than was given to any other 
Indonesian province and an amount so great that it actually had negative effects on 
Indonesia's national budget.26 This money was spent on programs to improve tangible 
developmental criteria such as farming, industry, education, health care, and media 
access, as well as on less quantifiable items such as spiritual development. East Timor 
After Integration even managed to spin the resettlement camps into which East Timorese 
were confined and in which many died as intended to "improve social welfare" by 
concentrating the East Timorese population in designated areas in which Indonesian 
development policies could be easily enacted.27 The Province of East Timor: 
Development in Progress even bragged about the number of taxis Indonesia had imported 
into Dili. The strategy of the Indonesian government in these pamphlets was to deploy 
data and to prove that the East Timorese were better off under Indonesian rule than they 
had ever been before, and to reassure the readers that the regime was committed to 
continuing its developmental policies for the good of the East Timorese. 
This paternal image of Indonesia furthering the development of East Timor met 
with great opposition, not just from Western and East Timorese activists, but even from 
some Indonesians. Two academic studies rejected this image, detailing the occupation's 
Republic of Indonesia, East Timor After Integration, pp. 90-143; Republic of Indonesia, The 
Province of East Timor, pp. 21-49. 
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harmful effects on East Timor and effectively debunking the figures and rhetoric with 
which the Indonesian government advertised its developmental policies. By far the more 
critical of the two was George Aditjondro's In the Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The 
Impact of the Occupation of East Timor, which concluded that of the billions of rupiah 
pumped into developmental projects in East Timor, very little ever made it to the 
Timorese themselves. Instead, Aditjondro argued, Jakarta's development funds were 
often absorbed by Indonesian companies associated with the military. These companies 
had been established immediately following the invasion, and had been given lucrative 
monopolies over high-value goods such as sandalwood, marble, and coffee, which taken 
together, comprised East Timor's most profitable exports.29 Such corruption was 
endemic in the New Order, but Aditjondro's critique was especially bold given that it 
argued that the military's exploitation of East Timor's resources made the Timorese 
people themselves poorer. For along with monopolies came price controls, which 
meant that the military monopoly purchased a product at fixed below-market prices in 
East Timor, and sold it in a neighboring Indonesian province at an unregulated price, and 
for a hefty profit. Aditjondro further exacerbated his criticism of the regime's 
occupation policies by describing how other former Portuguese colonies were faring on 
the developmental index. His data were explosive: in almost all cases, these former 
George J. Aditjondro, In the Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the Occupation of East 
Timor (Leiden: INDOC, Indonesian Documentation and Information Center, 1994), pp. 57-62. 
30
 In the mid-1990s, Aditjondro successfully applied for asylum in Australia, fearing that he was 
about to be imprisoned for criticizing Suharto; Adam Schwarz, "Running for Cover," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, June 29, 1995, p. 29. He was thus no supporter of the New Order, which makes his 
negative analysis of the occupation suspect. However, as many of Aditjondro's conclusions, if not his tone, 
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colonies had higher literacy rates, more doctors, and higher per capita income than did 
East Timor. This held true for colonies even smaller than East Timor, such as Cabo 
Verde and Sao Tome e Principe, giving the lie to Indonesia's claim that micro-states were 
destined to fail.32 Aditjondro thus challenged the very foundations of the occupation, 
questioning its rationale and justification, and concluding that the occupation had actually 
been detrimental to both East Timor and the Republic itself.33 
A less antagonistic, yet still damning, study of the occupation's effects on East 
Timor was conducted in 1991 by a team at Gadjah Mada University led by Professor 
Mubyarto at the behest of the Bank of Indonesia. Their report, East Timor: The Impact of 
Integration, also concluded that rhetoric and reality did not agree in East Timor: "[w]hile 
the integration of East Timor... has brought physical progress... it has not yet been able to 
eliminate social, economic and political problems resulting from an integration process 
which has cost too many human lives."34 As George Aditjondro would find later, so 
Mubyarto and his team discovered that many development projects actually ended up 
harming the people they were supposed to assist. It was true, for instance, that the 
Indonesian government had built much low-cost housing in East Timor. However, the 
program was ineffective because the houses were similar in design to those on Java, with 
specifications unsuitable for East Timor's climate. And East Timor's agricultural 
Angola and Mozambique were major exceptions to this trend of Lusophone colonies doing well 
after independence. Both scored lower on Aditjondro's developmental index than did East Timor; Ibid., 
pp. 77-78. However, the poverty of these two countries was at least partly explicable due to ongoing 
warfare. 
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output had still not recovered from the war, as most farmers were unable to purchase 
modern tools.36 While Mubyarto et al. did not attribute these failings to avarice or 
cruelty, their conclusions nevertheless painted a grim portrait of Indonesia's development 
efforts, efforts hampered by the attitude of Indonesia's representatives in East Timor. 
East Timor: The Impact of Integration chronicled Indonesian arrogance towards the 
Timorese, stereotyped as backward and lazy. The East Timorese responded to this 
contempt with a marked distrust of Indonesians and their policies.37 This mutual 
stereotyping, coupled with what Mubyarto et al. characterized as ABRI's "excessive" 
presence, fostered secessionist tendencies and thus perpetuated the very problems that 
Indonesia was trying to correct.38 It was only through involving the East Timorese in 
their own province's development that the Indonesian government had any hope of 
winning them over. Mubyarto and his colleagues, in contrast to George Aditjondro, 
certainly saw this as possible and desirable, but they agreed with him that Indonesia's 
development policies in East Timor left much to be desired. 
The Republic Strikes Back: Defense and Offense 
The Santa Cruz massacre presented Indonesia with an enormous diplomatic 
challenge, effectively showing that many East Timorese did not accept integration despite 
its touted material benefits. Notwithstanding that its developmental policies had not 
bought loyalty, the New Order regime remained wedded to using the rhetoric of 
36
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modernization in response to the massacre. In this, Jakarta was not alone. Its defensive 
efforts corresponded to those of other authoritarian regimes in the early 1990s as they 
prepared to attend the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June 1993. 
With other Asian countries, especially China, Indonesia elaborated a position of 
developmental exceptionalism in regards to human rights, stating that human rights could 
be subservient to economic development.41 Addressing the Vienna Conference, Ali 
Alatas, Indonesia's Foreign Minister since 1988, argued that gross poverty was also a 
human rights violation, and that countries might choose to tackle this particular problem 
in advance of other violations.42 He also maintained that each country had the right to 
interpret what was meant by "human rights." Indonesia and other developing countries 
"do not and cannot maintain a purely individualistic approach towards human rights," 
both because they were more communally oriented than the West, and because the 
economic rights of the entire nation took precedence over those of the individual. The 
major justification for the New Order's existence—that it delivered economic 
development to its citizens—which was also a major justification for Indonesia's 
presence in East Timor, became the regime's primary excuse for any undemocratic action 
44 
or atrocity. 
Jakarta also engaged the services of Hill & Knowlton, a Washington-based public relations firm 
that was later used by Kuwait to effect American support against Iraq; Matthew Jardine, "Forgotten 
Genocide," The Progressive 56, 12 (December 1992), Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, Concordia 
University Libraries, March 6, 2007 <http://search.epnet.com>. 
41
 For more on the collective position taken by Asian leaders at the Vienna Conference, see 
Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 167; Challis, p. 169. 
42
 Ali Alatas, "A Balanced Approach to Global Action on Human Rights (Statement before the 
Second World Conference on Human Rights; Vienna, 14 June 1993)," in A Voice for a Just Peace: A 
Collection of Speeches by Ali Alatas (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), p. 475. 
43
 Ibid., p. 477. 
44
 It should be noted that pro-democracy activists in Indonesia called on the international 
community to refuse to accept the contention that development took priority over human rights. In May 
1993, a group of forty-nine Indonesian non-governmental organizations and 109 individual activists 
released a statement that refuted Alatas's future talking points in detail. The statement argued that 
85 
Closely linked with Indonesia's prioritization of development over human rights 
was a righteous fury that anyone dared challenge how the country managed its internal 
affairs. Indonesia's diplomatic representatives adopted an aggressive attitude that 
accused the regime's critics of racism and double standards. At the Vienna Conference, 
Ali Alatas, without any embarrassment, asked how Indonesia could be singled out for 
criticism when "a few hundred kilometers from here an entire nation is being subjected to 
brutal aggression, mass murder, systematic rape, and the inhuman practice of ethnic 
cleansing" without any strong international response.45 He went on to caution against 
"prejudicial publicity," which made some countries, specifically Indonesia, "the targets 
of unfair censure."4 An Indonesian military analyst went even further in a paper blasting 
"human rights" as a "political weapon" used by the West to keep the economies of 
developing countries from competing with them.47 Through these actions, the Republic's 
representatives attempted to diffuse and deflect the criticisms leveled at Indonesia in the 
wake of the Santa Cruz massacre. Soon after the event, Indonesia discovered that it no 
longer controlled the public and diplomatic narrative. Prior to the invasion, the regime 
development, while certainly a right, meant nothing unless accompanied by human dignity, and that human 
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had successfully managed the flow of information, and was able to ensure that its version 
of events was always in the foreground, but the government's ability to continue to shape 
the news, already teetering in the early 1990s, died amidst the gravestones of Santa Cruz. 
The Journalist Narrative 
Relevant journalistic coverage of the Santa Cruz massacre fell into two distinct 
phases. The first phase centered on numerous reports of the massacre in media around 
the world, featuring moving eyewitness accounts—East Timor became major news for 
the first time. One of the first major articles on the massacre, Helen Todd's "A Son's 
Death in East Timor," was written by the mother of a Western activist killed during the 
shooting. This moving and personalized reconstruction of the massacre was written with 
the mother witnessing for her dead son, and it merits comparison with the first-person 
account of the shooting by Allan Nairn, whose article for The New Yorker was one of the 
most indelible records of the killings. The second phase in coverage was marked by calls 
for action to aid the East Timorese. Moved by the eyewitness accounts of the shooting, 
both in print and on television, editors and journalists called for Western governments to 
take action to guarantee the rights of the East Timorese. Individual journalists, with 
Australian John Pilger leading the pack, made it their mission to report on and skewer 
Western complicity in the occupation. Foreign media coverage made the Santa Cruz 
massacre a prominent event and the killings came to symbolize Indonesia's East Timor 
policies for a worldwide audience. The new narrative of East Timor would always have 
to include the events of November 12. 
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Acts of Witness 
Helen Todd's memorialization of her son, twenty-year-old Kamal Bamadhaj, 
appeared in The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) on December 3, 1991, less than a 
month after the Massacre.48 Bamadhaj, a New Zealander and East Timor activist, had 
gone to Dili in late October, hoping to act as a translator for the Portuguese parliamentary 
delegation. Like many other foreigners, Bamadhaj was a witness of the march to the 
Santa Cruz cemetery, where, according to Indonesian officials, he was caught in the fire 
of Indonesian soldiers defending their lives against a fanatical and armed Timorese mob. 
When the smoke cleared, the official story went, Bamadhaj lay dead. Helen Todd's 
refusal to accept this story, coupled with her painstaking account—based on 
eyewitnesses—of Bamadhaj's last hours were the subject of "A Son's Death in East 
Timor." 
While Constancio Pinto claimed that the memorial march was carefully 
organized, Helen Todd saw it as an act of desperation on the part of East Timorese 
activists, who had already exposed themselves to Indonesian reprisals by agreeing to be 
interviewed by Portuguese parliamentarians, and thus thought they were about to be 
arrested anyway. Indeed, Todd reported that her son had written to her that unless the 
international community took action, the Timorese would experience "another wave of 
genocide." The East Timor described by Todd was not a hopeful place, but one where 
the Indonesian security apparatus held sway and Indonesia's developmental rhetoric hid 
its rapaciousness. 
All references in the next few paragraphs are from Helen Todd, "A Son's Death in East Timor," 
The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), December 3, 1991, p. A14. 
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As life in occupied East Timor was desperate, so too, according to Helen Todd, 
was the death of her son. Basing her account on conversations with Anton Marti, the Dili 
representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who had been with 
Bamadhaj in his last hours, Todd assembled an account that demonstrated the casual 
cruelty and general untrustworthiness of the Indonesian authorities. According to Marti, 
he had found Kamal Bamadhaj lying in his own blood after the shooting, desperately 
clutching his New Zealand passport and pleading for aid. Marti had put him in a Red 
Cross jeep and tried to drive him to a hospital, only to be stopped and turned back at two 
ABRI roadblocks. By the time they finally got through the security cordon, it was too 
late, he had bled to death. The Indonesian soldiers had been fully aware that Bamadhaj 
was a foreigner, wrote Todd, underscoring the fact that East Timorese received even 
worse medical treatment than her fatally wounded son had received. What the shooting 
proved, concluded Todd, was that Indonesia had convinced the world that the occupation 
was beneficial for East Timor without convincing the Timorese themselves and that the 
only way for Indonesia to maintain control was through violence. 
Among the most moving accounts of that violence was Allan Nairn's article in 
"The Talk of the Town" section of The New Yorker on December 9, 1991. Unlike Helen 
Todd, Nairn was an eyewitness to the Santa Cruz massacre. His story meshed well with 
hers, particularly about the brutality of the Indonesian occupation and the unreliability of 
ABRI's accounts of what had happened. Like Todd, Nairn described a territory living in 
fear, where the caked blood of the murdered Sebastiao Gomes still could be clearly seen 
on the steps where he had been shot and killed on October 28. And yet, according to 
49
 Allan Nairn, "The Talk of the Town: Notes and Comment," The New Yorker, December 9, 
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Nairn, the East Timorese were generally unbowed. The memorial march was not an act 
of desperation, but a highly disciplined expression of East Timorese rejection of 
Indonesian rule. Even so, Nairn recalled that the march was "astonish[ing]" in scope, 
with more and more people joining the demonstrators as they moved through Dili; "East 
Timor and its occupiers surely hadn't witnessed such a bold public display in years," he 
noted.50 
It was into this disciplined and nonthreatening mob that Indonesian soldiers fired. 
According to Nairn, there was no doubt that ABRI meant to shoot the demonstrators. 
Soldiers had not fired in defense of their lives, as the Indonesian government later 
claimed, but had marched up the street, formed up, raised their rifles, and shot into the 
crowd.51 It was, according to Nairn, "deliberate mass murder": "[f]he soldiers simply 
shot several hundred unarmed men, women, and children." Nor did the killing stop 
after the initial volleys. Nairn and Amy Goodman, another American journalist, were 
themselves beaten (Nairn's skull was fractured) and their equipment seized, while "[a]ll 
around, other soldiers were executing Timorese." Nairn was convinced the soldiers 
were about to shoot him and Goodman, as well, until the two managed to pull out their 
American passports. This immediately gave the soldiers a shock: "[apparently because 
we were from the United States.. .a country that provided Indonesia with fifty million 
dollars in outright aid this year, and sells it most of its weapons.. .the soldiers decided not 
to shoot us."54 Nairn and Goodman were able to flee on a passing truck, leaving behind 
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constituted a powerful indictment of the occupation. The Indonesians found it nearly 
impossible to refute the accounts of a grieving mother and a wounded eyewitness. Their 
testimony spread rapidly throughout the foreign media, establishing the Santa Cruz 
massacre as a worldwide icon for Indonesian colonial brutality. 
Action and Activism 
The idea that the West needed to do something about the East Timor situation was 
implicit in the work of Helen Todd and Allan Nairn. In the United States, opposition to 
the occupation in the wake of the shooting was especially evident in the editorial pages of 
such influential newspapers as The New York Times and The Washington Post. The New 
York Times, already opposed to the occupation, specifically cited Nairn's and Goodman's 
experiences when criticizing the Indonesians in an editorial on November 21, 1991.55 
The same article lamented the fact that few Americans knew anything about East Timor, 
and that the world had "deservedly punished" Iraq for undertaking the same action in 
Kuwait that Indonesia had taken in East Timor.56 In early December, another Times 
editorial, written by long-time columnist Anthony Lewis, explicitly criticized the 
Administration of President George H.W. Bush for its commitment to a "realist" foreign 
policy, especially the State Department's conviction that "quiet diplomacy," which Lewis 
castigated as merely asking Suharto to treat the East Timorese more nicely, was the best 
en 
way to handle Jakarta. Lewis, for his part, pointed out that decades of such "quiet 
diplomacy" had utterly failed to prevent the shooting in the first place and had, indeed, 
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failed to curb any harsh policies throughout the occupation. Realism, according to 
Lewis, had become an excuse for inaction and acquiescence; a robust international 
response was required to end the occupation and bring justice to East Timor. 
The Washington Post was as scathing as The New York Times in its editorial 
treatment of Indonesia following the Santa Cruz massacre, but it kept up its attack 
considerably longer than the Times. The Post's first treatment of the killing appeared on 
November 20, 1991, in an editorial that attacked American support for Indonesia's 
conquest of East Timor, support which might have made sense in the context of the Cold 
War but was unconscionable after the 1989 Revolutions.59 Another editorial on 
December 9 once again pointed out that the end of the Cold War allowed many 
"previously inhibited" people "to ask for change in a place like Indonesia," and went on 
to advocate self-determination for East Timor.60 Another editorial a year after the 
shooting labeled Indonesia an exploitative imperialist power and reiterated the call for 
East Timorese self-determination.61 By this point, it was clear that hopes for a resolution 
to the East Timor issue in the aftermath of Santa Cruz were mistaken. However, these 
editorials clearly show the reasoning that editors used to criticize U.S. support for 
Indonesia; the rubric of anti-Communism no longer allowed the United States to excuse 
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Indonesia's repression in the post-Cold War world. They also showed that the editors 
of major American dailies expected the government's human rights rhetoric to actually 
mean something, and that Western policy towards international crimes needed to become 
consistent, without regard to political circumstances. 
With some media outlets now less willing to accept Indonesia's version of events 
in East Timor, journalists were free to engage in muckraking exposes of international 
support for the occupation. John Pilger was the best exemplar of this breed, ceaselessly 
writing and speaking against the occupation and attacking every country that supported it. 
His tactics were guaranteed to offend. In 1992, he traveled undercover to East Timor 
with Max Stahl, a British cameraman who had smuggled footage of the Santa Cruz 
massacre to the outside world. The two filmed their journey throughout the occupied 
territory, chronicling a continuous Indonesian security presence, despite Suharto's pledge 
to draw down ABRI's numbers in East Timor. One of the reasons Pilger made this 
journey was to examine reported mass graves of Santa Cruz victims; however, he and 
Stahl came to believe that all of East Timor was a mass grave, "marked by paths that 
ended abruptly, and fields inexplicably bulldozed, and earth inexplicably covered with 
tarmac; and by the legions of crosses." The November 1991 shooting, according to 
Indeed, the U.S. State Department no longer used the exigencies of anti-Communism to excuse 
its support for Indonesia. When queried in 1992, State Department witness Kenneth Quinn told the U.S. 
Senate that American support for Indonesia was based on the fact that Indonesia was the world's largest 
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determined American support for Suharto, not anti-Communism; United States Senate, "Hearing of the 
East Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subject: East Timor. 
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Pilger, was merely the killing that was noticed. It was not an aberration, as Indonesia's 
Western defenders claimed, but the norm. 
For John Pilger, the occupation was inextricably linked with foreign support. 
Indonesia could act with relative impunity because it was enabled and protected by 
Western countries. This was not a revelation—Western commercial and strategic ties 
with Indonesia were well-documented—but Pilger was unique in his ability to find 
incriminating and embarrassing evidence of foreign complicity in atrocities in East 
Timor. He was especially critical of the British government, which increased aid to 
Indonesia by 250 percent following the massacre, "the largest percentage rise of any 
donor country."65 Pilger managed to link this aid directly to Indonesia's military 
activities in East Timor. For instance, the British government sold several BAE Hawk 
aircraft to the Indonesian Air Force, after ABRI promised not to use them for offensive 
purposes. Yet, when Pilger interviewed Alan Clark, a Defense Procurement Minister 
under Margaret Thatcher, he found that such a guarantee had never been asked for, 
indeed, that Clark would not have accepted one even if it had been offered. According to 
an unabashed Clark: "[fjhat [the guarantee] must have been something the Foreign Office 
did.. .a guarantee is worthless from any government as far as I'm concerned."66 In this 
one interview, Pilger effectively skewered the British government's assurance that it was 
not facilitating Indonesian military actions in East Timor.67 And in the aftermath of 
65
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Santa Cruz, it was difficult to convince the public that such military actions would lead to 
anything less than the murder of more peaceful demonstrators. 
The Truth Commission's Narrative 
The Santa Cruz massacre had an ambiguous place in the findings of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation. East Timor's truth commission 
endorsed the idea that the shooting was one of the most prominent and momentous events 
of the occupation, but then shied away from describing the events of the massacre, 
instead devoting the majority of its account of the Santa Cruz atrocity to an examination 
of the aftermath of the shooting, especially the multiple investigations conducted by 
Indonesia and the international community. This fascinating occurrence is the subject 
of this section. 
The Massacre 
In some respects, according to the CAVR, the years preceding the Santa Cruz 
massacre, dating from the early 1980s, were far less onerous for many Timorese than the 
bloodbath and horror that had followed immediately after the 1975 invasion. The 
dearth of mass killings, however, did not mean that the Indonesian occupiers forswore 
violence. In this respect, the Santa Cruz massacre was a natural outgrowth of Indonesia's 
repression. What made the Santa Cruz shooting noteworthy was that it revealed to the 
Action" and their trial in Andrea Needham, Jen Parker, and Jo Wilson, "Seeds of Hope—East Timor 
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world the "violent oppression by the Indonesian military of ordinary East Timorese," and 
made such oppression undeniable.70 It was, the CAVR stated, the "turning point in world 
opinion [about] the territory," confirming what East Timor's advocates had been 
claiming: that East Timor was anything but pacified under Indonesian rule, that 
Indonesia's control was maintained through violence, and that the East Timorese had the 
right to freely decide their national fate.71 The truth commission insisted that East 
Timor's struggle for freedom was inseparable from the 1991 massacre in Dili. 
The findings of the CAVR about Santa Cruz are straightforward. The 
Commission concurred with eyewitness statements that ABRI had fired into an "unarmed 
and peaceful crowd."72 The CAVR also made exhaustive use of ballistics evidence to 
prove that there had been few attempts on the part of ABRI to keep casualties to a 
minimum; Indonesian troops opened fire with little if any warning and had shot to kill. 
The Commission also found that those wounded in the shooting had been mistreated, 
often by being subjected to interrogation, including torture, before receiving medical 
treatment, and, in some cases, being taken directly from hospitals to be killed by 
Indonesian forces.74 The disappearances of many wounded demonstrators from the 
hospitals made it difficult for the truth commission to offer an accurate estimate of how 
70
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many died in the massacre, however, it felt that a figure of 200 casualties was 
"not.. .unreasonable."75 
A great deal of ChegaPs, narrative about the Santa Cruz massacre summarized the 
multiple inquiries that had been conducted after the killings. The CAVR was 
overwhelmingly critical of the six investigations that Jakarta launched to examine the 
atrocity, blasting them for sloppy work, undue willingness to privilege the testimony of 
ABRI members over that of the wounded and other eyewitnesses, and eagerness to place 
blame for the shooting on the demonstrators.76 Indonesia's investigations into Santa Cruz 
were, the CAVR concluded, little more than "damage limitation and deliberate attempts 
to manufacture a version" of the massacre that was critical enough of the military that it 
would alleviate international criticism, but not so onerous that it threatened "the 
institutional mechanisms of impunity which protected" ABRI members from harsh 
77 
censure over human rights violations. 
In contrast to the Indonesian investigations, the CAVR presented a detailed 
78 
breakdown of unit and individual responsibility for the shooting. Yet, the Commission 
was the first to admit that its investigation of the massacre was incomplete. According to 
Chega!, the truth commission lacked the time and resources to fully examine the 
70 
massacre and its aftermath. It had discovered the potential existence of two mass 
graves containing remains of those murdered during and after the massacre, but it had not 
been able to exhume them.80 Time constraints had also hampered the CAVR's 
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investigation into the massacre. In addition, the Indonesian government had been 
exceptionally unhelpful, refusing to release its records about the shooting or assist in 
tracing East Timorese who disappeared after the massacre. Yet, despite these very real 
constraints, the CAVR's treatment of the Santa Cruz massacre also resulted from those 
things it chose to emphasize in this period of East Timor's history, namely the 
development of the second-generation clandestine urban resistance and that resistance's 
focus on diplomatic, rather than armed, methods of achieving self-determination. 
Patterns 
In agreement with Constancio Pinto and the unknown author of "If only I were 
Free," the CAVR found that the crucial component of the long-term resistance to the 
occupation was East Timor's youth. The urbanization of the Timorese population under 
the occupation, as well as expanding access to education, created the foundations for 
renewed resistance that the Indonesian authorities had hoped to avoid with their 
modernization of East Timor.83 Furthermore, Chega! emphasized, the student resistance 
was highly organized, both inside East Timor and in the archipelago as a whole. From 
the mid 1980s, young East Timorese began to articulate their grievances against the 
occupation system, and, gradually, their tactics and aims solidified. The CAVR located 
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the genesis of this new clandestine resistance in the 1989 visit of Pope John Paul II to 
East Timor. This event became a "watershed in the activities of the youth clandestine 
movement," with a peaceful pro-independence demonstration occurring during the Papal 
mass, in front of foreign media, and despite a massive Indonesian security presence. 
The aim of the clandestine resistance, shown by this and other demonstrations, was to 
gain international visibility, to prove that the Timorese had not acquiesced to Indonesian 
rule. The Santa Cruz demonstration was the continuation of long-term resistance 
strategy, conforming to patterns and goals established in the 1980s. Demonstrations such 
as the one preceding the shooting were characteristic of the new resistance that formed 
after the destruction of massive armed resistance in 1979. 
As seen in the previous chapter, the truth commission was highly critical of the 
Fretilin-led armed resistance of the mid-to-late 1970s. It was much more comfortable 
with, even laudatory of, the resistance that emerged after the defeat at Mount Matebian. 
As described by the Commission, the new resistance was more realistic and less 
ideological than its Fretilin predecessor, with its leaders realizing that they could never 
defeat the Indonesians militarily, but would have to rely on international pressure to force 
Indonesia to moderate its East Timor policy.87 This did not mean that Falintil grounded 
arms, but rather that its aim shifted from "win[ing] the war" with Indonesia to "add[ing] 
weight to the demands of a wider resistance" as enunciated by the clandestine youth 
go 
movement in its demonstrations and by East Timor's diplomats in foreign capitals. The 
new resistance, as described by the CAVR, was one of concrete and realistic action, not 
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ideology and suicidal bravery. It was a resistance whose members were capable of a 
Santa Cruz demonstration, a tactic at which old Fretilin cadres would have scoffed. 
The benefits of this tactical shift was a point much stressed by the Commission 
for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, which listed "diplomacy" as "the most 
important factor in achieving self-determination" for East Timor. Such diplomacy was 
made possible when the resistance abandoned Fretilin's hard-line policies of non-
negotiation and self-reliance.90 The Santa Cruz massacre, in the CAVR's chronology, 
thus coincided with the development of an inclusive East Timorese nationalist movement 
that moderately advocated self-determination for the territory, rather than outright 
independence.91 And it was this inclusive movement, which would come to include not 
only members of Fretilin, but also of the UDT and Apodeti, that culminated in the 
successful independence vote in 1999. One event, even one as heinous as Santa Cruz, 
was secondary to the broader picture of how the resistance, especially its clandestine 
wing, developed into what the CAVR called one of the "most successful movements of 
people's diplomacy" in the twentieth century. The Santa Cruz massacre, while 
undeniably important, even "pivotal," to the maturity of the resistance, was not the truth 
commission s focus.94 It was the process, rather than the event, that seemed to matter. 
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Conclusion 
The massacre at Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery was a pivotal event in East Timor's 
modern history. Before the shooting, Indonesia had been able to proudly declare that it 
had brought modernization to backwater East Timor and that the Timorese, aside from a 
few malcontents, appreciated these efforts. Opposition to Indonesia's colonialist policies 
in East Timor emerged among Indonesians themselves, and some of them wrote pieces 
attacking the occupation as immoral, wasteful, and neocolonialist. However, Suharto's 
dictatorship, at the height of elaborating its development policies and with world opinion 
on its side, could afford to ignore such dissidents. After November 12, 1991, this was no 
longer possible. The brutality of Indonesian rule had been exposed before the world, and 
claims that the Timorese accepted Jakarta's suzerainty lay in tatters. 
The Santa Cruz demonstration was not an isolated incident. From the late 1980s 
on, young East Timorese had taken to the streets to make their dissatisfaction with the 
occupation known. A highly committed clandestine resistance had been organized 
among students both within the territory and throughout the wider archipelago. 
Ironically, the very education opportunities that were meant to Indonesianize young 
Timorese introduced them to a greater knowledge of anti-colonialism and gave them the 
tools to communicate to Indonesians the injustice of the occupation using their own 
nationalist rhetoric. Thus, by 1991, the East Timorese resistance movement had matured 
beyond its early self-destructive emphasis on Marxism and ideological purity. And it was 
this maturation, the transformation of the East Timorese resistance into a coherent and 
representative nationalist movement, which culminated in independence by the end of the 
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century. This was the story which the Commission for Reception, Truth, and 
Reconciliation emphasized in its study. The mobilization for the demonstration which 
led to the Santa Cruz massacre reflected the maturation of the resistance movement; its 
success in transforming world opinion validated the new strategies of the resistance. 
It would be a mistake to completely subsume the massacre into the chronicle of 
the East Timorese resistance and to flatten the story of the second resistance. The events 
of November 1991 were so pivotal because, for many Westerners, they were the first 
indication that East Timor existed, let alone that atrocities occurred there. It was the 
media coverage of the massacre, the moving personal recollections of Helen Todd and 
Allan Nairn, and the footage of East Timorese screaming and running for their lives amid 
the crack of bullets, which made November 12 matter. The presence of international 
observers guaranteed that Santa Cruz did not fade from memory. The narrative of East 
Timor would now be colored by the massacre and many subsequent events would be seen 
through the prism of its dead. In contrast to the 1970s, this was a narrative beyond 
Indonesia's control. The situation in East Timor was now synonymous with murder of 
the weak and innocent. After Santa Cruz, it was impossible to ignore East Timor's claim 
for independence and justice. The East Timorese and their wishes were now the key part 
of the story. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POPULAR CONSULTATION AND DESTRUCTION, 1999 
On December 10, 1996, Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta 
accepted Nobel Peace Prizes in Oslo.1 In his acceptance speech, Belo, head of the 
Catholic Church in East Timor since 1983, affirmed that the Timorese people desired 
peace with Indonesia and called for respect for human rights.2 Jose Ramos-Horta, 
speaking for the CNRM, took the opportunity to outline a peace plan for East Timor. 
This plan envisioned a period of at least seven years during which East Timor would gain 
autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia. An act of self-determination could then be 
proclaimed if all parties agreed.3 This proposal, elaborated before a huge international 
audience, was an example of the resistance asserting its primacy: it, not the Indonesian 
government, represented East Timor and its people. After the end of the Cold War and 
following the Santa Cruz massacre, East Timor could no longer be ignored by the world, 
and the impetus for a resolution to the conflict grew. Yet when a resolution occurred in 
1999, as 78.5 percent of the Timorese voted for independence, it was in the face of 
Indonesian opposition, intra-Timorese violence, and the erupting tensions of the 
territory's past. 
1
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October 24, 1996, pp. 16-17; Keith D. Suter, "The Nobel Peace Prize and East Timor," Contemporary 
Review 270, 1577 (June 1997), Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, Concordia University Libraries, 
January 30, 2007 <http://search.epnet.com>; Kohen, pp. 220-253. 
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1996," Indonesia 64 (October 1997): p. 158. 
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 Jose Ramos-Horta, "The Nobel Lecture Given by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, 1996," 
Indonesia 64 (October 1997): p. 168. Ramos-Horta was not always so conciliatory. Soon after learning he 
had received the Peace Prize, Ramos-Horta had pledged to "intensify the resistance in East Timor, in 
Indonesia and the international arena," and called Indonesia's claims of legitimacy in East Timor an 
"illusion," hardly language appealing to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry; Cohen, "Nobel Calling," p. 17. 
The East Timorese Narrative 
Relatively few Timorese have written at length about their personal experiences 
during the Popular Consultation. Representative figures such as Constancio Pinto have 
yet to set down their experiences in print about this period. Thus, the East Timorese 
narrative of the events of the late 1990s must be gleaned from interviews and reporting at 
the time. These records indicate that the Timorese were profoundly conscious of the 
divisions that existed within their society, divisions that would have to be overcome if the 
nation in formation was to develop and survive. 
The Meaning of Collaboration 
Many East Timorese supported a continuing Indonesian presence in 1999, and 
feared what would happen to them if the pro-independence side succeeded in the August 
vote. It was a problem of which Xanana Gusmao was intensely aware. In a 1998 
interview with Far Eastern Economic Review reporter Margot Cohen, he spoke of the 
need to "respect the rights of the losers" of any referendum on East Timor's future 
status.4 The major political task facing the East Timorese, Gusmao elaborated, was to 
convince those Timorese supporting integration that their rights, especially "their right to 
live," would be respected.5 Implicit in Gusmao's statements was his fear that the 
Timorese were so traumatized, not only by the occupation, but by the memories and 
4
 Margot Cohen, "Crack in the Wall," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 3, 1998, p. 24. 
5
 Ibid. 
grudges of the Civil War, that the chance for East Timor to finally determine its own 
future could easily evaporate amidst mass bloodletting on all sides.6 
Yet, the harsh social divisions and hardened identities that Gusmao and others 
feared were perceived by other contemporary observers to be less rigid and permanent. 
Two 1999 FEER articles, both written by Dan Murphy, showed that Timorese who 
supported the occupation had identities more malleable than the label "collaborator" 
could encompass. The first article, Murphy's "Up in Arms," profiled Martinho 
Fernandes, a civil servant and proud militia leader. Fernandes had a long history of 
support for integration: he was formerly a member of Apodeti, he had been imprisoned 
by Fretilin during the Civil War, and had acted as a guide for Kopassus after the 
Indonesians freed him in 1977. Fernandes did not hide the fact that he was still prepared 
to fight for integration and he justified the creation of militias as a necessary precaution 
given that Falintil remained armed. In many ways Fernandes's profile seemed to 
confirm the existence of irreconcilable divisions within Timorese society. However, his 
family life made the situation much more complex. In the 1970s, Fernandes had adopted 
a boy named Francisco Gusmao, a relative of Xanana Gusmao, after the child's father 
was murdered by ABRI. Among the "things peace has got going for it," according to 
Murphy, was the fact that Fernandes had not only adopted a relative of the resistance's 
leader, but also that the father and stepson maintained a cordial relationship despite the 
fact that Francisco Gusmao was staunchly pro-independence. Similar situations were 
6
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relatively common in East Timor. As had been the case with the brothers Arsenio and 
Jose Ramos-Horta in the 1970s, so it was also in the 1990s: politics could divide families, 
but not necessarily sunder them. 
Dan Murphy further demonstrated the tenuous nature of collaboration in occupied 
East Timor in "Local Hero," a profile of Oscar Lima, a former Falintil guerrilla who had 
started a construction company and become a millionaire, becoming an undeniable 
beneficiary of the occupation who remained "a staunch supporter of independence."10 
Indeed, Lima was close friends with Xanana Gusmao and claimed the latter had regularly 
snuck into his house for dinner in the early 1990s. Lima's motivation was not entirely 
nationalistic. With his highly placed resistance contacts, Lima would benefit immensely 
from independent East Timor's business opportunities, especially if political 
independence coincided with the departure of the Indonesian businessmen who then 
dominated the territory's economy. Nevertheless, the fact that Lima would support 
independence, with all its intangibles and uncertainties, over the status quo from which 
he benefited enormously exposed "the depth of Jakarta's failure to win over the hearts 
and minds of the East Timorese." It also underscored the fact that there were few 
absolutes in occupied Timor. Collaboration and resistance were flexible concepts. If 
they lived in East Timor, even the most ardent nationalist had to reach some sort of 
accommodation with the regime. And likewise, someone who benefited from the 
occupation or believed in integration would not necessarily assume that those opposed to 
Indonesian rule were traitors. While East Timor's society before the August ballot was 
certainly fractured, there were also reasons to believe that self-determination could 
10
 This paragraph is based on Dan Murphy, "Local Hero," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
February 18, 1999, p. 47. 
evolve without mass violence. Few might have believed in that likelihood, but the 
potential was undeniable. 
Blame and Reconciliation 
The mass violence that engulfed East Timor in 1998 and 1999 was hardly 
unanticipated. Militia violence had exploded across the territory and it was clear that the 
groups were being supported by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (National Army of 
Indonesia, TNI). Indeed, an Asiaweek investigation concluded that without the TNI, "the 
militia would disappear overnight." This assessment of the relative weakness of the 
militias without military support was echoed and extended by John Pilger, still active on 
behalf of East Timorese independence. In a September 1999 article for London's 
Guardian Unlimited, he insisted that Indonesia was deceiving the West into believing 
that the Timorese themselves caused violence in East Timor. On the contrary, he 
claimed, most militia members "are not East Timorese at all, but Indonesian soldiers in 
disguise."12 While Pilger's point was undoubtedly flawed by the fact that he ignored the 
glaring evidence of intra-Timorese antagonism, it was also representative of a major 
" The article further noted that militia membership could be economical; some militia members 
were paid, and steady income was attractive. The pay was, of course, provided by the TNI; Tom 
McCawley, "Murderous Puppets," Asiaweek, September 17, 1999 <http://www-
cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/99/0917/militia.html> (accessed July 25, 2007). Another 
Asiaweek article estimated that the TNI had provided at least 10,000 weapons, including Ml6 rifles, to 
militia members by the fall of 1999; Sangwon Suh and Tom McCawley, "East Timor's Agony," Asiaweek, 
September 17, 1999 <http://www-cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/99/0917/coverl.html> 
(accessed July 25, 2007). 
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<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/> (accessed January 31, 2007). 
resistance trope: that the TNI, virtually alone, was responsible for the violence gripping 
1 T 
East Timor during the Popular Consultation period. 
This was certainly the view of Xanana Gusmao who, despite his 
misapprehensions about tensions among East Timorese, placed the blame for the pre-
ballot violence solely on the TNI. Interviewed by the Far Eastern Economic Review on 
August 5, 1999, Gusmao told the questioner that he was most concerned about how the 
TNI, rather than the militias, would respond to East Timor's independence.14 The 
militias, he opined, were composed of "our brothers," who would be amenable to a 
"political approach" by the pro-independence activists, whereas the TNI, with its history 
of bloody suppression and stated disinclination to release East Timor from the Republic, 
made him "very, very worried." Thus, less than a month before the ballot, the 
announced results of which would cause the militias to lay waste to East Timor, Gusmao 
expressed more concern about the Indonesian Army than about potential civil war. 
Indeed, he warned Indonesia's Defense Minister, General Wiranto, to rein in his 
Indonesian troops, otherwise they would "suffer many casualties" at the hands of 
Falintil.16 Gusmao and others here seemed more prepared for war with Indonesia, with 
combating another invasion or covert destabilization program, than with confronting 
In an interesting counterpoint, Allan Nairn had snuck into East Timor in the spring of 1999 and 
secured an interview with Herminio da Costa, a high-ranking militia commander, who bragged that the 
militias had received a "conditional license to kill" from the TNI: so long as the militias attacked pro-
independence demonstrators, the police and TNI would leave them alone. Nairn's careful report is a more 
convincing portrayal of events in East Timor at this time than Pilger's invective; Allan Nairn, "License to 
Kill in East Timor," The Nation, May, 31, 1999 <http://www.thenation.com/archive/> (accessed August 7, 
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deported by the Indonesians, who had been wary of letting him report from the country ever since his 
coverage of Santa Cruz; "Indonesians Deport an American Journalist," The New York Times, September 20, 
1999, p. A6. 
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20. 
15
 Ibid., p. 22. 
domestic problems. Perhaps, after more than two decades of occupation, looking to the 
Indonesians as the source of all traumas in East Timor was a natural response. By 
focusing criticism on the TNI rather than Timorese militias, Gusmao effectively appealed 
to international opinion, which already perceived Indonesia as an aggressor and potential 
spoiler. The media-savvy Gusmao was also arguing against the idea that East Timor was 
about to be ripped apart by civil war, an idea that the Indonesians had successfully 
disseminated, as will be seen. An unstable East Timor would have difficulty acquiring 
international aid and protection, whereas an East Timor portrayed as recovering from 
Indonesian depredations committed in the face of an internationally-sanctioned act of 
self-determination would be more appealing to world public opinion. 
The horrific aftermath of the August 1999 ballot required that newly independent 
East Timor confront its past. Its political leaders, especially Gusmao, opted to pursue a 
policy of reconciliation, consistent with the political solution he had said he wanted to 
offer pro-integrationists in the months before the vote.18 This process, which would 
culminate in the establishment of the CAVR, was seen by the country's leadership as 
"vital to the political and economic renaissance the new nation so urgently needs." 
There was a sense in East Timor, Margot Cohen reported, that the relative peacefulness 
Jose Ramos-Horta was also threatening Indonesia with dire consequences should it not allow the 
ballot to take place. On August 17, 1999, he threatened to unleash a "desperate and ferocious" internet 
campaign against Indonesia if it refused to abide by the results of the August 30 ballot. Ramos-Horta 
claimed that 100 hackers in Europe and the United States were prepared to unleash computer viruses 
against Indonesian interests, affecting everything from the Jakarta stock exchange to Indonesian air traffic 
control. Indonesia, it was reported, took this threat "extremely serious[ly]," although many analysts 
concluded that Ramos-Horta was bluffing; David T. Hill, "East Timor and the Internet: Global Political 
Leverage in/on Indonesia," Indonesia 73 (April 2002): pp. 42-43. 
18
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of the early 2000s was contingent on some form of non-retributive justice being applied 
to the perpetrators of the most recent violence.20 The bitterness engendered by the events 
of 1999 remained and threatened to explode in further violence unless steps were taken to 
alleviate the tension. 
What the leadership of East Timor chose, or were constrained by circumstances, 
to do was described by Adelino Gomes, a prominent Portuguese journalist, in 2004.21 
Gomes recounted the CAVR hearing on Internal Political Conflict, held in Dili in 
December 2003 and attended by most of East Timor's past and present political leaders. 
Gomes reported that former Fretilin Central Committee members admitted responsibility 
and asked forgiveness for human rights violations during the Civil War, a conflict that a 
UDT leader apologized for beginning. The meeting ended with Gomes almost in tears as 
the representatives from all the old parties shared a spontaneous group hug. As Gomes 
recounted it, the hearing was a resounding success for political reconciliation, and, by 
extension, for the policy of reconciliation throughout East Timor.22 The country's leaders 
hoped for peace, but the question was whether they would be able to achieve it in 
practice. 
The Indonesian Narrative 
Responses among Indonesians to the events of 1999 in East Timor were complex. 
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Habibie's East Timor policy to be irresponsible and opportunistic, and felt that any 
alteration of the Republic's borders during a period of political transition was potentially 
disastrous.23 Others in the Indonesian government considered East Timor to be too much 
of a diplomatic and economic liability to be worth retaining, not just an irritating "pebble 
in our shoe," in the words of an anonymous Indonesian diplomat and government 
minister, but "a millstone around our neck."24 Another group, including much of the 
military, agreed with militia leader Martinho Fernandes, who refused to surrender 
integration without violence. Still others were so preoccupied with their own concerns, 
including living in a country that had just undergone a revolution and was in the midst of 
economic meltdown, that they could spare little thought for events in a distant province. 
And some Indonesians considered the resolution of the East Timor situation to be the 
litmus test for Indonesia's new democracy.25 Many of these responses will be considered 
in this section, using the report of the Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia 
di Timor Timur (Investigative Commission on Abuses of Human Rights in East Timor, 
KPP HAM) and Ali Alatas's view of the East Timor situation from inside the government 
of Indonesia as described by him in The Pebble in the Shoe. 
KPP HAM 
23
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I l l 
In late September 1999, the Indonesian government charged KPP HAM to 
investigate human rights violations in East Timor from January to October 1999.26 KPP 
HAM's conclusions were explosive, not merely accusing the TNI of orchestrating the 
pre- and post-ballot violence, but also challenging the very legitimacy of the occupation 
itself. This historical revisionism began in the first pages of the report, when KPP HAM 
denigrated the Indonesian government's past assertions that the Timorese had freely 
chosen to become part of the Republic. In fact, the Investigative Commission concluded, 
the New Order's East Timor policy in the mid 1970s was a conscious "effort to suppress 
the right to self-determination" of the Timorese. The occupation had run "counter to 
the fundamental rights of the people of East Timor" and represented an illegal act of 
Indonesian aggression. The events of 1999 were not an aberration, but the continuation 
9Q 
of a pattern of murder, torture, and destruction. 
In the case of the period of its mandate—January to October 1999—KPP HAM's 
report completely dismissed the notion that the East Timorese had been divided into two 
factions battling on equal terms for control of the territory's future. There had been no 
civil war, no chaotic bloodletting, but instead a "systematic, planned, collective, massive, 
T A 
and widespread" effort to terrorize the Timorese. The actual perpetrators were often 
Timorese themselves, especially after the May 5 Agreement, when the TNI found itself 
suddenly subjected to intense international scrutiny.31 However, the militias' violence 
26
 The former month refers to Habibie's announcement that East Timor would be allowed to 
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was, KPP HAM concluded, unquestionably sanctioned and instigated by the TNI, which 
used the militias as "proxy forces." According to the report, militias and the TNI 
carried out joint operations against pro-independence Timorese, the military both armed 
and stored weapons for the militias, and militia ceremonies were attended by prominent 
military figures.33 This meant that the Indonesian authorities not only tolerated, but 
actively encouraged the militias, and it was these authorities, especially those serving in 
the security apparatus, that bore the blame for the disaster that had engulfed East Timor 
in 1999.34 
After squarely blaming the Indonesian military for the destruction of East Timor, 
KPP HAM compiled a preliminary list of individuals that it felt should be investigated 
and tried. The list was wide-ranging and included not only militia leaders and culpable 
members of the TNI and the police—those who had personally committed human rights 
violations—but also Indonesian bureaucrats serving in East Timor and military 
commanders.35 Of especial import was the fact that the indictments prominently listed 
Defense Minister Wiranto. In KPP HAM's estimation, the plans for post-ballot militia 
violence were so comprehensive and relatively open that he must have known about 
them. It argued that he had, in fact, either approved the plans himself or simply allowed 
32
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them to be carried out. The fact that a civilian organization, government-sanctioned or 
not, could contemplate the indictment of the head of the Indonesian armed forces was a 
sure sign of the waning power of the military in the immediate aftermath of the May 
Revolution, although it must be noted that the Indonesian Attorney-General's Office 
repressed the report until March 2001. 
Ali Alatas 
Indonesia's former Foreign Minister wrote his memoir of East Timor diplomacy, 
The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor, for, he argued, "the 
sake of completeness." In many respects, Alatas seemed well placed to offer an 
insider's perspective on this issue. He was a veteran member of the Indonesian Foreign 
Service, and as Foreign Minister had constantly defended the occupation, a fact evident 
in the previous chapter. Alatas also served as Foreign Minister during the most important 
T O 
Indo-Portuguese negotiations over the future of East Timor. Alatas's book describes 
these negotiations in some detail. Alatas portrayed the talks as immensely frustrating, 
marred by constant bickering over diplomatic minutiae and protocol. Worst for Alatas, 
however, was what he considered to be Portugal's unprofessional conduct, which he 
blamed for retarding any progress towards a solution. Indeed, for Alatas, the problems 
KPP HAM also faulted Wiranto for publicly and repeatedly hailing the productive nature of the 
TNI-militia relationship, which effectively sanctioned their violent anti-independence activities; Ibid., p. 
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that Indonesia faced because of East Timor were most often not of the Republic's own 
making, but rather the result of international connivance, sloppiness, or bad judgement. 
Despite his airing of the regime's position that East Timor was an inviolable part 
of Indonesia and that international pressure to alter the situation was an unjustified 
imposition upon Indonesia, Alatas's book revealed him to be among the coterie of 
government officials who, in the early 1990s, unsuccessfully urged Suharto to accord 
some sort of special status to East Timor as a way of diffusing international criticism.41 
Habibie's offer of autonomy in 1998 was therefore not representative of totally new 
thinking within the Indonesian government.42 However, while Alatas might have 
supported some type of accommodation with the Timorese nationalists, he totally 
opposed Habibie's ultimate offer to East Timor posing a choice between significant 
autonomy and outright independence. 3 
Alatas's description of how Habibie presented his decision on independence to 
the Indonesian Cabinet on January 27, 1999 reveals a great deal about the functioning of 
the Indonesian government. There was a compelling logic to Habibie's decision, namely 
that there seemed little reason for Indonesia to continue financing East Timor during a 
transitional autonomy period only to have the territory leave the Republic at a later date. ' 
Giving independence to East Timor would also remove a great drain on the national 
41
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budget. In fact, Alatas stated that Habibie encountered no outright ministerial 
opposition to his proposal in January, even from the military.4 This lack of opposition 
was partially explained by the mindset of Alatas and other Indonesian officials, few of 
whom believed the Timorese would vote to leave the Republic. Indeed, according to 
Alatas, Indonesian bureaucrats devoted much less time to contingency planning for East 
Timor's independence than to crafting an autonomy package acceptable to the 
international community that was not applicable to other restive provinces within 
Indonesia.47 The potential concerns of the Timorese seemed to factor little in the analysis 
of Indonesian government officials during much of the Popular Consultation, rather, the 
Habibie Administration was more concerned with massaging international opinion and 
preventing the "balkanization" of Indonesia. 
Opposition to the independence option for East Timor did exist within the 
government of Indonesia, a situation of which Habibie and Alatas were well aware. It 
was in order to soothe this opposition, Alatas explained, that the government constrained 
him with "an extremely rigid and narrow brief regarding acceptable security 
arrangements for the Popular Consultation.48 This brief was ultimately adhered to, as 
under the May 5 Agreement, security was to be the responsibility of the TNI and police, 
rather than an international force.49 Alatas recalled that he was fully cognizant of the 
poor security situation in East Timor in 1998 and 1999, and he must have known that 
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allowing the TNI to maintain its presence in the territory was inviting trouble. However, 
in Alatas's view, the greatest threat to peace in East Timor came not from the TNI, but 
from the Timorese themselves. Alatas recalled that his thoughts contained a great deal of 
foreboding, as he believed that the losing side of the ballot would never accept the 
results. If the pro-independence side lost, Alatas opined, then they would resume their 
guerrilla campaign, whereas the success of the independence option would lead its 
opponents to commit mass violence; either way, post-ballot violence was inevitable.50 
This did not mean Alatas denied the existence of TNI collusion with the militias, but he 
also insisted that this collusion resulted more from ambivalence than malevolence or 
planning.51 At the worst, the TNI engaged in a "misguided" policy of encouraging the 
militias, but Alatas felt by doing so they were taking advantage of a situation already 
bordering on civil war, rather than creating the atmosphere themselves. 
By August 30, Alatas had begun to suspect that Timorese support for the 
autonomy option was not as strong as many in the government, especially in the military, 
believed. Despite this pessimism, Alatas still confessed himself "painfully surprised" 
when the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence, a sentiment doubtless 
shared by a great deal of the Indonesian Administration.53 As the territory descended into 
violence, Alatas found himself following the Indonesian government's line that no 
foreign peacekeepers would be permitted in East Timor. Yet even as he did so, Alatas 
insisted that he felt increasingly doubtful that the TNI could control the situation. He 
thought that even Habibie had lost confidence in the military, but that the President 
50
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deferred to Wiranto, who refused for weeks to countenance the presence of peacekeepers 
on Indonesian soil.54 The fact that Indonesia's top general could effectively stymie his 
President's preferences says a great deal about the power dynamics of the Habibie 
Administration, as it was only when Wiranto stopped his opposition that the government, 
with Alatas as its spokesman, acquiesced to a Chapter VII peacekeeping deployment.55 
Alatas thus saw his "worst fears become reality" in East Timor, with the territory 
dissolving into inevitable violence and Indonesia's international reputation torn to 
shreds.56 
The Journalist Narrative 
In 1999, journalists could travel throughout East Timor with far less interference 
than in the past. However, they were still constrained by the fact that the militias, and 
often the TNI, considered them little more than proponents of independence, and thus 
potentially subject to the same harsh measures that were enacted against Timorese 
opponents of integration.57 Nevertheless, international journalists in East Timor offered 
Ibid., p. 219. Habibie's resistance to peacekeepers would not save his political career, which 
was finished in a great deal because of the Indonesian nationalist backlash over the "loss" of East Timor; 
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valuable commentary on events in 1999. This section examines two distinct trends in 
journalistic coverage of the Popular Consultation, both of which reflect continuities with 
previously discussed media coverage of East Timor. The first trend, which was prevalent 
before the actual ballot on August 30, 1999, witnessed debates over whether East Timor 
was a viable independent country, and whether the violence presaging the ballot was a 
sign of incipient civil war. Such coverage mirrored concerns that had been articulated in 
1975. The second trend, which arose after the militias began their greatest terror 
campaign against the Timorese population in September 1999, recalled editorial coverage 
following the Santa Cruz massacre, which had analyzed events in East Timor in the 
context of the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War. In 1999, the editorial 
temptation was to compare international responses to the massacres in Kosovo and in 
East Timor, thus establishing a debate on the uses of humanitarian intervention. A 
fascinating example of this dynamic was found in the editorial pages of The New York 
Times, which witnessed a confrontation between international affairs experts about the 
proper use of humanitarian intervention, and whether the situation in East Timor 
represented the opportunity to advance respect for international human rights. 
Echoes of the Past: Viability and Civil Conflict 
As in 1975, editorial coverage of the benefits of integration showed a clear 
discrepancy between reporters on the ground and their editors in 1999. In the 1970s, 
editorials in the Far Eastern Economic Review criticized the Suharto regime for failing to 
act aggressively enough to prevent the existence of a "Communist" East Timor. The 
2007).There was also a great deal of violence directed against Indonesian journalists by both the Indonesian 
military and militias; David T. Hill, p. 45 n. 96. 
119 
invasion was also supported by the Australian conservative magazine Quadrant, which 
accused those who supported East Timorese independence of coddling Communism and 
of incipient racism. Journalistic coverage of events in late 1975, which was almost 
totally dependent on sources provided by the Indonesians, also encouraged the 
assumption that the conflict was a long civil war between Fretilin and its opponents. 
Thus, a conflict that actually involved Indonesian troops was widely presented as an 
intra-Timorese war, albeit with one side receiving substantial Indonesian support. These 
two concerns—whether East Timor was a "viable" independent country and whether the 
mass militia violence was actually civil war—re-emerged in coverage of the Popular 
Consultation. 
On February 18, 1999, FEER reporter Dan Murphy published an article on coffee 
cultivation in East Timor, which concluded that the territory did, indeed, possess at least 
one industry with proven profitability and huge growth potential, an industry that could, 
C O 
in theory, do a great deal to make an independent East Timor economically viable. 
According to Murphy, coffee cultivation was by far the largest industry in East Timor, 
occupying at least one-fifth of the population. It could also be quite profitable, with 
economists estimating that the coffee industry would bring at least US$30 million into 
the territory in 1999.59 This industry was also well-integrated into the global economy. 
The military monopolies that controlled coffee production for most of the occupation, 
which had been so criticized by George Aditjondro, had been dismantled in the mid-
1990s allowing East Timorese farmers to sell their products on the open market. Murphy 
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reported this new freedom meant farmers had been motivated to open new land to 
cultivation and to take better care of their crops, which had often been neglected under 
the Indonesian monopoly system. In addition, East Timorese coffee farmers had played 
the international market well, joining the National Cooperative Business Association of 
the United States and quickly obtaining an organic certificate for their coffee, all of 
which translated, concluded Murphy, into rising incomes. East Timor's coffee was in 
demand and its farmers had proven their ability to navigate the international marketplace, 
resulting in both increased profits and production. The coffee industry in East Timor, in 
Murphy's estimation, was well-placed to provide needed funds to the Timorese 
government, whether autonomous or independent.60 
Ten days before the ballot, Murphy's editors at the Far Eastern Economic Review 
issued an editorial in which they recommended that the East Timorese accept Indonesia's 
autonomy package, rather than vote for independence.61 While admitting that "in a more 
perfect world we would champion sovereignty for every community," they concluded 
that East Timor lacked the means for independent economic survival. The territory was, 
the FEER editors argued, too dependent on agriculture and lacking in proven natural 
resources to survive as an independent entity, and, while Indonesia's rule had 
undoubtedly been "brutal," that country also had proven itself capable of delivering 
economic development to East Timor. The Indonesian government's offer of autonomy 
was, FEER's editors felt, extremely "reasonable," and an excellent opportunity for the 
This article may also be read alongside Murphy's "Local Hero," discussed previously, whose 
profile of Oscar Lima suggested that there were indigenous entrepreneurs poised to take advantage of new 
business opportunities that would result from independence. 
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Timorese to achieve a measure of political autonomy while maintaining ties with the 
more robust Indonesian economy. 
With the province of East Timor apparently dissolving into chaos following the 
September announcement of the results of the Popular Consultation, it was important to 
ask what type of environment would greet any peacekeepers. A renewed civil war in 
East Timor would certainly not encourage the dispatch of such a force. Yet, at least for 
readers of The Economist, the perception was that peacekeepers going into East Timor 
would be entering a disaster zone, with rampaging militias and Indonesian troops ready to 
create a bloodbath. Such coverage had begun in April 1999, when The Economist 
reported that optimism suggesting that the Popular Consultation would proceed smoothly 
was being dashed by the depredations of the militias. The same article further reported 
that Gusmao was calling for a "popular insurrection" against the militias should 
Indonesian troops fail to contain the violence. Such reporting could only bolster 
impressions, which Indonesia was actively trying to encourage, that East Timor was 
sliding steadily into anarchy. 4 In September, that impression was further bolstered. 
According to "The dangers in East Timor," any peacekeeping force would be entering "a 
humanitarian mess," not only confronting a devastated territory and brutalized 
population, but also 20,000 Indonesia troops "of varying loyalties" and likely resentful of 
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an armed foreign presence in their country. The Economist also predicted that pro-
independence Timorese would use the cover of an armed humanitarian deployment in 
order to settle scores with actual and suspected militia members. Any peacekeeping 
force entering East Timor, in other words, would find a logistical, emotional, and 
nationalist nightmare. It was not difficult to escape the impression, after reading this 
article that it was best to leave East Timor to its own devices. 
To Intervene or Not to Intervene 
As had been the case following the Santa Cruz massacre, editorial opinion on the 
situation in East Timor in 1999 was heavily influenced by concurrent circumstances. In 
1991 and 1992, the end of the Cold War and the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in the 
Persian Gulf War framed the East Timor question in the media; both events undercut 
Indonesia's claims to East Timor. In 1999, editorialists and columnists were preoccupied 
with the parallels between Kosovo and East Timor, and especially with why it had been 
acceptable for the West to intervene in the former, but apparently not the latter, despite 
similar circumstances. This section examines three editorials that appeared in The New 
York Times from September 11 to September 15, 1999. These articles, by Stanley 
Hoffmann, Ronald Steel, and Thomas L. Friedman, all struggled with the similarities 
between Kosovo and East Timor and whether the U.S. should militarily intervene in 
en 
every case of mass human rights violations. 
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On September 11, 1999, Stanley Hoffmann, professor of international relations at 
Harvard University, published "Principles in the Balkans, but Not in East Timor?" This 
article inaugurated a debate within The New York Times on whether there were 
similarities between the Kosovo and East Timor situations and, if so, what the proper 
international response to the violence in East Timor should be. For his part, Hoffmann 
perceived compelling similarities between events in Kosovo and East Timor, namely that 
they confronted the international community with a choice between whether to privilege 
national sovereignty over the protection of human rights.68 For Hoffmann, the West's 
eventual forceful response to the Kosovo situation represented "a new standard" in 
international relations, "that no state was allowed to commit gross human rights 
violations even on its own territory" with impunity. In both Kosovo and East Timor, 
Hoffmann continued, "quasi-genocidal violence" demanded a forceful international 
response in the name of human rights and the fact that the international community had 
intervened militarily in Kosovo meant that such intervention should also take place in 
East Timor. Indeed, according to Hoffmann, East Timor in 1999 represented an even 
more compelling case for humanitarian intervention than Kosovo because arguments in 
favour of national sovereignty could not properly be applied to East Timor. Unlike 
Serbia in Kosovo, Hoffmann pointed out, Indonesian control over East Timor was illegal 
and unjustified. Therefore, to act as if it was necessary to get Indonesia's permission to 
experience given that he thought the inhabitants of East Timor were called "East Timorians," rather than 
"East Timorese"; Maureen Dowd, "Trust but Verify," The New York Times, September 15, 1999, p. A29. 
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dispatch a peacekeeping force to East Timor made the international community's 
"commitment to human rights... [look] scandalously selective."69 It was incumbent upon 
the United Nations to take forceful action to guarantee East Timor's security, not only 
because of the Kosovo precedent of privileging human rights over sovereignty, but 
because East Timor represented a case where arguments about sovereign immunity did 
not even apply. To intervene in Kosovo in the name of human rights, argued Hoffmann, 
mandated intervention in the analogous situation in East Timor. 
The day after Hoffmann's article appeared, The New York Times published an 
editorial by Ronald Steel, a professor of international relations at the University of 
Southern California. Steel's article, entitled "East Timor Isn't Kosovo," forcefully 
disagreed with Hoffmann's premise that an armed international response to Serbian 
depredations in Kosovo represented a new paradigm in international relations, one that 
called for similar intervention in East Timor. In fact, Steel argued, there was no new 
international consensus on humanitarian intervention and, furthermore, while the 
situation in East Timor represented a much "stronger" case for intervention than had been 
the case in Kosovo, a peacekeeping force should not be dispatched to the territory.70 This 
was the case, Steel believed, because the premise that the situations in East Timor and 
Kosovo were analogous was false. Serbia, he wrote, was a "puny" country that had no 
direct bearing on American interests. The United States, according to Steel, had not gone 
into Kosovo for humanitarian reasons, but to contain the Balkan conflict and to prove 
69
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NATO's continuing relevance in the post-Cold War world. Intervention against Serbia 
could, therefore, take place "relatively cheaply," with massive public support, and with 
little chance of long-term damage to the United States' wider economic and political 
needs. Indonesia, by contrast, was, according to Steel, a major component of 
international political and economic systems and thus could not be so readily confronted 
by American power. Indonesia was the world's fourth most populous country, a major 
American trading partner and strategic ally, and possessed a military capability that 
Serbia would have envied. Military action against Serbia, in other words, had entailed 
little risk, while action against Indonesia carried great economic, political, and strategic 
drawbacks. Humanitarian intervention, Steel concluded, should thus remain "the 
exception rather than the rule" and should certainly not be undertaken against Indonesia. 
Such realism, he admitted, was "deeply regrettable on moral grounds," but was 
nevertheless mandated by this case.71 
Three days after Steel's article appeared arguing against intervention in East 
Timor on realist grounds, Thomas L. Friedman's "The Four Questions" presented its own 
version of the proper international response to the bloodshed in East Timor. Like Steel, 
Friedman adopted a realist stance towards humanitarian intervention, but he arrived at a 
cautious rationale for American action.72 Friedman, like Stanley Hoffmann, argued from 
the premise that the Kosovo and East Timor situations were analogous and concluded 
that the reasons to intervene in Kosovo also applied to East Timor. Friedman discussed 
these reasons under the rubric of his titular four questions, which focused on U.S. 
71
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strategic interests, cost, effectiveness, and time commitment. In Kosovo, according to 
Friedman, the United States had been presented with a strategic problem that NATO was 
able to confront relatively cheaply via an air war and with a fair expectation of achieving 
a sustainable peace through the introduction of a multinational peacekeeping force. 
American intervention in East Timor, Friedman argued, followed a parallel track. It was 
strategically justifiable in that the stability of the archipelago would be increased by the 
removal of the East Timor occupation. Intervention could also be conducted relatively 
cheaply from the American perspective, with the U.S. providing logistical and 
intelligence support to an UN-sanctioned force, in lieu of troops. Friedman further 
argued that an independent East Timor would be self-sustainable. And, finally, there was 
no reason, he predicted, to suppose that American involvement in East Timor would 
necessitate the United States taking its focus away from any other problem areas. Using 
realist criteria, Friedman came to the conclusion that military intervention in East Timor 
was justifiable on realist grounds. 
The Truth Commission's Narrative 
In several ways, the CAVR concluded, 1998 was a fortuitous year for East Timor. 
With the fall of Suharto and the crippling of the New Order, an autonomy package for 
East Timor could be openly considered within the Indonesian government. President 
Habibie's decision to let East Timor become independent, while more pragmatic than 
altruistic, was nevertheless more generous than any previous offer to the Timorese by the 
government of Indonesia.73 In addition, the Timorese resistance was at the apogee of its 
unity and organization, with the Concelho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense (National 
73
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Council of Timorese Resistance, CNRT) replacing the CNRM in early 1998. 
Furthermore, the reputation of resistance diplomacy had been bolstered by Jose Ramos-
Horta's reception of the Nobel Peace Prize and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 
decision to make the resolution of the East Timor conflict a personal priority.75 
Unfortunately, the May 5 Agreement that capped this revitalized diplomacy was, the 
CAVR concluded, inherently flawed by its provisions assigning the maintenance of 
security during the Popular Consultation to the TNI.76 While such an accommodation 
might have been necessary to secure Indonesian approval of the Agreement, it also 
opened the door to a security situation that resulted in the greatest upsurge of violence 
and upheaval in East Timor that the island had seen since the disasters of the 1970s.77 
This violence, committed overwhelmingly by the militias and the TNI was, the CAVR 
found, the culmination of Indonesia's long-term occupation strategies, especially that of 
stoking intra-Timorese violence. Regarding the events of 1999, the Commission also 
disputed the assumption in the media that anarchy had taken hold of the territory. In fact, 
the CAVR found, there were clear patterns and aims to the militia rampage and much of 
Chegal's coverage of the Popular Consultation period was devoted to revealing its 
underlying structure. 
The Epitome of Occupation Policy 
Intra-Timorese violence was, of course, not a new feature of modern East Timor's 
history. Such violence, encouraged at times by Indonesia, was present from the earliest 
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days of decolonization and reached its zenith with the use by ABRI of Timorese 
"Partisans" preceding the invasion.78 However, the first real precursor to the militias of 
the late 1990s had been the establishment in 1976 of Timorese paramilitary forces 
subordinate to ABRI, which were designed to combat Fretilin; these forces were 
disbanded in 1978.79 Despite sporadic attempts by the Indonesians to reactivate 
indigenous paramilitary cells throughout the 1980s, the most direct ancestor of the 
militias was Gadapaksi, a paramilitary group formed in Dili by Kopassus in the mid-
1990s with the aim of combating the clandestine resistance.80 Many future militia leaders 
had been members of Gadapaksi.81 "In many ways," East Timor's truth commission 
concluded, "the formation of militias [from 1998 to 1999] was the culmination of the 
strategy of militarisation" practiced by the Indonesian military in East Timor from the 
earliest days of the occupation.82 
The context in which the first militias were mobilized by the Indonesian military 
is instructive. According to the CAVR, June 1998 saw multiple demonstrations 
throughout East Timor calling for self-determination and independence. Almost 
immediately, these demonstrators were confronted by militia groups. The CAVR found 
that these early militias had been mobilized by the TNI, which found itself facing a 
grounds well of pro-independence sentiment. From the military's perspective, the 
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situation was spiralling out of control; the demonstrations had to be confronted quickly 
and ruthlessly, but there were too few troops in East Timor to do so, and the TNI wanted 
to downplay its role in the suppression of the demonstrations. Thus, the CAVR 
concluded, the TNI had used pre-existing Timorese paramilitary organizations to act 
against the pro-independence demonstrators due to its desire for deniability and because 
of personnel shortages.84 Militia violence began well before autonomy was even 
suggested for East Timor, as a response to the specific circumstances of June 1998, 
although the militias thus created were easily adaptable for anti-independence activism in 
1999.85 
Indeed, according to the CAVR, the militias were always central to the military's 
plans to create a pro-autonomy vote in East Timor. The four generals serving in 
Habibie's Cabinet, the Commission concluded, would only have agreed to the President's 
proposal to offer East Timor a vote on independence if they had felt assured that the 
Timorese would never exercise that option. The existence and successful employment 
of militias would certainly have played a role in such a calculation. Yet, any anti-
independence campaign had to be carefully managed to offer the TNI maximum 
deniability. The Indonesian military in East Timor had found itself subject to an 
"unprecedented" degree of international scrutiny as the August ballot approached; by 
August 30, 1999, the CAVR reported, the United Nations Assistance Mission in East 
Timor (UNAMET) had accredited at least 600 journalists and 2,300 foreign observers to 
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monitor the Popular Consultation. The necessity of preserving positive international 
opinion thus mandated the use of Timorese militias to secure Indonesian aims. 
However, in practice, the TNI proved completely unable to maintain distance 
between itself and the militias: military support for the militias was public, insistent, and 
undeniable. Chega! extensively documented links between the Indonesian military and 
the militias. On the ground, the TNI formally incorporated the militias into the territorial 
military structure, with TNI officers attending militia inauguration ceremonies and rallies, 
giving speeches supporting militia actions, and, on occasion, quartering militia members 
in TNI barracks. The Commission also found evidence of operational collusion 
between the TNI and militias, with Indonesian military figures consistently helping 
Timorese militias prepare for their operations, providing them with arms and 
ammunition, and helping the militias dispose of bodies. Furthermore, these actions 
were not confined to one locality or practiced by only a few military units; this wide-
spread pattern characterized TNI-militia relations throughout the territory. This meant, 
the C AVR concluded, that the militias were an integral part of "a TNI plan" for the 
province, one that the military could not cover up.90 
Aims and Patterns 
The major aim of the militias was to ensure that East Timor voted for autonomy, 
not independence, in August 1999. This was to be achieved through intimidation, 
murder, and expulsion, all of which had become regular militia tactics before they were 
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practiced on a province-wide scale in September 1999. A key goal of the militias' was to 
create the impression of civil war, allowing Indonesia to claim that the militias were 
merely pro-autonomy groups defending themselves against marauding pro-independence 
activists. Almost every militia action, so the Indonesians claimed, was the response to 
provocation on the part of the CNRT.91 However, the CAVR found little evidence of 
such provocation on the part of the resistance. Chega! recorded only a few killings by 
pro-independence activists in the summer of 1999, as well as 22 killings and seven 
disappearances committed by Falintil in 1999.92 However, these acts of verifiable 
resistance violence paled in comparison to those committed by the militias and TNI, who 
in the same period were estimated to have murdered between 1,400 and 1,500 people. 
Furthermore, the Commission pointed out, Falintil had put itself into cantonments during 
the ballot, and remained there even at the height of militia violence in September 1999, 
thus giving the lie to the idea that two armed groups were fighting for control over East 
Timor.94 Reading the CAVR, it is clear that the TNI used the militias as its proxies, 
hoping to create the impression of mass chaos in East Timor in order to disguise its own 
responsibility for the human rights violations. A perusal of media coverage shows that 
this impression of anarchy in East Timor at times found a receptive audience. However, 
the CAVR found little evidence that the CNRT engaged in a program of intimidation and 
provocation, and concluded that the resistance was the victim of targeted violence.95 
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In the course of its work, the C AVR found definite patterns to militia violence 
during the Popular Consultation period. These patterns existed in terms of both the 
timing and scope of the violence. The truth commission discovered, for instance, that 
violence had been heaviest at certain crucial times. The first major spike in violence 
occurred during April 1999, as Indonesia and Portugal were concluding the negotiations 
that would result in the May 5 Agreement.96 Violence at this time interfered with these 
negotiations and sent a warning to the resistance. Violent actions by militias markedly 
tapered off during the UNAMET period from early June to late August, as a heavy and 
widespread foreign presence in the territory made it difficult to disguise collusion 
between the militias and TNI.97 However, once voting concluded, violence increased 
again and then exploded out of all proportion when the election results were announced 
on September 4, at which point "TNI soldiers and police... [took] to the streets in towns 
and villages across the territory, firing their weapons, attacking supporters of 
independence, and burning houses and public buildings."98 Two days later, President 
Habibie declared martial law in East Timor, far too late to stop the greatest and most 
gratuitous explosions of violence in the entire Popular Consultation period. 
The period following the ballot witnessed, the CAVR reiterated, the "final and 
most comprehensive phase of the violence" in East Timor during 1999.10° Tactics which 
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had been practiced in isolation now occurred throughout the province. While tens of 
thousands of Timorese had been displaced before the ballot, hundreds of thousands 
would be driven from their homes in September 1999.101 And although before, militias 
and the TNI had generally targeted CNRT activists, violence after the ballot also 
routinely engulfed those activists' friends and families.102 Previously unscathed groups, 
such as the clergy, were now exposed to attack. The CAVR even recorded cases of 
entire communities being targeted because they were perceived as being pro-
independence or because a major CNRT figure either lived in the community or was from 
there.104 Beginning in September 1999, the CAVR chronicled what can only be 
described as a frenzy of massacre and destruction carried out by the TNI and militias. 
Following their defeat in the Popular Consultation, these groups undertook a massive 
campaign against anyone they considered to be pro-independence. This purge affected 
all of Timorese society, and was seemingly driven by the idea of inflicting extreme 
suffering on those who had voted for independence, as well as their relatives and 
communities. Indeed, this suffering was to extend to the entire territory, as the militias 
achieved the near-complete destruction of East Timor's economy. Yet, the CAVR 
made clear, the violence was neither unplanned nor random, but was, in fact, deliberately 
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and coldly orchestrated by the TNI and the militias, and conformed to discernable 
patterns and goals. 
Conclusion 
In 1999, East Timor was given the opportunity to participate in an act of self-
determination. This was only made possible by the fall of Suharto and the 
acknowledgement, within most of the Indonesian government, that the integration of East 
Timor had caused a great deal of harm to the Republic's international image. Yet a 
significant portion of Indonesia's ruling elite, especially in the military, was reluctant to 
allow East Timor to achieve independence. To prevent this, it sponsored the creation of 
Timorese militias, which were supported by the TNI in a terror campaign against the 
province's population. As East Timor's truth commission made clear, there were definite 
operational and logistical links between the TNI and militias, and the violence that 
levelled East Timor in September 1999 was the predictable and natural outcome of these 
links. 
Examination of the other narrative strands of the events of 1999 East Timor 
reveals both continuity and change. Journalistic coverage, for instance, showed a marked 
distrust of Indonesian claims to neutrality regarding the outcome of the Popular 
Consultation, and generally reported on the close association between the TNI and 
militias. However, media coverage of the 1999 ballot also demonstrated preoccupations 
with the viability of an independent East Timor and with the possibility that the territory 
was about to dissolve into civil war, both issues that had been central in journalists' 
reporting on East Timor since the 1970s. From the Indonesian perspective, KPP HAM 
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challenged not only the TNFs protestations of innocence regarding support for the 
militias, but the very justification for the occupation itself. KPP HAM's conclusions 
were so explosive that Indonesia's Attorney-General suppressed its report until March 
2001, Nationalistic tomes like that of Ali Alatas dominated Indonesian perceptions of the 
events of 1999. And, for the East Timorese, the Popular Consultation period could only 
be bittersweet. The early decade had seen the Santa Cruz massacre, which brought 
international attention to the situation in East Timor. In 1996, two East Timorese won 
the Nobel Peace Prize and used the opportunity to call for a comprehensive peace with 
Indonesia. Yet, when independence was finally achieved, it came at a very high cost, 
with the Indonesian military engineering the creation of a devastated territory and deeply 
traumatized people. The new country's leadership, which in many ways had never 
considered the possibility such devastation could occur, was faced with a gargantuan task 
of rebuilding and reconciliation. The East Timorese were now fully in control of their 
own narrative, but at tremendous cost. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
This thesis analyzes and places in historical perspective the conclusions of East 
Timor's Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, which has become the 
major new source for the history of the occupation period, comparing the Commission's 
findings with media reports, memoirs and other documents from the period in question. 
These other sources were clustered together to illustrate major patterns, which ultimately 
evolved into "narratives." For the purposes of this paper, four separate narratives were 
examined. The first, the East Timorese narrative, was composed of memoirs, interviews, 
manifestos, and speeches. The Indonesian narrative, the second, was based on diplomatic 
correspondence and speeches, government documents, memoirs, and academic works. 
The third pattern, the journalists' narrative, was composed of news reports from a wide 
variety of newspapers and magazines from the U.S. and other countries. The final 
narrative, that of East Timor's truth commission, was derived from the CAVR's massive 
Chega!. This report is the most complete record to date of the whole of the occupation, a 
chronicle of what happened to the people of East Timor from 1974 to 1999. Each of 
these narrative strands contained its own patterns, concerns, and conflicts, yet each also 
formed an indelible part of the history of occupied East Timor. 
To facilitate analysis, this paper focused on the three major events of modern East 
Timor's history. The first event was the Indonesian invasion of December 7, 1975, itself 
preceded by civil war within East Timor. Following the invasion, Fretilin forces and 
much of the Timorese population fled into the hills, where they remained in deteriorating 
circumstances until Indonesian bombardments and their own political instability forced 
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the mass surrender of the population in the late 1970s. This population was then 
subjected to a horrific famine, due in great part to the occupation practices of the 
Indonesian military forces. The second major event analyzed was the Santa Cruz 
massacre of November 12, 1991, when a crowd of Timorese demonstrators was fired into 
by Indonesian troops. The killings, which took place before the eyes of the international 
media, stoked international criticism against the occupation and ensured that the situation 
in East Timor remained imprinted on the world's conscience. The final event, the 
Popular Consultation of 1999, saw the East Timorese given the opportunity for self-
determination. The consequent balloting resulted in a landslide victory for those 
Timorese advocating independence, however, the results were marred by the destruction 
of the territory by Indonesian-sponsored militias that occurred after the results of the 
voting were announced. Together, these three events encompass the experience of the 
East Timorese under Indonesian occupation; this examination of the conclusions of the 
CAVR reveals a great deal about the shades of meaning emerging within each of the 
narratives. 
Assessing events during the years from 1975 to 1979, the CAVR concluded that 
the death toll suffered by the Timorese resulted from a combination of Indonesian war 
crimes and Fretilin's ideological preoccupations. It had been well-known that ABRI's 
targeting of civilians and their crops caused starvation, however, the CAVR was almost 
as scathing in treating the impact on the Timorese living behind Falintil lines of the 
Fretilin administration's refusal to allow the population to surrender and its self-defeating 
and suicidal purges. Many East Timorese had already recorded their disappointment with 
the Fretilin regime of the 1970s, but the CAVR offered by far the most public and well-
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documented treatment of the manner in which the policies of the anti-Indonesian 
resistance combined with ABRI atrocities to create a lethal cycle. By focusing so much 
on intra-Timorese violence at this time and apportioning blame to all sides, the CAVR 
doubtless hoped to speed reconciliation among the East Timorese, many of whom 
remained scarred by the memories of the Civil War and its aftermath. 
The events of the 1970s were also notable for the ability of Indonesia to control 
the narrative of the events unfolding in East Timor. The Suharto regime was able to 
convince many foreign governments, among them the governments of Australia and the 
United States, that an independent East Timor represented a great threat to the anti-
Communist Republic of Indonesia, and, by extension, to Western interests in Southeast 
Asia. The U.S. government, for its part, had little interest in or knowledge about East 
Timor, and proved more than willing to accept Indonesia's version of events in the 
territory, a version that led, inexorably, to annexation. Journalists had little problem 
questioning Indonesian insistences that an independent East Timor would be a 
Communist satellite, or that the Timorese people overwhelmingly desired integration 
with Indonesia, but were constrained by the fact that they depended on Indonesia for the 
bulk of their information about events in East Timor. While reporters might be critical of 
Indonesian aims, their stories still dealt with themes chosen by the Indonesians, 
especially pertinent being those of civil conflict, Indonesia's reluctant entry into 
Timorese politics, and the difficulties that would be faced by East Timor as an 
independent nation. The Indonesian narrative thus dominated 1970s coverage of and 
perceptions toward the situation in East Timor. It was only with the Santa Cruz massacre 
that Indonesia's narrative lost a great deal of its appeal to an international audience. 
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The CAVR's treatment of the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991 is fascinating for how 
the Commission contextualized the shooting. In Chega!, the importance of the massacre 
was shown by the patterns it represented. The authors of the report clearly argued that 
Indonesia bore ultimate and sole responsibility for the massacre and that the regime's 
attempts to hold its military personnel responsible were halfhearted at best and a 
whitewash at worst. Chega! also criticized Indonesia for its treatment of the wounded 
and for refusing to assist the CAVR in determining the fate of those Timorese who 
disappeared after the massacre. However, the truth commission's primary focus when 
describing Santa Cruz was on the ways that the event fit into the patterns of the 
occupation as a whole. The CAVR especially emphasized how the demonstration that 
had preceded the killing was representative of the new clandestine resistance strategy, 
where young East Timorese, usually students, staged demonstrations before an 
international audience with the aim of showing that they were not reconciled to 
Indonesian rule. This new strategy was itself predicated on the fact that, following its 
military defeat in the late 1970s, the anti-Indonesian resistance decided to focus on 
achieving diplomatic recognition, with the aim of securing self-determination for East 
Timor. It was these two processes, which were crucial to the history of East Timor as a 
whole, which preoccupied the CAVR and its treatment of the Santa Cruz massacre, not 
the fate of the disappeared of Santa Cruz, which, while tragic, affected only the families 
of the missing. 
The Santa Cruz massacre was important because it demolished Indonesian 
attempts to justify their occupation of East Timor. The regime did this by describing the 
development projects it had undertaken in East Timor, which included the construction of 
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roads, schools, and hospitals. These achievements, while undeniable, often had a military 
component and were almost always undertaken for strategic ends or to provide the 
military monopolies with a revenue source. Further, the inefficiencies and inequalities of 
the occupation were commented on by Indonesians themselves, especially academics, 
who criticized Indonesia's development policies and even the occupation itself. And 
following the emotional first-hand testimony of reporters on the scene at Santa Cruz, 
Indonesia's boasts of modernization in East Timor availed it little in the international 
community. After the end of the Cold War made it difficult to appeal to anti-
Communism to justify its policies in East Timor, Indonesia depended upon its 
developmental policies to maintain international acquiescence of the occupation. Santa 
Cruz proved in a very public way that the East Timorese themselves were not appeased 
by these arguments, and made it more difficult for Western governments to rationalize 
their support for the regime's policies in East Timor, although they still managed to do 
so. The Santa Cruz massacre, then, witnessed the break-down of the Indonesian narrative 
of East Timor. After 1991, anything Indonesia claimed about East Timor was tainted by 
the blood of Santa Cruz. 
The CAVR's description of the Popular Consultation period, from 1998 to 1999, 
is even more concerned with patterns of violence than its treatment of the Santa Cruz 
massacre. This was the case because the events of 1999 superficially resembled mass 
chaos, with militias and their Indonesian allies running amok throughout East Timor, 
laying waste and murdering. However, when examined by the truth commission, the 
violence of the militias demonstrated clear patterns and planning. Violent periods were 
time-sensitive and early targets were often pro-independence activists, rather than whole 
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communities; militia violence before September 1999, while endemic, was often 
selective. The militias, which the CAVR considered in many ways to be the epitome of 
Indonesian occupation policies, were most destructive, the Commission found, after the 
results of the ballot were announced on September 4, 1999. It was at that point that 
violence exploded throughout the territory, now targeting not only CNRT activists but 
also those communities who supported them. This violence, while extreme, nevertheless 
conformed to many of the basic patterns and planning that had characterized the early 
actions of the militias in 1998. Despite the impression the TNI hoped to create, one of 
spontaneous civil conflict and mass chaos, the CAVR found instead that the atrocities of 
1999 were discernable, explicable, and quantifiable. 
In many ways, the other narratives of the Popular Consultation were themselves 
culminations of previous treatments of East Timor. East Timorese society, for instance, 
remained deeply divided, not only over whether or not East Timor should be 
independent, but over the unmediated traumas of the mid-1970s. The CNRT's leaders, 
who were well aware of these divisions, sought to assuage the concerns of the pro-
autonomy camp with promises of a political solution to their concerns and appealed for 
reconciliation. Indeed, reconciliation became a major theme of independent East Timor's 
first government, driven as much by necessity as by choice. Meanwhile, Indonesia was 
also split over how to view the end of the occupation. One trend was to see the 
occupation as a criminal act, which culminated with TNI support for the militias in 1999. 
A second trend viewed the Popular Consultation as an almost farcical exercise, a series of 
missed opportunities and tragic misestimations. And for journalists, the Popular 
Consultation was the occasion for renewed debates over whether or not East Timor was a 
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viable independent entity, whether or not the violence was a civil war, and what the 
proper international response to the violence should be. Each of these trends paralleled 
previous coverage of the occupation. While few trusted the Indonesian narrative 
anymore, it was difficult to escape it once it had been framed. 
This thesis has shown that, while Chega! offers perhaps the most comprehensive 
description of occupied East Timor, its conclusions had many antecedents in the various 
narratives that came before it. These narratives, in dialogue with and in opposition to 
each other, formed the story of East Timor. The CAVR itself was concerned with 
describing the patterns of violations. One reason for this was simple conceptual 
mechanics: it was impossible to chronicle every event of a twenty-five-year period 
without resort to some type of rubric to organize the narrative and analysis. In order to 
explain how East Timor survived the occupation and became an independent nation, the 
East Timorese truth commission focused on those events and trends that led to 
independence. At times, this meant that the Commission favored the elaboration of 
processes over events, however, to do so was part of its mandate. The CAVR was also 
strongly focused on cases of intra-Timorese violence. This was a major advance in the 
popular narrative of East Timor, much of which had been written by activists who 
emphasized the heroic nature of the Timorese people's struggle against the Indonesian 
occupier, offering an endless catalogue of undoubtedly real and horrendous crimes that 
the Indonesians had committed against their Timorese subjects. The Commission, in 
contrast, focused on Timorese reconciliation. It could not afford to ignore the injuries 
that the East Timorese had inflicted upon themselves. To do so would not only have 
been against the Commission's mandate, but against finding the truth, which was the 
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ultimate aim of the CAVR, as it was felt that only through a full accounting would East 
Timor finally be able to move beyond its past. 
A final word remains to be said about the fate of the Commission for Reception, 
Truth, and Reconciliation's report. After receiving Chega! in 2005, the government of 
independent East Timor made many efforts to disassociate itself from the report. Perhaps 
dissatisfied with the truth commission's conclusions, or wary of its repercussions, the 
governments of East Timor and Indonesia established a joint truth commission, the 
Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) in 2005. The Commission of Truth and 
Friendship was hailed by its international advisors, Robert Evans and Alice Evans, as a 
great achievement in post-conflict resolution, as the two nations came together to "reveal 
the conclusive truth, heal the wounds, and contribute to future friendship." However, 
there were strong indications that the joint truth commission would be little more than a 
device for perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity to reshape the 
historical record to their advantage. General Wiranto, for instance, in testimony before 
the Commission of Truth and Friendship in May 2007, denied that the military had 
sponsored the creation of militias, stated that the violence of 1999 was the result of a 
Timorese civil war, and claimed that there had been no systematic violations of human 
rights in East Timor.2 This not only contradicted the most respected research on the 
events of 1999, but also conflicted with Indonesian data, not only from government 
1
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investigations, but also from military figures. If the Commission of Truth and 
Friendship was to provide, as its sponsors stated, the most comprehensive account of the 
occupation, such distortions give great cause for concern. Yet, even if the joint truth 
commission provides a more complete description of occupied East Timor than the 
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, the latter's importance in the 
narrative of independent East Timor is guaranteed. 
3
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